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Abstract
This thesis develops and tests a model of political representation based on the
participation and specialisation decisions of individual MEPs. Political
representation is determined by the institutional and party-political incentives
that guide legislative behaviour at different stages of the policy process.
Proportionality requirements, majority rule and intra-party politics affect whether
MEPs engage in different legislative activities in the European Parliament and
the extent to which they specialise in the policy areas that their national party
stands for. The model can be adapted to a wide range of legislative activities and
to different institutional environments.
At the decision-making stage, majority rule makes participation most
attractive to MEPs from party groups that are pivotal under the majority
thresholds required to pass legislation. In contrast, minority MEPs limit their
participation to the policy areas that are salient to their national party. In other
words, minority legislators are more responsive than majority MEPs.
In policy formulation, an auction system enforces a proportional allocation of
committee reports, which favours the representation of a broad range of values
and interests across the political spectrum. However, competition among party
groups affects who gets the most desirable reports. Open rule enforces a
distribution of salient reports in line with voting coalitions in the plenary and on
the committee floor. Within party groups, the leadership distributes reports in an
effort to maintain group cohesion. As a result, majority legislators who are loyal
to their party groups are more responsive than other MEPs.
Finally, in parliamentary oversight at Question-Time, party groups do not
have any gate-keeping powers. Also, national parties rather than party groups are
5
the primary actors in legislative-executive relations. MEPs without national party
ties to the Commission attribute a greater role to overseeing the executive in a
large range of policy areas than 'governing' MEPs. As a result, such 'opposition'
MEPs are better represented at this stage of the policy process but they specialise
less in salient policy areas.
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CHAPTER 1 - THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION
"Democracy is the government of the people, by the people, for the people"
(Abraham Lincoln)
Through its directives and regulations, the European Union I has become
the most important legislator in Europe. As Nugent (2003) points out, more than
60 percent of national legislation is now determined at the European level. Most
significantly, perhaps, the formal powers of the European Parliament have
increased immensely since the first direct European elections in 1979. Indeed,
with the creation and expansion of the co-decision procedure, the Parliament has
become an equal co-legislator with the Council of Ministers on a wide range of
issues (e.g. Hix, 2005).
This creeping 'parliamentarization' (Magnette, 2005; Rittberger, 2005)
affects both the political representation of European citizens and the legitimacy
of policymaking in the EU. With the increased influence of the European
Parliament, the question which MEPs have access to which policy areas has
taken on a significance that goes far beyond legislative organisation. As a result,
there is a burgeoning literature on the democratic performance of the European
Union and its member states (see Follesdal and Hix, 2005 for an overview).
Much of this research has concluded that government of and for the people in the
EU, and in the European Parliament in particular, works moderately well at best
(e.g. Scharpf, 1999; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk and Franklin. 1996;
I In order to avoid confusion, European Union and European Community are abbreviated as EU
throughout this thesis.
2 As opposed to the European Parliament, which represents all European citizens and is staffed
with MIPs elected in pan-European elections, the Council of Ministers is composed of national
government ministers. which represent the member states.
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Carrubba, 2001; Bowler and Farrell, 1993; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999: 2000;
Thomassen and Schmitt 1997; Katz, 1997; 1999; Marsh and Wessels, 1997:
Wessels, 1999; Norris and Franklin, 1997; Weiler, 1995; Hayward, 1995). Others
contend that EU democracy does not fare badly considering the limited political
competences of the EU and the system of checks and balances instituted by
member state governments (e.g. Majone, 2000; Moravcsik, 2002).3
This thesis takes a different approach by investigating the conditions
under which the legislative behaviour of representatives in the European
Parliament reflects the political priorities of their national parties. What
motivates a broad cross-section of MEPs from various national parties to
participate in the EP (i.e. exercise government of the people) and to specialise in
the policy areas that their party stands for in public (i.e. government for the
people)? The model finds the answer to this question in the institutional and
party-political incentive structure at different stages of the policy process in the
European Parliament. The empirical part of the thesis quantifies the impact of
these incentives on the participation and specialisation decisions of individual
MEPs in policy formulation, decision-making and parliamentary oversight. To
what extent do MEPs specialise in the policy areas that their national party stands
for? And does the European Parliament represent the diversity of opinions
among European citizens at all stages of the legislative policy process?
These questions have profound implications for the linkage between
citizens and politics in Europe. As most existing research has shown, national
parties are the primary connection between European citizens and the EU (Reif
and Schmitt, 1980; Hix, 2002; Jun, 2003). Other things equal, if the preferences
3 Much of this research does not so much praise the representational performance of European
institutions as it raises doubts about the EU's claim to constitute a "government" in the traditional
sense of the term.
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of a wide range of parties are represented at all stages of the policy process,
government of the people occurs, which should increase the legitimacy of the
EP's legislative output. Similarly, government for the people takes place if MEPs
specialise in policy areas that correspond to the publicly stated political priorities
of their parties. Effective representation therefore requires "responsible parties"
whose elected members act to put the political programme of the party into
practice.
The model predicts the responsiveness of individual legislators and the
representativeness of parliamentary business as a function of institutional and
party-political incentives. With its focus on individual incentives at different
stages of the policy process, the model can easily be adapted to other political
systems or used to evaluate the impact of various parliamentary reform proposals
on political representation. Finally, the findings also have important implications
for the political direction that the European Union is going to take. What are the
prospects for political representation in an increasingly federal 'United States of
Europe'? Or is there, as some contend, a natural trade-off between policy-
effectiveness in a fully federal Europe and the democratic accountability of
parliamentary representation?
This chapter is organised in three parts. First, it provides a short overview
of the concept of political representation as used by political scientists and
practitioners throughout history. Second, it places the study in the context of the
wider contemporary literature. points out differences in how representation is
conceptualised across political systems and sets the stage for an alternative
conception of political representation based on the legislative behaviour of
16
individual representatives. Finally, the chapter identifies the mam research
question of the study and provides an overview of the remainder of the thesis.
I. The Role of Political Representation in Historical
Perspective: Legitimacy and Interest Articulation
This section provides a short overview of the historical evolution of views
about political representation. It is only with at least a minimum of historical
knowledge that we can understand the role of representation in contemporary
political theory. For those well versed in political history the following
discussion might seem rather crude. However, the point is not to provide a
comprehensive account of political representation throughout history. Others
have done that already (see for example Manin, 1997; Ankersmit, 2002). Rather,
the aim of this section is to present a short outline of different conceptions of
representation and set the context for the subsequent empirical study that forms
the core of this thesis.4
The structure of the discussion reflects the idea that political innovation is a
response to challenges to the status quo. According to this view, political thought
and practice evolve when existing arrangements are under pressure. Conversely,
the solutions that are eventually implemented are shaped by the particular
problem that prompted them in the first place (Ankersmit, 2002).5 Such an
argument of course, is highly functionalist, and not immune to criticism.
However, it is useful to outline the historical meaning of representation
according to the political roles it played at different points in time and in
different political systems.
4 This section draws considerably on Eulau (1978) and Ankersmit (2002).
S Along these lines, some have argued for instance that the nation-state is a product of societal
"modernization" (Gellner. 1983).
17
Table 1.1 illustrates that political representation has fulfilled radically
different, even contradictory, functions throughout history. Initially conceived to
ease the threat to direct democracy as a result of ever growing populations. it is
seen today as the only way to extend participation in political decision-making to
all citizens. Despite this apparent contradiction, representation has always
addressed the same two problems: a) the problem of political legitimacy and b)
the problem of interest articulation. By comparing the solution to these problems
we can trace the evolution of the concept of political representation across time
and space.
TABLE 1.1. CHANGING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATION
Period Place Legitimacy Interest Function
Articulation
Antiquity Greece Direct Democracy Individual Limit Direct Participation
Medieval Europe Impersonation Abstract 'whole' Limit Power of Monarchy
ts" Century Anglo- Trustee Constituency Act in Interest of Common
Saxon Good
Restoration Continental Delegation Individual Limit Social Division
Europe
Contemporary Europe Responsible Party Party Voter Act in Interest of Party
Voter
Contemporary Western Responsiveness & Multiple Ability to Respond to
Democracy Representativeness Constituents & Articulate
Societal Preferences
Representation as a political term first appears in the democratic city-states of
ancient Greece. This might seem surprising given that today we associate the
Greek polis with direct democracy. While this is certainly true, historical
scholarship has also established that a large share of public business in the Greek
city-states was carried out via a range of public offices occupied by
"representatives" of the polis (Larsen, 1955). Most administrative positions could
only be exercised once in a lifetime and were distributed by lot, which assured
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almost every citizen the right to occupy a public office of some kind at some
point in his life (Dahl, 1989).
This conception of representation IS of course entirely different from
contemporary meanings of the term. Representation in the Greek sense is a
means of limiting the participation of citizens in direct government (Eulau,
1978). It is designed to make direct democracy possible and does not carry any
benefits outside of this function. Elected offices are simply an instance of limited
direct citizen influence, which alone can be legitimate. In the political system of
ancient Greece, legitimacy derives from the process of direct democracy where
individuals articulate interests directly. Representation is a means to facilitate
direct democracy by limiting citizen participation where necessary.
For ancient Greeks, interest articulation and the legitimisation of rule
remained firmly rooted in the notion of direct democracy and political theory of
the time simply failed to register any qualitative difference between direct and
representative democracy. Incidentally, this misconception has stark
consequences for the ability of the system to adjust to the challenges posed by an
ever-growing population. Friedrich (1968) traces the decline of the polis to the
failure of ancient Greeks to understand representation as a means of extending
the power of government to larger populations.
In the early Anglo-Saxon medieval polity, representation assumes an entirely
different function characterized by a particular conception of legitimacy. Here,
representative institutions fulfil a dual role. First, they are of course a means of
power for the monarch, designed to facilitate the conservation of peace and
public administration while legitimising the authority of existing rule. Second.
however, they also serve to check the power of the monarch against the interests
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of Church and estates (Eulau, 1978). As Ankersmit (2002) points out, in the early
United States and 17th century England, there was less competition about who
should control the state as there was a united effort to check the power of the
sovereign or president .
Apart from its role within the political system of the time, representation in
the early Anglo-Saxon polity also features a peculiar notion of legitimacy based
upon impersonation. The King represents his realm, the Pope stands for the
whole of Christendom and the nobility for its estates. Each representative
impersonates a particular political entity in the common quest for political
consensus. However, as Eulau (1978) notes, a representational theory which only
asks who represents each whole does not provide an instrument for dealing with
competing claims to authority. In other words, the definition of representation as
impersonation does not effectively address the problem of interest articulation
and is therefore unable to establish a link between representatives and
represented.
The understanding of representation as delegation, which comes about with
the rise of the nominalist" school of thought and the growing importance of the
individual as a political actor, addresses this failure (Eulau, 1978). Indeed,
nominalists realise that abstract concepts such as "Church" or "State" do not
exist as such but are mere constructs made up of individuals with diverging
interests. On the European continent, representation as delegation finds its
application in parliamentary representative democracy as a means of avoiding
another series of revolutions and ideological wars (Ankersmit, 2002). Rather than
a consensus to check the power of the King as in the Anglo-Saxon context,
6 Nominalism (Latin nominalist"ofor pertaining to names") is themedieval scholastic doctrine
statingthat abstractions are without essential or substantive realityt and thatonly individual
objects have real existence (http://mb-soft.comlbelieveltxnlnominalLhtm).
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representation in continental Europe is motivated by the search for compromise
among diverse interests within society. Political representation in this sense is
designed to ensure a policy of juste milieu or what Ankersmit (2002) calls a
"principled-unprincipledness" in politics.
According to Ankersmit (2002)~ the difference between early conceptions of
political representation in England and the rest of Europe still has repercussions
today. Indeed, he argues that the political power of the monarch still survives in
the two-party system that is prevalent in most contemporary Anglo-Saxon
democracies. He sees the party in power as the successor of the absolute monarch
who embodies the search for societal consensus. Similarly, the multi-party
systems and coalition governments of most continental democracies can be
traced to the search for societal compromise that characterized 19th century
continental European politics.
Compared with our starting point in ancient Greece, the concept of
representation has come full circle. Intended initially to limit the direct
participation of citizens of the polis, representation now promotes the individual
as a constraint on the power of the ruler. It is only under these premises that it
makes sense to talk of representation in the contemporary sense: as a means of
extending participation in political decision-making,"
This section has provided a brief overview of the evolution of political
representation throughout history. From its very beginnings in the Greek city-
state through to the present era, representation has provided different solutions to
the dual problem of political legitimacy and interest articulation. The next section
7 Note thatthere are of course many other views of representation, which I donotmention at
length. A formalistic view, for instance, simply contends that"a representative is someone
authorized to act" while therepresented remain responsible forthataction as ifthey had done it
themselves (pitkin, 1967). Other approaches include descriptive andsymbolic representation. See
Pitkin (1967) fora comprehensive review.
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focuses on contemporary conceptualisations of political representatives as
delegates, trustees and responsible parties.
II. Modern Theories of Political Representation: Delegates,
Trustees and Responsible Parties
This section outlines contemporary debates about the concept of political
representation and how it works. The most prominent contemporary debate
among theorists of political representation concerns the role of representatives as
either delegates or trustees. Both trustee and delegate theory, either implicitly or
explicitly, define representation as a 2-stage repeated game consisting of
elections and legislative behaviour. However, the two theories differ on the role
they attribute to each stage of the game. The distinction between delegates and
trustees has important normative implications that affect the conception and
measurement of representational performance for individual representatives and
the political system as a whole.
In the following, I first elaborate on the behavioural distinction between
delegates and trustees and specify the role of elections in each theory. Then, I
introduce the Responsible Party Model (RPM) and the concept of system-level
representation which adapts these theories to the political environment of
European parliamentary democracies. Finally, I outline Pitkin's (1967) criticism
of the delegate-trustee distinction and introduce the idea of "responsiveness" as
an alternative conceptual tool to measure representational performance.
Legislative Behaviour: Delegates versus Trustees
As discussed in the previous section, the concepts of "delegation" and
"nominalism" help elucidate the link between representative and represented. At
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the same time, they create a new paradox, namely: how can legislators represent
individual and common interests at the same time? Pre-nominalists had solved
this problem by assuming that legislators represent homogenous wholes such as
Church, state or nobility. Representation in this sense is governed by a search for
societal consensus.
Nominalist theory, on the other hand, is vulnerable to the criticism that
legislators only advocate selfish interests because it conceptualises the role of the
representative as the agent in an individual principal-agent relationship. Even if
this problem were solved, however, nominalists face the difficult challenge of
mandate clarity. Indeed, even for willing legislators it is not always easy to
determine what exactly the constituency's preferences are. Conflicting interests
within the constituency leave politicians at a loss as to what their public mandate
actually consists of. Conceiving representation as delegation surely runs the risk
of polarising society and leaving the community as a whole worse off.
It is this paradox that "trustee theory" proposes to solve. In his speech before
the Bristol assembly in 1774, its "father", Edmund Burke, resolves the nominalist
conundrum by rejecting the all-encompassing delegate theory in favour of a new
conception of the role of representatives. According to Burke, legislators could
effectively choose to represent either local interests or the interests of the
community as a whole and he argued forcefully in favour of the latter.
Representatives should aim to cater to the community as a whole rather than to
selfish individual interests.
However, as pointed out by nominalists. electorates are heterogeneous and
characterized by diverging, and often diametrically opposed interests. As a
consequence, Burke contends that representatives can only act in the interest of
the community if they reject all instruction from constituents and follow their
own judgement. As Burke (1774, pg 448) writes to his Bristol electors,
"Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from
different and hostile interests, which interests each
must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against
other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a
deliberative assembly of one nation, with one
interest, that of the whole - where not local
purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but
the general good, resulting from the general reason
of the whole. You choose a member, indeed; but
when you have chosen him, he is not a member of
Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament"
Burke's theory, of course, requires that the electorate trust the representative to
act in the interest of the common good. Politics, according to him, is too complex
and changes too rapidly for the public to act as an ad hoc source of legitimacy. In
order for the representative to act responsibly and in the interest of all, he must
be able to follow his own judgement and free will.
Though initially conceived in the is" century, trustee theory has enjoyed
continued popularity to this day among scholars and practitioners alike.
Schumpeter (1942) claims, political action is the business of elected officials not
that of voters. This means that they must refrain from instructing him what he is
to do". Similarly, Walter Lippman (1956) sees the duty of the citizen in filling
the office - not in directing the office-holder. On a more topical note, British
Prime Minister Tony Blair defends his decision to go to war with Iraq with his
role as a trustee. As he says in an interview on March 1 2003, after massive anti-
war demonstrations in London and across the world: "one thing I've learned in
this job is you should always try to do the right thing, not the easy thing. Let the
day-to-day judgments come and go: be prepared to be judged by history". 8
8 Jackie Ashley and I.wen MacAskill, 'History will be my judge', Guardian (March 1.2003).
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Proponents of delegate theory on the other hand continue to claim that
legislators can only be representative if the preferences and interests of
constituents inform their legislative behaviour. Dahl (1970, pg. 1) for instance
finds that "a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness
of the government to the preferences of its citizens". Similarly, Luttbeg (1968)
maintains that in a representative democracy government policy must reflect the
preferences of the governed and the public interest. The delegate paradigm also
pervades the 'real world' of politicians. As Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende
admits after the referendum rejection of the draft European constitution in his
country: "we have to listen seriously to the feelings of the Dutch people and -
while recognising that we don't oppose Europe - accept that there are doubts
about the entire process"."
At the heart of the debate between delegate and trustee theories lies the
notion of the elusive common "good". Proponents of the trustee approach
ultimately believe that an objective common "good" first of all exists and,
second, can be achieved as long as there is a consensus to actively search for it.
Advocates of delegate theory are more sceptical about the idea that some policy
choices are objectively "good" for the community as a whole. They see politics
not as a search for consensus but as a constant effort to compromise between
clashing and ultimately irreconcilable societal interests.l" In any case, the
distinction between delegates and trustees continues to inform most of the debate
on the normative role of representatives.
9 Nicholas Watts, Luke Harding and Michael White, 'Crisis talks as treaty nears collapse',
Guardian (June 3, 2005).
10 As Ankersmit (2002) notes, it is not surprising that trustee theory has its origins in the Anglo-
Saxon systems while delegate theory emerged in continental Europe.
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Elections: Selection versus Sanctioning
Apart from different conceptions of legislative behaviour, delegate and
trustee theories also differ on the role they attribute to elections. In delegate
theory, voters first select representatives among a pool of candidates with
different policy preferences and personal backgrounds. Trustees, on the other
hand, interpret elections as a way for voters to sanction incumbent politicians
based on their past record. Both theories explain the electoral phenomenon with
the language of accountability, but they make different assumptions about the
electorate itself.
First, delegate theory assumes a forward-looking electorate. As Maravall
(1999, pg. 155) notes, elections could act as a "prospective mechanism for the
responsiveness of politicians". Fearon (1999, pg. 82) makes this point very clear:
"voters think about elections much more as opportunities to try to select good
types than as sanctions to deter shirking by future incumbents". According to
him, this is so because unlike a policymaker's past performance "variations in
[good and bad] type are relevant to voters' payoffs at the moment of choice"
(Fearon, 1999, pg. 82). In other words, elections serve mainly as a means of
communication between voters and representatives.
In trustee theory, the role of periodic elections is to hold representatives
accountable for their actions post hoc. Elections prevent the legislator from
straining too far from the interest of constituents and the electorate engages in
retrospective voting to assess the past performance of representatives. Manin
(1997) for instance equates representation with the "supreme moment" when the
electorate is called on to judge the action of government.
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Figure 1.1 summarizes the space of contestation defined by the two theories
of representation.11 Elections and legislative behaviour perform different
functions under the delegate and trustee paradigms. In trustee theory,
policymakers act according to their own free will in the interest of the 'common
good'. Empirically, there should be a clear correspondence between the personal
policy preferences of representatives and actual policy outcomes. Elections serve
as a means of sanctioning representatives who have failed to live up to the
expectations of the electorate post hoc. Delegates, on the other hand, behave in
accordance with the preferences of their constituents. Representation occurs
when legislators consistently adopt policy positions in line with constituents'
demands. Elections serve primarily as a means of selecting candidates who
promise to comply with constituency preferences. They are public statements of
voters' preferences and a means of communication between voters and
representatives.
II Research on political representation either explicitly or implicitly adopts a similar conception
ofpolitical representation as therelationship between constituency, representative attitudes,
elections and legislative behaviour. Miller and Stokes (1963) describe oneof themost influential
such models, which discussed in more detail later on in thischapter.
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FIGURE 1.1. CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION: THE SPACE OF
CONTESTATION
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The discussion thus far has implicitly focused on individual legislators as
the relevant actors. Certainly, it is in this spirit that delegate and trustee theories
were initially conceived. However, the delegate-trustee framework is not
necessarily limited to the level of individual legislators. Indeed, a purely
individual-level theory is likely to be less applicable in systems with strong
political parties than it would be, for instance, in the US (Krehbiel, 1993). In
addition, representational performance can also be analysed at the institutional
level. Indeed, it is often the representational performance of the political system
as a whole, which is of most interest to practitioners and citizens alike.
Variations ofthe Delegate-Trustee Paradigm: The Responsible Party Model
Much research has concluded that the political systems of continental
European democracies cannot easily be compared with the presidential two-party
system in the United States (Thomassen, 1999). In many European countries,
parties are significant political actors because they organise and finance election
campaigns, adopt or reject legislation, and support or depose governments. As
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Schmitt and Thomassen (1999) find, governments in parliamentary system
depend on party discipline, which makes political parties - not individual
members of parliament - the most relevant actors.
The Responsible Party Model adapts the framework in Figure 1.1 to party-
centred systems without, however, eliminating the fundamental distinction
between delegates and trustees or the two stages of the representational process.
Specifically, the Responsible Party Model posits that representation occurs if a)
several parties compete in elections on different political platforms, b) voters can
and do choose the party whose platform is closest to their policy preferences, and
c) parties follow up on their electoral promises.
Like individual-level theories, the model explicitly incorporates both stages
of the representational process. It was originally intended to ensure a closer track
between public preferences and policy outcomes in the delegate tradition
(Kirkpatrick, 1971; Converse and Pierce 1986). Responsible parties ensure
representation because their public mandate derives from their commitment to
the political platform on the basis of which they are elected.
While the Responsible Party Model successfully incorporates parties as
political actors, it also attributes significant communicative power to periodic
elections and presupposes an unrealistic degree of information on the part of
parties and voters alike. First of all, parties can only commit themselves to a
policy position to the extent that they are able to anticipate issues that might arise
during the legislature. If electoral platforms are vague and incomplete, however,
parties function as trustees just like individual legislators do in the context of
Burke's conception of representation. As Converse and Pierce (1986) themselves
note, some decisions must be taken under conditions of such emergency or are so
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technical that even most advocates of the delegate model accept the need for
trustees.
Second, the model assumes that voters have perfect information about their
own policy preferences and those of the parties that are up for election. Such an
assumption clashes with Putnam's (1976) characterisation of election results as
"notoriously uninformative". If voters' opinions are not very specific they can at
best be interpreted as diffuse expectations rather than specific instructions
(Hoffmann-Lange, 1991). In the context of the European Parliament, which is the
subject of the empirical part of this thesis, a prolific literature has established that
elections are but second-order contest, with low turnout, apathetic voters and
vague political platforms (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Blondel et al., 1998).
These caveats do not question the applicability of the Responsible Party
Model per se. On the contrary, despite Krehbiel's (1993) scepticism, most
students of European parliamentary democracy confirm that legislative politics
takes place primarily at the party level. However, they do invalidate the
interpretation of the responsible party model as firmly rooted in the delegate
tradition. With vague electoral platforms and badly informed voters, there is no
reason why parties should not be able to act both as trustees and delegates, much
like individual legislators.
The Responsible Party Model forms an important part in any discussion of
contemporary theories of political representation. It does not, however, alter the
fundamental dichotomy between delegates and trustees. Instead, it shifts the unit
of analysis to the party level and introduces electoral programmes and voter
information as constraints on the ability of parties to ignore public preferences.
Parties choose their position along the delegate-trustee continuum based on
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constraints defined by the specificity of their electoral platform and the level of
information of their voters. In other words, the Responsible Party Model adapts
the delegate-trustee dichotomy to the context of European parliamentary
democracy. As a result, the model (or its adaptation to the European Parliament)
is at the root of the analysis in this thesis (see Chapter 2)
Variations ofthe Delegate-Trustee Paradigm: System-Level Representation
In addition to the individual and party levels, representation can also be
analysed at the level of the parliament, or even the political system, as a whole.
Most definitions of the legislature consider representation a vital element of its
institutional role in democratic political systems. As Norton (1990, pg. 1)
concludes, legislatures are "constitutionally designated institutions for giving
assent to binding measures of public policy, that assent being given on behalfof
a political community that extends beyond the government elite responsible for
formulating those measures" [emphasis added].
Norton's definition illustrates the dual role that is common to all legislatures.
'Giving assent' refers to the influence Parliament has over the formulation and
enactment of policy. The second part of the quote ('on behalf of) describes the
representational function of legislatures. In other words, every assembly is part
'legislature' and part 'parliament'. It is a lawmaking body responsible for
formulating, developing and enacting policy and, at the same time, it is a place of
deliberation, where elected representatives come together to discuss the impact
of policy and act on behalf of the citizens they represent.
Despite different categorisations and levels of analysis, most studies adopt a
similarly functional view. In their authoritative manual on Comparing
Legislatures, Loewenberg and Patterson (1979) for instance claim that
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legislatures assume three general functions: they ensure the linkage between
citizens and government, foster the recruitment of political leaders and engage in
- what they call - 'conflict management'. Similarly, Packenham (1970) sees the
major functions of parliaments in legitimating the actions of government,
socialising elites and exercising influence over policy outcomes. More recently,
Copeland and Patterson (1994) distinguish between legitimation, linkage and
decision-making. In the context of the ED, Judge and Earnshaw (2003) identify
policy influence, linkage and legitimation as the primary functions of the
European Parliament.
'Conflict management', (policy) 'influence' and 'decision-making' denote
the power that the legislature has over policies and laws. For Loewenberg and
Patterson, 'conflict management', measured as the number of bills introduced
and enacted, captures the power of the legislature to impose its will on the
government by developing and enacting policy. There are a variety of
mechanisms through which legislatures can exercise policy power including
appointing the government, introducing votes of no confidence, amending,
proposing or deciding legislation or simply watching over the government's track
record in the implementation of bills that have already been enacted. While there
are large differences across countries and political systems, most legislatures
have at least some influence over the legislation that the government wants to
introduce as well as some budgetary and oversight powers.
However, there is more to Parliaments than merely' giving assent' to matters
of policy. As Packenham (1970, pg 536) notes, "even if [a legislature] had no
decision making power whatsoever, the functions which it performs would be
significant". Linkage, recruitment. legitimation, or 'socialisation' all form part of
32
what constitutes more broadly the representational function of parliament. In the
words of Loewenberg and Patterson (1979, pg 167), "whatever else legislatures
do, they connect the people to their government in special ways [... ]
Representation describes that special relationship". Parliament links citizens to
their leaders and the policies they make by acting on their behalf. In other words,
parliament ensures that the electorate 'owns' both the government and the
policies it produces.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the conventional conception of the dual role of
legislatures in democratic political systems. In this hierarchical model, citizens
choose representatives and, in a separate stage, legislators choose policies. The
two roles are linked VIa periodic elections. As noted above, the delegate
paradigm emphasises the role of elections as a selection mechanism that
determines the composition of the legislature. Representation is reduced to a
principal-agent relationship where the principal (citizens) chooses the agent
(representative) that is closest to him in terms of policy (or some other measure
of) preferences. The trustee model on the other hand sees elections primarily as a
way to sanction representatives whose behaviour deviates from the preferences
of the electorate. Under both paradigms, parliament lends legitimacy to the
government by creating a hierarchical link between policy and citizens.
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FIGURE 1.2. THE DUAL ROLE OF PARLIAMENT
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Thus far, the discussion has centred on the evolution of different theoretical
conceptions of political representation. However, the debate surrounding
delegates and trustees has also sparked a large amount of empirical research that
investigates representational performance at the level of individual legislators,
parties and at the institutional level. The remainder of this section gives a short
overview of this literature.
Empirical Assessments
By now it should come a little surprise that models based on delegates,
trustees and responsible parties lead to different empirical evaluations of
representational performance. Empirical assessments of delegate theory benefit
from an abundance of public opinion surveys that propose to measure
constituents' preferences (e.g. the Eurobarometer series or the US' National
Election Studies). Elite surveys that gauge the preferences of representatives and
their perception of constituency interests are harder to come by, although they do
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exist (see for instance the European Parliament Research Group's recurnng
surveyor the European Candidate Study). In some cases such elite surveys are
replaced by direct measures of legislative behaviour in, most commonly,
parliamentary votes (e.g. Hix's collection of European Parliament roll-call
votes). Together, these data have sparked a large amount of empirical research
from Miller and Stokes early analysis of the US Congress to complex cross-
national studies across a wide range of political systems. 12
At the level of individual legislators, Miller and Stokes' (1963)
investigation into constituency influence in Congress is probably the most
famous contribution to the empirical literature on the link between legislative
behaviour and representation. The definition of representation as congruence, be
it policy, issue or opinion congruence, at the core of their analysis, is common to
most subsequent empirical studies. Miller and Stokes make use of previously
unavailable data on constituency and representative preferences to examine
whether and, if so, to what extent the roll-call behaviour of US Congressmen
mirrors the opinion of their electoral districts. Using simple correlation, they find
that constituents have a considerable amount of control over the behaviour of
their representatives. However, representatives are often unsure about the exact
nature of constituency preferences and constituents do not always have a clear
notion of their representatives' policy positions. Further, they find that
congruence between constituency and representative is closest to the delegate
model on the issue of civil rights and closest to the trustee interpretation of
representation on foreign affairs. On issues of social welfare, which are most
12 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of these data.
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clearly governed by a left-right cleavage they find support for an ideological
party split both within the electorate and among legislators.
A large number of subsequent studies have confirmed and amended Miller
and Stokes' conclusions or tested their model in different political contexts.
Achen (1977, 1978) criticises the use of correlation coefficients in studies of
representation, develops various alternative measures of congruence, and tests
them on the same type of data as Miller and Stokes. He finds that winners are
less representative than losers and that there is no difference across issue
dimensions. In a trilogy of articles on France, Germany and the United States,
Brooks (1985, 1987, 1990) reports little overall congruence between actual
policy outcomes and public opinion. Similarly, Converse and Pierce (1986),
Fiorina (1974) and Powell (1982) measure representation as the fit or congruence
between the policy positions of representatives and the preferences of their
constituents.
At the party level, Stokes (1999) analyses party manifestos in Latin America
to determine the level of commitment that parties show to their electoral
programme. She finds that "mandates may be widely and severely violated. [... ]
When politicians viewed voters' preferences as erroneous and unstable, mandates
were bad predictors of policy" (pg.126). Studies in the European context attribute
the lack of congruence between public mandates and policy at the party level to
coalition government and party weakness (Klingemann et aI., 1994). In line with
the trustee conception of representation, Stokes concludes that "sticking to
mandates is not the only way politicians can represent citizens' interests, and that
governments may have to violate mandates in order to represent [... ] It matters
little that citizens hold erroneous ex ante beliefs if they at least are capable of
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making good ex-post judgements of incumbent governments by the end of the
term" (pg 127). In support of responsible parties, Esaiasson (1999). in a study of
four democracies, finds that party voters' policy views are more in agreement
with the collective of party representatives than with their own local
representative. Pierce (1999) on the other hand contends that the responsible
party model does not hold particularly well because voters do not cast their
ballots for parties representing the political platform closest to their preferences.
He finds some support on the "left-right super-issue" but little when issues are
considered separately. Similar studies of issue congruence between parties and
their voters in Europe include Barnes (1977) on Italy as well as Esaiasson and
Holmberg (1996) and Holmberg (1989) on Sweden.
In addition to these country-level studies, the European Parliament has
provided an interesting outlet for comparative research on party representation.
With different electoral and party systems in each member state, the EP serves as
a "natural experiment" for testing the validity of the responsible party model. In
an early study, Dalton (1985) examines the congruence between party candidates
for the European Parliament and their voters. He finds close correspondence in
some areas, such as economic and security issues, and less correspondence in
other areas, including foreign affairs. In an analysis of issue congruence in the
1994 elections, Schmitt and Thomassen (1999) find that correspondence is
relatively high along the left-right spectrum but representatives are generally
more pro-European on specific issues than their constituents.
Finally, not all studies have focused on individual legislators or parties.
Recent scholarship also addresses the representational performance of entire
political systems. Huber and Powell (1994) for instance find that proportional
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systems lead to better congruence between the positions of the median legislator
and the median voter and between the positions of the median member of the
cabinet and the median voter than majoritarian systems. Wessels (1999) argues
that proportional systems are more responsive to party voters while congruence
with the policy position of the median voter is higher in majoritarian systems. He
concludes that the electoral system and the number of parties with different
policy platforms affect the representational performance of policymakers. Most
famously, perhaps, Arend Lijphart (e.g. 1999) argues that so-called •consensus
democracies' outperform majoritarian systems on measures of political equality,
women's representation, participation in elections and proximity between
government policies and voter preferences.
Some recent "systems studies" remain based on the principle of congruence
but employ more sophisticated statistical measures to examine "dynamic
representation" and the influence of the "public mood" on policy outcomes in the
US context (Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson, 1995; Stimson, 1991). Dynamic
representation introduces a time lag between public opinion and the
responsiveness of different US institutions. Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson
(1995) find that the political system in the United States works more or less in
line with the founding fathers' intentions. The level of overall responsiveness is
high but there is a difference between House and Senate. As Stimson (1999)
notes, the House is immensely sensitive to public opinion changes and adjusts its
position continually and decisively, much in line with the delegate conception of
representation. The Senate on the other hand behaves in line with the electoral
connection. It is less able to anticipate public opinion changes but corrects its
position as a result of elections as predicted by the trustee model. In the context
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of the European Union, Carrubba (2001) also finds evidence that is consistent
with the Stimson model.
As this short and incomplete survey of the literature has shown, delegates,
trustees and responsible parties still dominate theoretical and empirical
discussions of political representation.!' Progress in the field since Burke' s
fateful speech before the Bristol assembly in 1774 has consisted mainly of using
ever more sophisticated statistical tools to measure similar things. Despite a
notable degree of discontent with existing models of representation, few
researchers have ventured beyond the theoretical status quo. However, as pointed
out above, the delegate trustee framework also has significant shortcomings. The
next section summarizes some of the problems with existing models and presents
an alternative conception of representation based on the concept of
responsiveness.
III. Beyond Delegates and Trustees: Access to Power and
Responsiveness
In her 1967 work on the Concept of Representation Pitkin isolates strengths
and weaknesses of the delegate-trustee dichotomy. First, trustee theory IS
vulnerable to the accusation that representatives merely "take care of
13 The discussion has ignored a substantial literature, which addresses non-electoral forms of
representation, such as different forms of interest group pluralism, or corporatism (see for
instance Schmitter and Streeck, 200 I). Indeed, some scholars contend that parliamentary
democracy and with it, electoral forms of representation, are on the decline (Anderson and Burns,
1996; Wessels and Katz, 1999). According to many, this move away from parties and towards a
more functional form of political representation is even more forceful at the European level
(Wessels and Katz, 1999;). The rise of a "democracy of organisations" at the expense of a
"democracy of citizens" gradually hollows out the meaning of political representation as a source
of democratic legitimacy (Anderson and Burns, 1996; Schmitter, 2000; Warren and Castiglione,
2004; Ryden, 1996). Despite the growing importance of interest groups and the proliferation of
theoretical models of interest group behaviour, the vast majority of citizens associate political
representation with the electoral relationship between them and their representatives. As a result,
this thesis focuses exclusively on electoral forms of political representation.
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constituents", in which case representation loses its substantive meaning. This is
likely to be the case in areas where the public simply does not have preferences
or interests, such as highly technical fields that require expert knowledge. In
these cases, delegate theory with its reliance on instruction from the public,
however, does not offer a promising solution either. The populism inherent in
delegate theory may also not be particularly desirable from a democratic point of
VIew.
Second, trustee theory does not clarify why voters should reward politicians
who act in the common good, however defined, by re-electing them. Instead,
rational self-interested voters are more likely to choose politicians who promise
them the greatest amount of specific benefits (as long as this promise is credible)
without much regard to the well-being of society as a whole. Trustee theory
becomes even more problematic if political choices are mere matters of taste.
Choices based on taste are arbitrary and therefore, by definition, preclude
trustees from representing others through their own independent policy decisions.
Third, delegate theory requires a clear understanding of the nature of the
constituency to be represented. On many issues, however, constituents have
conflicting interests that cannot easily be aggregated. Is the representative to
respect the preferences of his territorial constituency, his political party or the
public at large? How does the widespread practice of pork-barrel politics affect
this equation? What about people who do not participate in the political process
for various reasons?" Finally, both delegate and trustee theory assume that
representatives act consciously in someone's interest, be it their own, the party or
constituents at large. However. it is perfectly possible for representation to
14 There is indeed quite a bit of scholarship on the effects of participation (or the lack thereof) on
the representational performance ofa political system. See for instance Verba and Nie (1972) in
the US or Blondel et at. (1998) in the context of European elections.
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emerge from a political system in which policymakers are pursumg entirely
different goals.
In sum, for Pitkin, it is the nature of the issues at stake, the political choices
to be made, the constituency to be represented and the relative capacity of
represented and representatives to develop and articulate clear preferences that
determine a political system's representational performance. She summarizes
these factors in the notion of "responsiveness". Delegate theory sees
responsiveness as constant action in line with constituents' wishes and interests;
for trustees responsiveness is rooted in their accountability to constituents, which
in tum is ensured by periodic elections. Whereas delegates must follow
constituents' lead, trustees can only be responsive if they act independently and
base their behaviour on their own personal judgement.
Ultimately, however, responsiveness is a dual concept that incorporates
elements of both trustee and delegate theory. Surely, government can only be
representative if its subjects have control over policy. However, representation
cannot simply mean a constant activity of responding. Instead, Pitkin (1967, pg.
233) argues, what is required is a "constant condition of responsiveness, of
potential readiness to respond". The representational performance of a political
system is not only determined by policy outcomes that are congruent with public
preferences but also by the system's readiness to respond to public demand for
action. According to this approach, access to power is equally or even more
important than the actual exercise of power itself.
Eulau and Karps (1978) extend Pitkin's institutional argument to the level of
individual legislators. Defining representation as 'access to power' rather than
actual responses allows legislators to go beyond merely reacting to the demands
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and preferences of constituents and requires them to take legislative initiative.
Eulau and Karps (1978) distinguish between four components of representation:
policy, service, allocation and symbolic responsiveness. Three of these
components describe the relationship between the legislative behaviour of
individual representatives and their constituents. Most studies of representation
are limited to policy responsiveness, which refers to the connection between
constituent policy preferences and the behaviour of the representative. Service
and allocation responsiveness are the benefits that representatives obtain for
particular constituents and their districts through non-legislative services or pork-
barrel politics. Finally, symbolic responsiveness refers to the trust and confidence
that constituents have in their representatives.
In sum, Eulau and Karps (1978) warn that theoretical knowledge on
representation can only progress if responsiveness goes beyond simple
congruence between citizen preferences and representatives to take into account
access to power across a variety of legislative activities. By measuring
responsiveness as legislative participation and specialisation in different policy
areas and across different stages of the legislative process, this thesis goes
beyond conventional definitions of representation within the delegate/trustee
framework. The next section outlines the research question of this study and the
rationale behind the focus on the European Parliament.
IV. Research Question of the Thesis
The main research question that the study proposes to answer is: under what
conditions does representation occur in the European Parliament? In other words,
the thesis identifies the incentives that determine the representativeness of
legislative participation - or government of the people - and the responsive
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specialisation of individual representatives - or government for the people - at
different stages of the policy process. Together, representative participation and
responsive specialisation define representational performance because they
explain which MEPs have access to which policy areas. The empirical part of the
thesis assesses the relative impact of different institutional and party-political
incentives on the representational performance of MEPs from different party
groups, national parties, member states and political persuasions. To what extent
do institutional and party-political incentives explain differences in responsive
specialisation across MEPs and in the representativeness of legislative business
at different stages of the policy process?
Even though the theoretical model is applied to and tested on the European
Parliament, the findings have a wide applicability across political systems. The
model finds the essence of representation in explaining the responsive
specialisation and participation decisions of individual legislators in particular
policy areas rather than others. Government of the people occurs when a broad
cross-section of legislators participate in parliamentary business; government for
the people requires specialisation in the policy areas that each national party
stands for in public. This is true as much at the European level as it is among EU
member states or in non-European systems such as the United States or Latin
America. In other words, the theoretical foundations upon which the model is
built are not specific to the European Parliament but they can be applied across a
wide range of political systems.
In addition, unlike most previous research, this thesis makes theoretical use
of Pitkin's findings and incorporates them into an empirical analysis of
representation and representational performance. Pitkin's notion of
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responsiveness is at the root of the answer to the research question at the core of
the thesis. Representation is defined as the ability (access) of individual
legislators to address the publicly stated policy priorities of their national party.
Instead of preference or policy congruence, the thesis argues that responsiveness
is based on the extent to which an MEP engages in policy areas of different
salience", at different stages of the legislative process. Chapter 2 develops the
theoretical link between legislative participation, specialisation and political
representation in more detail.
Finally, the thesis departs from the existing framework to ask why and how
representational performance differs among individual legislators. It is here
where traditional conceptions of representation are most deficient. In delegate
and trustee models, competitive elections determine the utility functions of
individual legislators, which in tum define their legislative behaviour. However,
not every representative faces the same political opportunity structure within the
parliament. Institutional and party-political incentives for participation and
specialisation in different policy areas may vary across representatives and across
the stages of the legislative process, depending on applicable majority thresholds,
partisan politics or institutional rules.
As a result, the thesis argues that it is imperative to examine the political
opportunity structure within the legislature. As Converse and Pierce (1986) have
noted in the context of the French political system, it is perfectly possible for a
representative to base his legislative behaviour entirely on instructions from
constituents yet fail to represent their preferences compared with other
legislators. Conversely, it is also possible for legislators to ignore the demands of
15 throughout the thesis. policy salience/importance/emphasis are used interchangeably. See
Chapter 3 for a detailed definition and operationalisaion of 'salience'.
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their constituency and still perform rather well in terms of representational
performance. What do legislators try to achieve in the EP? What legislative tools
do they use to achieve their goals? How does the party-political and institutional
context in which legislative participation and specialisation take place affect
representational performance?
v. Focus on the European Parliament
The empirical and theoretical analyses in this thesis focus on the European
Parliament. To some observers this may seem a strange choice. Indeed, there are
quite a few attributes that set the European Parliament apart from other
legislatures and may therefore undermine the generalisability of the theory and
the empirical findings. However, instead of conceptualising the EP as a sui
generis phenomenon, the 'starting point of any assessment' of representational
performance should be a comparison with the characteristic features of
legislatures in other political systems (Judge and Earnshaw, 2003). Also, there
are several characteristics that make the European Parliament a particularly
interesting institution to study.
First, there are significant doubts about the representational performance and
legitimacy of the European Union. Unlike other federal systems, for instance, the
assembly of European citizens (the EP) is less powerful than the assembly of
states (Council of Ministers) in some policy areas while both institutions share
equal legislative powers in other policy areas. As a result, many commentators
including academics, practitioners, the media and citizens have repeatedly
questioned the legitimacy of the European institutional infrastructure. However,
some more recent research maintains that the EP functions very much like any
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other domestic Parliament within the system of the European Union (Hix, 2001,
2002; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2002 ; Judge and Earnshaw, 2003).
Second, most scholars agree that within the institutional framework of the
EU, the European Parliament comes closest to a representative institution. The
representational function of the European Parliament is firmly inscribed in the
Union's treaties. Article Two of the draft European Constitution explicitly states
that, 'the European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the
Union's citizens'. As Rittberger (2005) confirms, policymakers in the member
states continually 'project a model of representative government onto the EU
polity' and the European Parliament plays the preponderant role in legitimising
EU governance.
As a result, the representational performance of the European Parliament has
been the object of a significant amount of political contestation. Concerns about
the democratic nature of the EU have pushed member states to address the
representational role of the EP (Pollack, 2003).16 Purported to represent all
European citizens within the complex of the EU's institutional structure, the EP
is seen by some as the potential solution to the democratic deficit. At the same
time, the EP has been the focus of much criticism for being unrepresentative,
unknown to the public and far too powerful.
Indeed, the EP has gradually increased its influence to become an equal
legislator with the Council of Ministers in many areas. Concurrently, most
national legislatures have lost influence compared with their executives.
16 Other researchers have challenged this explanation. Moravcsik and Nicolaidis (1999) for
instance claim that the increase of the Parliament's powers at Amsterdam can be explained with
the predominance of Social Democrats in Council and Parliament at the time. According to them
it was relatively easy for the heads of state to delegate power to the EP because the majority in
the EP was of the same political persuasion as the majority in the Council. Hix (2002) on the
other hand maintains that Amsterdam merely reconciled the de jure and de facto powers of the
LP in the Commission investiture procedure and in legislative decision-making.
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According to Kreppel (2002), the EP is a 'transformative legislature' with a
significant impact on EU policy and decision-making. After the treaty reforms of
Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000) the European Parliament now possesses
almost all of the powers traditionally associated with national parliaments,
although it is constrained in their application to a restricted number of policy
areas. As Scully (2000, pg. 235) contends, "the European Parliament is now a
serious player in EU law making".
Third, precisely because of the evolving nature of the European political
system, representation at the European level is an important object of study. The
European Union is currently undergoing a period of fundamental change.
Enlargement to the East, the balance between European institutions, national
institutions and the public, and the relationship among European institutions
themselves constitute the core of the current constitutional debate. Politicians at
the national and European levels continually make controversial decisions that
alter the way politics is done in Europe. With the demise of national parliaments,
it is important to understand how political representation at the European level
works in order to safeguard the democratic procedures that are at the heart of
European politics (Rittberger, 2005).
Finally, from an empirical perspective, focussing on the European Parliament
allows extending the existing research programme on political representation to
include a cross-national dimension. Most empirical scholarship on representation
has focussed on political systems or policymakers within individual countries."
While this limitation makes empirical sense, analysing representation in
international organizations or federal-type systems (such as the European Union)
17 But see Chapter 2 for other studies that focus on the European Parliament.
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substantially increases theoretical leverage because it incorporates a comparative
element.
The European Union is a union of individual states with different political
systems, cultural traditions and historical backgrounds. Country-level case
studies fail to capture the importance of these differences. A study of
representation in France tells us very little about the way representation works in
Germany for instance. In addition to cultural and historical factors, the member
states that make up the European Union also differ in the way they structure their
relations with the European institutions. Apart from very broad co-ordination
within the European party groups, most national parties in each member state
carry out their own European election campaigns for instance. Only a study that
cuts across these national differences can generate findings that apply across
countries.
This section has presented the mam research question that this thesis
addresses and explained the focus on the European Parliament. Under what
conditions does political representation occur? How does the representational
performance of individual legislators differ? And how can it be explained as a
function of the institutional and party-political opportunity structure that guides
legislative behaviour at different stages of the policy process? The final section
of this chapter gives a brief overview of the remainder of the thesis.
VI. Overview of the Thesis
The remainder of this chapter outlines how the thesis proposes to answer
these questions. The thesis goes beyond the delegate-trustee framework by
developing and operationalising Pitkin's (1967) concept of responsiveness as
'access to power'. The study models the link between legislative participation
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and political representation in terms of a "competence logic" that defines how
well legislators are able to act upon the political platform that their national party
stands for.
Chapter 2 defines representation as a function of the legislative participation
and specialisation decisions of individual policymakers. MEPs try to achieve a
range of legislative goals within the party-political and institutional incentive
structure at different stages of the policy process in the European Parliament. It is
the interaction between individual goals and political/institutional incentives that
determines responsiveness. Coalition dynamics across party groups, legislative-
executive relations with the European Commission and party group gate-keeping
power over the distribution of legislative spoils affect representational
performance. Institutional rules, such as open rule in committee and plenary,
proportionality requirements and majority thresholds also determine which MEPs
can participate and which policy areas are most attractive to them. The chapter
derives a set of hypotheses to be tested in the second part of the thesis.
Chapter 3 operationalises the theoretical concepts developed in chapter 2,
presents the research design and discusses the data used to test the predictions of
the model. The thesis is based on a unique dataset of legislative participation in
the fifth European Parliament (1999-2004) including committee assignments,
attendance at committee meetings, rapporteurships and parliamentary questions.
Together, these data cover a wide range of legislative activities at different stages
of the policy process.
Chapter 4 analyses the effect of selective attendance at committee meetings
on political representation in the EP. MEPs attend committee meetings because
they address policy areas that feature prominently political platform of their
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national party. This is particularly the case for substitutes who are more likely to
replace full members on the most salient policy areas than in less attractive
committees. Also, majority rule makes committee attendance most attractive to
MEPs from party groups that are pivotal under different majority thresholds. On
the other hand, committee business is of less interest to minority MEPs with little
say over policy decisions. In any case, selective attendance on the part of MEPs
undermines the proportional committee composition that is enshrined in the
Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament.
Chapter 5 analyses the distribution of rapporteurships within parliamentary
committees. Despite an auction system, which enforces a proportional allocation
of reports, competition among party groups affects who gets the most salient
reports. Again, open rule in committee and plenary enforces a political
distribution of salient rapporteurships along the lines of voting coalitions in the
plenary and on the committee floor. MEPs whose party groups hold the majority
in the EP write the most salient reports. Minority legislators write reports in
policy areas of less interest to their national party. Within party groups, the
leadership distributes reports so as to maintain group cohesion. Rank-and-file
MEPs from smaller national parties are involved in the most salient pieces of
legislation. Preference outliers on the other hand must make do with less salient
reports.
The last empirical chapter focuses on parliamentary questions at Question
Time. Unlike for committee reports, party groups do not control access to
parliamentary questions. Also, unlike the previous two chapters, national parties
rather than party groups are the primary actors in legislative-executive relations.
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MEPs without national party ties to the Commission attribute a greater role to
overseeing the executive in a large range of policy areas than' governing' MEPs.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the effect of party political and institutional
incentives on representational performance at different stages of the policy
process in the EP. The text synthesises the findings of the three empirical
chapters and discusses the impact of the findings on several proposals for
institutional reform in the EP under different 'what-if scenarios. Finally, the
chapter points out several ways in which the analysis could be extended, and the
findings applied to, a larger time frame, a more comprehensive set of legislative
tools or a broader range of party-political and institutional environments.
51
CHAPTER 2 - A THEORY OF POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION IN THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
"Incentives are the cornerstone of modem life. And
understanding them - or often, ferreting them out - is the key
to solving just about any riddle, from violent crime to sports
cheating to online dating" -Levitt and Dubner (2005)
The introductory quote best illustrates the paradigm upon which this thesis is
built. As Chapter 1 has argued, in order to explain why some legislators represent
their constituents whereas others do not, we must identify the incentives that explain
their legislative participation and specialisation decisions in the EP. If responsiveness
is defined in Pitkin's (1967) sense as 'access to power', then the party-political and
institutional incentive structure that governs participation and specialisation within the
European Parliament is a major determinant of how government for and of the people
work, both at the level of individual MEPs and for the institution as a whole.
This chapter develops a model of political representation based on the
responsiveness of individual legislators at different stages of the legislative process
and under different institutional and party-political arrangements. The model explains
why MEPs might or might not participate at different stages of the policy process and
why they might or might not discriminate between policy areas in an effort to put
their national party's policy platform into practice. The model has important
implications for parliamentary reform in the EP, the link between policy and citizens
in the EU and the assessment of political representation in other political systems.
Unlike much previous research, the thesis takes into account both the
representativeness of parliamentary business (government of the people) and the
responsiveness of individual legislators (government for the people). First, by
explaining differences in levels of participation among legislators, the thesis
identifies the values, interests and constituencies that the European Parliament
represents at different stages of the legislative process. Second, the thesis addresses
the extent to which legislators specialise in policy areas that feature prominently in
their party's political platform. There is an uneasy tension between representativeness
and responsiveness, which calls into question research confined to only one of these
two dimensions of political representation.
The model has profound implications for our understanding of how political
representation works in the European Union and elsewhere. Contrary to the
assumptions of most existing research, representational performance does not rely on
the dichotomy between delegates and trustees as ideal-types. Rather, the quality of
representation at the European level depends on the legislative behaviour of MEPs
within the political and institutional context in which they operate. Unlike the vertical
conception of the functions of parliaments presented in Chapter 1, the model
developed here describes the relationship between legislation and representation as an
horizontal decision between different legislative objectives by individual MEPs. As a
result, the solution to the so-called democratic deficit in the European Union lies at
least as much in creating individual-level incentives for MEPs to participate in the
legislature and specialise in salient policy areas as it does in large-scale constitutional
reform.
The chapter is organised into five parts. Section 1 outlines the distinction between
representativeness and responsiveness I, as defined by the two competing research
programmes on direct and indirect representation. Section 2 introduces the notion of
I There may be some confusion over differential meanings of the term "responsiveness". Most research
on political representation has defined the concept in terms of congruence (see Chapter I). The model
in this thesis is closer to Pitkin's understanding of responsiveness as "access to power".
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representation as 'access to power'f and states the main assumptions upon which the
thesis is built. Section 3 derives a set of hypotheses about the relationship between
political representation and inter- and intra-party politics at different stages of the
legislative process. Section 4 moves away from the focus on individual MEPs to look
at the representational performance of the European Parliament as a whole. Finally,
the last section concludes with a summary of the main results and a brief overview of
the rest of the thesis.
I. Measuring Representation: Representativeness v.
Responsiveness
As Chapter 1 has shown, political representation is a 2-stage game involving
competitive elections and legislative behaviour by individual representatives. At the
electoral stage, the translation of votes into seats determines the composition and
representativeness of the legislature. At the behavioural stage, the responsiveness of
individual legislators affects whose interests are represented. If delegate and trustee
models put forward rival conceptual definitions of representation, the distinction
between elections and legislative behaviour is primarily one of empirical
measurement. Where and when do we expect representation to occur?
The existing literature has addressed this question from two perspectives. First,
'indirect representation' occurs when voters select like-minded representatives In
competitive elections in order to implement policies that are in their interest. In
contrast, 'direct' representation refers to policy responsiveness in the legislative
behaviour of sitting politicians (see Wlezien, 2004).
2 See also the discussion of Pitkin's definition of responsiveness in Chapter 1.
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Indirect Representation: Representativeness and the Electoral Connection
Most students of representation in the EP have analysed what has variably been
called indirect (Wlezien, 2004), descriptive/formalistic (Pitkin, 1967) or procedural
(Powell, 2004) representation. This line of research asks how and to what extent the
range of political opinions within the public is translated into parliamentary seats.
Political representation occurs if there is a strong electoral connection between
citizens and their representatives, which leads to a representative composition of the
legislature.
The literature primarily revolves around the impact of electoral rules and parties
on the correspondence between votes and seats. Investigating the role of parties.
Duverger (1954) establishes that first-past-the-post electoral rules lead to two-party
systems (Duverger's Law). As Powell (2004, pg 278) summarises in her
comprehensive review of the literature, "different voting rules create incentives to
reduce the number of parties to varying levels", thus affecting the representation of
citizen preferences. Other major contributions include Rae's (1971) monograph on
The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, which establishes the importance of
district magnitude for vote-seat translation and Lijphart's (e.g. 1994) influential cross-
national comparisons, which identify the 'consensual' and 'majoritarian' features of
different electoral systems. The competing visions of democracy inherent in
proportional and majoritarian systems imply a trade-off between two desirable
characteristics: the correspondence between votes and seats and the proportionality of
legislative representation (Katz, 1997). Finally, Dalton (1985) analyses the
correspondence between the political opinions of party elites and their voters in nine
West European countries using survey instruments. He finds that public opinion is
represented fairly well in some policy areas (such as economic and security issues)
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but less well in others (e.g. foreign affairs). The efficiency of party linkages depends
considerably on the clarity of party positions on different policy issues.
In the European Parliament, the literature on indirect representation has also been
quite prolific. Indeed, the EP has served as a quasi-experiment allowing to investigate
the impact of different electoral rules on vote-seat distribution in a single legislature.
Like at the national level, the research programme has focused either on European
elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Carrubba, 2001;
Bowler and Farrell, 1993), representative role perceptions (Schmitt and Thomassen,
1999; 2000; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997; Katz, 1997; 1999; Marsh and Wessels,
1997; Wessels, 1999), or the social characteristics of representatives (Norris and
Franklin, 1997). Most studies have concluded that representation in the EP works
moderately well at best: the electoral connection is weaker than in domestic
parliamentary systems, MEPs have different preferences on specific policy issues than
their constituents and the Parliament is socially quite unrepresentative. Nevertheless,
Schmitt and Thomassen (1999) conclude that a European system of political
representation might be more feasible than is often suggested.
On the whole, the literature on indirect representation has made substantial
headway in addressing the conditionality of political representation. By focusing on
the correspondence between votes and seats, the research programme has successfully
evaluated the impact of different electoral rules on representation. However, this
research is vulnerable to the accusation that it over-simplifies the process by equating
political preferences with votes cast at election time. If, as Duverger has shown, the
range of party choices depends on the electoral system at hand, the correspondence
between votes and preferences may also differ across countries (but see van der Eijk
and Franklin, forthcoming for an elegant solution to this problem).
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Similarly, research on indirect representation assumes that legislative behaviour is
determined entirely by the social characteristics of representatives. The literature is
unable to address the fact that different issues define different constituencies and
might therefore require a different legislative composition for representation to occur.
A large proportion of female representatives, for instance, does not automatically
ensure effective representation for women in all policy areas. Indeed, because there is
nothing in particular that makes women more or less conservative than men, the
gender composition of the legislature is irrelevant when it comes to representation on
ideologically divisive policy issues.
Thus, while the composition of the legislature can be an important source of
legitimacy, political representation requires actual policy outcomes that are in the
interest of the represented. This observation is corroborated by the large share of
citizens who associate the work of the legislature primarily with its policy output (e.g.
Wahlke, 1978). In order to investigate the conditions under which representation
occurs, we need to take into account the link between legislative behaviour and citizen
preferences. Studies of representation that focus exclusively on the composition of the
legislature are inconclusive.
Direct Representation: Responsiveness andLegislative Behaviour
In response to these concerns, the research programme on 'direct' or -- in Pitkin's
(1967) words -- 'substantive' representation investigates to what extent the political
preferences of European citizens are reflected in the legislative behaviour of their
representatives and in the policy outcomes they produce. Direct representation is more
complex than simple vote-seat congruence because it can (at least theoretically)
distinguish between a large range of legislative activities, at different stages of the
policy process.
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Nevertheless, almost all studies in the US and Europe have focussed exclusively
on roll-call votes. The most influential piece of research remains Miller and Stokes
(1963) article, which uses a public opinion survey to match constituency preferences
with the voting behaviour of their representatives. Fenno (1978) qualifies the Miller
and Stokes results by positing that legislators focus on multiple constituencies,
including a territorial and a re-election constituency of fellow partisans within their
district. Similarly, Wright (1989) concludes that senators from different parties in the
same state cater to different constituencies. According to Kingdon (1973),
representatives balance simultaneous pressures from, among others, their constituency
and their own preferences when choosing which way to vote. Finally, in a more recent
example, Levitt (1996) finds that US senators vote mostly according to their own
ideology, while only 25 percent of their utility function can be ascribed to
constituency preferences.
In the European Parliament, a large share of the literature on direct representation
has focused on normative questions and the institutional set-up of the EU (Follesdal
and Hix, 2005; Majone, 2000; Moravcsik, 2002; Scharpf, 1999). Empirical research is
sparse, even though the EP is an ideal 'laboratory' to examine the correspondence
between citizen preferences and legislative behaviour under different electoral
arrangements. As Moravcsik and Sangiovanni (2002) point out, by measuring the
impact of constituency preferences on policy and regulatory outcomes at the
European level, we can determine EU responsiveness to underlying national moods.
Like in the US, the small number of empirical studies in Europe measure
legislative responsiveness as congruence between the policy positions of
representatives and represented, as evidenced in roll-call votes in the plenary. Hix
(1999, 200 I, 2002) for example uses roll-call votes to estimate the policy positions of
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individual MEPs with the Nominate technique.i He finds that MEPs are more
responsive to their national parties than their European party groups, especially if
national parties have the power to punish defectors. Moreover, party group cohesion
has increased with the power of the European Parliament (Hix, Noury and Roland,
2002; forthcoming).
Roll-call voting is an attractive object of study because data are now easily
available." Roll-calls however possess specific characteristics that set them apart from
other types of parliamentary activity. 5 First, voting is decidedly low-cost as it does not
require the representative to be particularly involved in the issue at hand. All that is
needed is for the MEP to be present during the voting session. As this thesis shows,
however, legislators are guided by different incentives when deciding to participate
and specialise in policy areas with different demands on their time and resources and
with different benefits in terms of policy and responsiveness.
Second, voting is about deciding, not about legislating. It takes place after the
substantive debate during which the policy proposal was developed but before it is
implemented and, thus, cannot reflect the contribution MEPs might have made at
these stages of the policy process. As this study argues, however, representation is not
only about voting amendments and policy proposals up or down but also about
actually developing legislation and monitoring its implementation. It is indeed wholly
conceivable that a representative never decides ('votes') on any policy proposal but
still does a good job representing his constituents in the formulation of these
proposals. Conversely, two representatives with identical voting records might have
3 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of Nominate.
~ See for instance http://personal.1se.ac.uklhix/HixNouryRolandEPdata.htm for data on all roll-calls in
the European Parliament since the first direct elections in 1979.
$ In addition to the theoretical concerns outlined below, recent research has pointed out that the focus
on roll-call votes is also problematic from a more technical standpoint. Carrubba et al (2004) for
instance find a considerable amount of selection bias in relation to roll-call votes in the European
Parliament.
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very different degrees of influence over which policy proposals are actually put to a
vote. If representation is construed only as decision-making in accordance with
constituency preferences, it disregards representatives' efforts to shape debates and
develop policy in the interest of their constituents.
Despite these empirical concerns, scholarship on direct representation adopts a
more convincing approach about when representation occurs and how to measure it.
First, direct representation is more complex than simple vote-seat congruence because
it can, in principle, distinguish between legislative behaviour in a large range of
activities and at different stages of the policy process. Second, unlike indirect
representation, which ignores the behavioural stage of the representational process,
elections play an intervening role in studies of direct representation because they
structure the behaviour of legislators. By focussing on the link between the legislative
behaviour of MEPs in the European Parliament and the political platforms of their
national parties, this thesis can examine the conditions under which representation
occurs at different stages of the policy process and under different electoral rules.
The next section develops a model of political representation in the European
Parliament to be tested in the remainder of the thesis. The section defines
representation as responsive specialisation, states several assumptions about the
preferences and representational foci of MEPs and derives a set of hypotheses to be
tested in subsequent chapters. The representational performance of MEPs is a function
of the party-political and institutional incentive structure for participation and
specialisation at different stages of the legislative process.
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II. Representation as Responsive Specialisation: Definition
and Assumptions
Il a. Defining Representation as Responsive Specialisation
As the previous section has argued, representative government does not solely
consist in the fact that every segment of the population has a seat in the legislature.
Instead, what matters is what legislators actually do once they have been elected.
Which MEPs have access to (i.e. are able to respond in) which policy areas? Because
they cannot engage equally in all policy areas and at all stages of the legislative
process, individual MEPs must decide to what extent they want to participate in the
legislature and whether they want to specialise in particular policy areas. The outcome
of these individual decisions is a particular division of labour that determines the
representational performance of the assembly as a whole and each one of its members.
Most existing scholarship considers legislative specialisation a danger to the
representative nature of parliamentary deliberation (e.g. Hall, 1996). In contrast, this
thesis suggests that specialisation is an essential element of political representation.
The need for specialisation manifests itself in different forms of legislative
organisation and institutional arrangements, such as parliamentary committees for
instance. Rather than deploring this division of labour, studies of political
representation should ask under what conditions MEPs specialise in policy areas that
are important to the representational process.
Measuring representation as a form of specialisation allows us to go beyond the
policy positions and legislative decisions of representatives in roll-call votes to take
into account that 'selective participation' grants MEPs access to power at different
stages of the policy process. As Hall (1996) notes in his study of participation in the
US Congress. the greater the intensity of a legislator's demand for participation in a
particular policy area, the more he or she will specialise in that area. In contrast to
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voting decisions, which can only be used to evaluate revealed preferences, such
revealed intensities partly reflect the relative importance of particular policy areas to
different legislators. As Hall (1996) points out, a good representative should not onlv
adopt the "electorally correct" policy position but also invest herself in areas where
that are of interest to her constituents, even if this means that she will not be able to
get involved in less salient policy areas. Similarly, Schmitt and Thomassen (2000)
point out in their study of the European Parliament that responsiveness should be
measured based on issue salience, following - what they call - a 'competence logic'.
Specialisation in particular policy areas leads to greater influence over debates,
deliberation and eventual policy outcomes in those areas. Representatives who focus
on policy areas that form an important part of their party's political platform are more
responsive because they are better placed to put their party's programme into practice.
The concept of responsive specialisation bridges the gap between the electoral and
behavioural stages of the representational process by addressing both the
representativeness of the legislature as a whole and the responsiveness of individual
legislators at different stages of the policy process. First, the individual participation
decisions of MEPs describe the representativeness of legislative deliberation. The
range of members involved in legislative business determines the values, interests and
constituencies that are represented in parliament. Second, legislative specialisation
determines the responsiveness of individual legislators. The thesis contributes to both
the research programmes on direct and indirect representation by explaining why and
to what extent representatives gain access to policy areas that allow them to put their
party's political priorities into practice.
In addition, the model takes into account that legislative specialisation may vary at
different stages of the policy process. In the European Parliament (as in most
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legislatures), we can distinguish between at least three elements of legislative work:
policymaking, decision-making and parliamentary oversight. Policymaking refers to
the formulation of policy (bill drafting) by sub-groups of legislators, decision-making
procedures in committee and plenary give every MEP the opportunity to express their
opinion in the form of a vote, and oversight allows individual representatives to hold
the executive accountable for its actions." At each stage, MEPs can choose, first,
whether or not to participate and, second, whether or not to specialise in areas that are
feature prominently in the political platform of their national party.
First, at the decision-making stage, policy proposals are debated, amended and
adopted in committee before they are passed on to the plenary for final adoption. As
pointed out before, most existing research has focused on the plenary stage where
roll-call votes are easily available. However, as Westlake (1994) points out, the
standing committees of the European Parliament are its 'legislative backbone'.
Proposals from Commission and Council are immediately assigned to one or several
committees where they are examined, amended and voted upon under open rule
(Neuhold, 2001; Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003). Committee work is the most time-
consuming activity for parliamentarians and defines the focus of their work (Corbett
et al., 2003). Representation at the committee decision-making stage consists of
participating in debates, introducing amendments and expressing opinions on
proposed legislation in policy areas that are salient to the party. By attending
committee meetings and participating in committee debates and votes, ~Ps can
6 Apart from these legislative powers, theEuropean Parliament also has substantial powers overthe
investiture anddismissal of the Commission andthe implementation of the EUbudget. While these
non-legislative powers arenot discussed in anydetail due to space constraints, there is no reason that
themodel developed here could notbeextended to incorporate a wider range of parliamentary
activities.
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exercise considerable policy influence and engage III policy areas that feature
prominently in their party's political platform.
Second, actual policymaking is primarily the responsibility of committee
rapporteurs. Most scholars agree that the production of legislative reports is one of the
most important elements of parliamentary committee work (Mamadouh and Raunio,
2001; 2003; Kaeding, 2004; 2005; Corbett et al, 2003). Rapporteurships afford
individual legislators significant influence over the formulation of policy proposals in
the inter-institutional game with the Council and the Commission. At the same time,
MEPs are responsive by signing up for and writing reports in policy areas that are
important elements of their national party's political platform. As Benedetto (2005,
pg. 67) notes, the distribution of reports among MEPs "allows us to conclude which
parties and nationalities [... ] have an impact on the content of European legislation".
Thus, maybe more than other legislative activities, 'selective participation' in
committee reports considerably affects the range of political opinions that are
represented in a particular policy area.
Finally, oversight refers to the European Parliament's powers to scrutinise the
activities of other European institutions, such as the Council and the Commission.
Parliamentary questions, for instance, allow individual legislators - as opposed to
parties or party groups - to bring up policy issues outside of their committee
jurisdictions in the plenary (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Raunio, 1997; Corbett et al.
2003). By questioning the executive on as wide a range of policy areas as possible,
legislators can monitor the government and minimize the risk of unexpected or
undesirable policy outcomes. At the same time, MEPs can be responsive by raising
issues of particular concern to their national party or by questioning the executive in
salient policy areas.
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The conceptualisation of representation presented in this chapter allows us to
consider all three stages of the legislative process. However, in order to explain their
participation and specialisation decisions, the study must make several assumptions
about the motivations of MEPs. The next two sections make these assumptions
explicit, explain why they are necessary and examine to what extent they are
justifiable.
Assumption One: The Preferences ofIndividual MEPs Determine Their Legislative
Behaviour
At its most fundamental, the model in this thesis assumes that MEPs are rational
actors whose behaviour can be explained as a function of their relative individual
preferences for representation and legislation. A substantial literature assesses the
motivations of MEPs to engage in the European Parliament. Individual legislative
behaviour is influenced by both individual-level attributes (such as individual
preferences and socio-political characteristics) as well as institutional factors (such as
national/partisan recruitment, partisan organisation at different stages of the
legislative process and country-specific attributes).
Empirical scholarship has found that institutional factors have an impact on the
role perception and attitudes of MEPs. Beauvallet and Michon (2006b) point to the
importance of national recruitment practices in determining parliamentary activity.
They find that French MEPs for instance "have long been selected on the basis of
national criteria which tend to disfavour those who are most committed to the
European Parliament" (pg. 339). Similarly, Katz points out that there are large
variations in MEP attitudes across countries, due to institutional differences such
length of membership and national influence within the EU (Katz, 1999).
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Given the preponderance of parties and high levels of institutionalisation in most
European legislatures, the question arises whether the socio-political attributes and
preferences of individual representatives have much power at all in explaining
legislative behaviour. If partisan organisation, for instance, explains most legislative
behaviour, individual preferences will matter only in relation to the party. Evidence
that this may be case. First, some MEPs hold dual mandates in the European and
national parliaments, though their number has decreased rapidly over the 1990s
(Beauvallet and Michon, 2006a). These legislators are likely put less emphasis on
individual participation in the EP. Others see the European Parliament as an
opportunity for political "professionalisation", These MEPs develop specialisms in
areas that they are already familiar with or where they can acquire further political
experience. Increasing professionalisation is reflected in the leadership structure
within the EP. In 1998, 75% of MEPs in leadership positions had spent at least 10
years in the EP. As Beauvallet and Michon point out (2006a), the composition of the
European Parliament and the background of legislators in leadership positions
indicate the emergence of a professional political class that responds to a European
career path and higher parliamentary institutionalisation.
Despite the importance of partisan factors for parliamentary careers, the vast
majority ofMEPs (74.70/0) claim that they base their legislative decisions on their own
opinions rather than on those of their national party or their voters (Katz, 1999).
Furthermore, Katz finds that national factors become marginal, once individual
attitudes of MEPs are taken into account. In the European Parliament, competing
pressures between the preferences and priorities of national parties, European party
groups and national delegations, entail that institutional "clues" for the legislative
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behaviour of individual MEPs are even less straightforward than in most national
legislatures.
These findings suggest that individual attributes may affect attitudes (and
behaviour) within the EP to a greater extent than in national parliaments. According to
Katz (1999), these results could suggest that, "since the European Parliament is not an
example of party government, nor is there a European executive whose stability
depends on its ability to command a parliamentary majority, party loyalty simply does
not matter as much as it might in a "normal" European parliament" (pg 64). As he
acknowledges, the extent to which personal preferences shape legislative behaviour in
the European and in other parliaments will be conditional on a large number of
factors. These could include legislative career prospects, the power of the legislature
in different policy areas or the characteristics of the legislative activity at hand (e.g its
relative importance in determining policy outcomes, its public visibility, etc).
However, his findings do indicate that, "in forming their own judgements, MPs
consider strategy as well as preference" (pg 64). In line with these results, this thesis
assumes that, while strategic objectives (including national/European partisan and
territorial characteristics) may play a role in determining legislative behaviour,
individual preferences remain important factors in determining the specialisation and
participation decisions of MEPs.
Assumption Two: MEPs Value Representation
While the model does not need to make any assumptions about the relative
importance of representation, legislation or other legislative objectives, it does assume
that, other things equal, MEPs prefer to be 'good' rather than 'bad' representatives. In
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other words, the thesis requires that MEPs have (at least) a weak preference for policy
areas that feature prominently in their national party's political programme.7
Table 2.1 examines whether this weak preference assumption is justifiable. Most
MEPs have clearly defined ideas about their role as legislators and representatives. A
survey carried out in 2000 asked individual MEPs to rank the importance of a range
of six aspects of their work.8 Of course, these results must be interpreted with care.
Most MEPs are seasoned politicians and they are likely to give strategic answers to
questions that could be interpreted as assessments of the quality of their work. Very
few MEPs who returned the questionnaire (about one third of the total) attributed only
little importance to any of the six aspects and around 70 percent of legislators score a
5 or a 4 for the first four aspects. Rather than relying on opinion surveys, studies of
the role of MEPs must therefore also take into account possible variation between
these stated preferences and actual legislative behaviour.
Nevertheless, Table 2.1 shows that legislators attribute a very important role to
both representation and legislation. The table confirms that MEPs value the
representational aspect of their work. A plurality of MEPs attributes a score of4 to the
representation of social groups and the mediation of societal interests. Relative to all
other aspects in the survey, the representation of individual interests is perceived as
least important.9 However, the survey also shows that legislation remains the most
important output of the legislature (see also Wahlke, 1978). Fully 57 percent of
7 Indeed, if this assumption is not fulfilled, political representation becomes arbitrary and it is
impossible to tracethe representational performance of individual MEPs to their behavioural choices in
the legislature.
• The survey had a good response rate of about 31% and constitutes a representative sample of all
MEPs in the fifth Parliament (see Hix,2002 for details).
9 Partly, this may be due to the perceived distance between individual citizens in EU member states and
the European Parliament in Brussels. However, theseanswers also reflectthe structure of the survey
which divides the representational ftmction ofthe EP into3 separate categories. This illustrates one of
the methodological problems associated with studies that relyon opinion surveys to assess policy
preferences ofconstituents and MEPs. Finally. the apparent lowimportance of individual
representation suggests that other political entities such as parties mightplay an intervening role in the
representational self-assessment ofMEPs in the European Parliament
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legislators attribute the highest score (5) to taking part in legislation. Parliamentary
oversight is the second most important aspect of legislative work according to most
MEPs. More than 45 percent of legislators attribute maximum importance to
legislative scrutiny.
TABLE 2.1. RELATIVE PREFERENCES FOR POLICY AND REPRESENTATION As SELF-
REPORTED BY MEPs
Legislation Representation
Importance Take part Parliamentary Develop Represent Mediate Represent
(l=10w-Svgreat) in Oversight Strategies Groups Interests Individuals
Legislation
1 0% 0% 2% 1% 7% 190 0
2 2% 4% 8% 7% 18% 18%
3 13% 16% 22% 23% 31% 27%
4 28% 34% 48% 40% 32% 19%
5 57% 45% 21% 29% 11% 17%
Overall
Preference 4.4 4.17 3.81 3.89 3.19 2.97
Index
Source: EPRG MEP Survey, 2000; Overall Preference Index is the importance ofeach aspect weighted by the percentage of
MEPs in each row; see Hix (2002)for details about the representativeness ofthe survey.
Table 2.1 confirms that MEPs have at least a weak preference for
representation. In other words, given the choice between a range of otherwise
equivalent policy areas, MEPs will choose to specialise in the areas that yield the
highest representational payoffs.
Assumption Three: National Parties are the Common Representational Focus of
MEPs
The third assumption underlying the thesis is that MEPs share the same
representational focus: their national party. As previous studies have shown,
institutional environments affect the extent to which MEPs focus on providing
constituency service (e.g. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2006) and how they
define their primary constituency (Kingdon. 1973; Wright, 1989). As Chapter 1 has
shown, "responsible parties" playa crucial role in the representational processes of
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most European parliamentary democracies. In order to successfully identify the
conditions under which MEPs represent their constituents the thesis must clarify, .
which group of people legislators understand that constituency to be.
In the European Parliament, the two most promising representational foci are
territorial and ideological. The relative importance of these two foci is likelv to differ
across electoral systems. Hix (2004) and Farrell and Scully (2002) show that the
domestic political systems in which MEPs compete for votes differ dramatically. In
some member states, electoral districts are small, candidate selection is highly
centralised and ballots for European elections are closed, which attributes substantial
selection powers to the national party leadership (Hix, 2004). MEPs from these
countries are likely to be particularly concerned with representing the preferences of
their national parties. In other member states, selection procedures are more
decentralised with open ballots and larger districts, which reduces candidate
dependency on the party leadership (Hix, 2004). Representatives from these countries
might prefer to focus on their territorial constituency (i.e. their country/electoral
district).
In addition to this national cleavage, a second set of studies has noted the
importance of party groups in structuring legislative behaviour in the EP and
elsewhere (Hix, 2005; Hix et al. 1999). As Hix et al. (1999) point out, many MEPs
want to be promoted to positions of authority and prestige within the European
Parliament, such as particular rapporteurships, committee chairs, or vice-chairs.
Legislators who have such career ambitions must cater to their party group leadership,
which allocates most EP internal positions. On the other hand, Westlake (1994) finds
that some MEPs are interested in positions outside the European Parliament upon
expiration of their mandate, either within their national legislature, their party or
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elsewhere. Again, these legislators are likely to adjust their legislative behaviour to
accommodate their career goals. Just like electoral incentives may shift the
representational focus more or less toward national parties, the career ambitions of
MEPs affect the importance they attribute to their European party groups.
In sum, both territorial and ideological cleavages define the representational focus
of MEPs in the European Parliament. It is at the level of national parties where the
features of the domestic electoral system intersect with the political ideology of
individual MEPs. In addition, most recent empirical research has found that
ideological politics have gradually come to dominate legislative decision-making in
the European Parliament (Hix et aI., forthcoming; 2004; Kreppel and Hix, 2003; Jun,
2003; Hoyland, 2005; Whitaker, 2001; 2005). As Kreppel (2002) notes, party
influence over electoral lists may give rise to a true 'electoral connection' between
MEPs and their national parties, if not their home electorate. In an in-depth study of
MEPs' roll-call voting records over the full five terms of the European Parliament,
Hix et al. (forthcoming; 2004), for instance, find that the legislative behaviour of
MEPs is more closely aligned with their national party than with their European party
group or their territorial constituency. Similarly, Jun (2003) notes that national parties
are crucial in determining MEP behaviour in budgetary discharge votes. Finally,
Whitaker (2001, 2005) concludes that national parties have increased their power over
policy outcomes at the European level by assuming greater control over committee
assignments and the direction of committee business as the powers of the EP
increased.
In line with these findings, the empirical assessment of the model developed here
focuses on national parties as an MEP's primary representational focus. MEPs are
responsive (i.c. they exercise government for the people) if they specialise in policy
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areas that feature prominently in the political platform of their national party.
Representative government (government of the people) occurs when a wide range of
national party interests are represented in a particular activity. However. territorial
cleavages remain a very important factor in EU politics that must be accounted for in
any empirical analysis of representation in the EP. Ultimately, the question of the
appropriate representational focus is an empirical one. Only an empirical analysis of
the actual legislative behaviour of MEPs can provide insights about their real
representational focus.
This section has made explicit the three main assumptions upon which this
thesis is built. First, individual decisions matter in explaining legislative specialisation
and participation. Second, representatives must hold at least a weak preference for
policy areas that yield a representational payoff (i.e. that feature prominently on their
national party's platform). Third, controlling for differences in electoral systems and
individual career ambitions, MEPs define their primary representational focus as the
national party to which they belong. Given these assumptions, the remainder of this
chapter investigates the conditions under which responsive specialisation occurs.
III. Representational Performance as a Function of Party-
Political and Institutional Incentives
The previous section has defined representation as a function of individual
legislative participation and specialisation decisions and described the legislative
objectives of MEPs. This section describes the institutional and party political
environment in which legislative behaviour takes place. The model argues that the
interaction of preferences for political representation and legislation with party-
political and institutional incentives at different stages of the legislative process
determines the representational performance of individual legislators.
1'2
Figure 2.1 illustrates this process. First, MEPs have certain preferences for
political representation and legislation. The assumption is that ~v1EPs make behaviour
is based on individual preferences, that all MEPs have at least a weak preference for
representation (i.e. representation is a 'good', not a 'bad') and that they share a
common representational focus (i.e. national party voters). Second, party political and
institutional incentives affect individual decisions to participate at different stages of
the legislative process and to specialise in different policy areas. Finally. these
decisions determine the representational performance of each individual legislator
and, by aggregation, the representational performance of the EP as a whole. The
remainder of this section describes the party-political and institutional incentives at all
three stages of the legislative process in the European Parliament.
FIGURE 2.1. REPRESENTATION AS A FUNCTION OF PARTY-POLITICAL INSTITUTIONAL
INCENTIVES
MEP
U(represent, legislate)
Incentives
---.. Party-Politics
Institutions
Behaviour
Participation
Specialisation
_--.. Outcome
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Party Political Incentives in the European Parliament
Comparative research has found that partisan politics are a major determinant
of legislative behaviour (King, 1976; Andeweg and Nijzink, 1995). In his seminal
contribution, King (1976) distinguishes between fives modes of executive-legislative
relations, most of which fall into the broader categories of inter- or intra-party
politics. As a function of the legislative behaviour of individual representatives,
political representation is conditional on intra- and inter-party politics at every stage
of the policy process.
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In most national systems, inter-party relations are dominated by majority rule.
Indeed, in delegation theories of parliamentary democracy, the majority of MPs
delegates executive authority to a government, which formulates and implements
policy in the interest of its principal (e.g. Saalfeld, 2000). Approval of the
parliamentary majority is required for most bills to pass through parliament. The
government is accountable to the parliamentary majority and remains in place as long
as it enjoys the support of the majority of MPs. In such a system, coalition dynamics
playa major role in the participation and specialisation decisions of legislators. Where
majority rule is the primary decision-making mechanism, parliamentary voting
coalitionsdetermine legislative behaviour and, therefore, political representation.
In the European Parliament, party politics involve both coalitions between EP
party groups in legislative activities that fall under majority rule and national party
ties with the Commission in legislative-executive relations. First, both policy-making
and decision-making are governed by majority rule between party groups. As Hix et
al. (forthcoming) and Scully (1997) confirm in two studies of roll-call votes, the
legislative participation of MEPs depends on their ability to influence policy
outcomes. They find that voting turnout differs substantially across party groups,
depending on coalition dynamics. Larger party groups and those which tended to be
on the winning side of most votes in the previous 6-month period participate 14%-
16% more than groups which tended to side with the losing minority. Thus, like for
national parliaments, voting coalitions between party groups determine the
participation and specialisation decisions of MEPs and, therefore, their
representational performance.
Second, however, the EP is different from an ideal-type parliamentary
democracy in that the executive does not emanate directly from the parliamentary
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majority. Instead, the nomination of Commissioners is in the hands of the governing
parties in each member state.l" As a result, unlike most national parliaments. there is
an additional dimension to inter-party politics in the EP. Ties between national party
delegations in the EP and the European executive, the Commission, govern executive-
legislative relations. As Jun (2003) concludes in a study of budgetary discharge votes,
for instance, partisan ties with individual Commissioners affect an MEP' s incentive to
exercise parliamentary scrutiny. MEPs whose national parties are represented in the
Commission are less likely to challenge its budget proposal than legislators without
such ties. In legislative activities that are not governed by majority rule, partisan ties
with the European Commission determine the participation and specialisation
decisions of MEPs and, therefore, their representational performance.
Finally, intra-party politics characterise the interaction between legislators from
different parties and their own party leadership. In the European Parliament and
elsewhere, parties are composed of individual members with their own policy
preferences, constituencies, and status within the party hierarchy. As Boucek (2002,
pg.454) notes, "parties are not unitary actors but collections of individuals [...] with
common but also divergent preferences and interests and with competing claims on
party resources." Members of governing parties may be frustrated with the constraints
under which the government operates, they may feel that the party's policy
preferences are being betrayed or they may be concerned about their personal re-
election prospects if the government drifts away from the policy preferences of their
constituents (Saalfeld, 2000). Similarly, opposition parties also have to contend with
different factions competing for the party leadership.
10 However, the IP has the right to reject the Commission as a whole and it holds hearings with
individual commissioners. This procedure led to a major reshuffle of the Barroso Commission after the
European Parliament refused to approve the nomination of Italian candidate Rocco Buttiglione as
commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs.
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The relatively loose nature of trans-national party group federations in the
European Parliament may make intra-party group politics an even more significant
determinant of legislative behaviour than in other legislatures. The party group
leadership in the EP must ensure the cohesion of the group by balancing the claims of
party elites and rank-and-file without endangering the 'brand name' of the group
(Boucek, 2002).11 In other words, cohesion is maintained by distributing the group's
resources to give all members a stake in its efficient operation and by rewarding
MEPs whose legislative behaviour is in line with group goals. The success of this
strategy depends on the party group's gate-keeping power, or its ability to
discriminate among its members in the allocation of legislative spoils.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the relationship between representation and legislative
behaviour as discussed so far. Whether and to what extent MEPs participate or
specialise in a particular policy area depends on coalition dynamics between party
groups, national party ties to the executive and intra-party group politics. Participation
and specialisation, in turn, determine legislative outcomes both in terms of
representation (i.e. the responsiveness of MEPs and the representativeness of
participation) and legislation (i.e. policymaking, decision-making and parliamentary
oversight). 12
Note that this conception of how parliaments operate is very different from the
hierarchical model presented in Chapter 1. Here, representatives adjust their
legislative behaviour to attain their representational and legislative objectives.
Institutional incentives, inter- and intra party politics define how MEPs participate
and specialise in the European Parliament. The next section examines how
7 Cohesion in this context refersto the ability of the party groupto rallyaround a common policy
~sition and entice its members to support groupgoals in their legislative work.
2 Notethat scrutiny is listed as part of"legislation" in this categorisation. Even though oversight is not
directly partof the law-making process as such, it is an essential step in the implementation ofpolicy
formulated and decidedby the legislature.
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institutional incentives affect the participation and specialisation decisions of
individual MEPs at all three stages of the legislative process.
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FIGURE 2.2. LEGISLATION AND REPRESENTATION AS A FUNCTION OF INTER- AND
INTRA-PARTY POLITICS
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Institutional Incentives at Different Stages ofthe Policy Process
Most legislative activities are governed by a set of rules laid down in the Rules of
Procedure of the European Parliament. Some of these rules are a result of European
treaties over which the EP does not have much influence. Others are drawn up by the
Parliament itself to facilitate its internal organization. This thesis examines three
institutional rules in particular that create a strong incentive structure for participation
and specialisation: proportionality requirements, open rule in committee and plenary
and majority thresholds.
First, proportionality rules affect how legislative spoils are distributed across
groups. Assignments to parliamentary committee for instance follow a proportional
allocation mechanism. As the Rules of Procedure (Rule 152) stipulate, "the
composition of the committees shall, as far as possible. reflect the composition of
Parliament". Similarly, committee reports are delegated to party groups in relation to
their size in the EP. Each time a committee takes on a report. a rapporteur is
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nominated to draw up a draft text for approval by the committee. The details of the
procedure for nominating rapporteurs vary, though all committees have instituted an
auction system where every party group is allocated a number of points based on its
delegation size.13 Committee coordinators fix the initial 'price' of each report and
make bids on behalf of their group. If more than one group is interested in a particular
report, the coordinators can raise their bids up to a certain maximum. Finally, group
co-ordinators allocate the reports they have won to 'their' MEPs. By auctioning off
reports according to party group size, the report allocation procedure enforces a
proportional pattern of participation across party groups and impedes party group
competition.
Second, incentives to participate and specialise at different stages of the legislative
process are also affected by the institution of double "open rule" in committee and
plenary. All reports that are presented to the committee or the plenary floor by their
rapporteur are subject to open rule. Open rule gives the (simple or absolute) majority
coalition the final say over the policy position of the Parliament and its committees
and forces minority MEPs to seek the support of (at least parts) of the majority in
order to get their reports or amendments adopted. As long as a party group (or a
coalition of party groups) holds a majority of votes in committee and plenary, it can
determine the content of policy by introducing amendments to, or participating in
votes on, existing committee reports. Thus, in contrast to proportionality requirements
in report allocation, open rule in committee decision-making creates a strong
majoritarian element and fosters competition among party groups.
13 NOlI.' that bidding points must be spent on reports in the committee where they were issued
originally. Indeed, if the points were transferable across committees, party groups would bid up reports
in the most interesting committees rather than using them on policy areas that lack salience or where
the EP does not have much power.
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Finally, one additional institutional rule has a strong impact on incentives to
participate and specialise in the EP. The legislative decision-making procedures in
effect in the European Union stipulate the majority thresholds that must be fulfilled
for the European Parliament to decide about the policy proposals before the plenary.
Most decision-making in the EP requires a simple majority (50 percent plus 1 MEP)
of all legislators that are present at the time of the vote. In other words, the number of
MEPs required to adopt a proposal or amendment depends on the number of MEPs
that attend each voting session. As some have argued, the legitimacy of decision-
making under simple majority decision-making can be in doubt if attendance levels
are very low (see also Chapter 4). Nevertheless, simple majorities are widely used in
most parliaments across Europe and at the European level.
However, some votes in the European Parliament cannot be taken by simple
majority. Notably, the co-decision procedure under which the European Parliament
has most of its power and under which it acts as an equal co-legislator with the
Council of Ministers requires an absolute majority of all legislators (whether they are
present at the voting session or not). In comparison with simple majority, the number
of MEPs required to make a decision under absolute majority does not change over
time (unless the size of the European Parliament changes, which is usually the case
after an ED enlargement). Several studies have analysed the effect of absolute
majority requirements on participation at roll-call votes. As Hix et al. (forthcoming)
find, participation across all groups is highest for co-decision votes, as a result of the
greater policy importance of these votes and because of absolute majority
requirements in the second reading. In an earlier article. Scully (1997) confirmed the
positive relationship between the use of the co-decision procedure and turnout at roll-
calls.
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Of course, majority thresholds are an essential determinant of coalition dynamics
across party groups in the European Parliament. Most recent research maintains that
left-right policy preferences drive coalition formation (e.g. Hix et al., forthcoming). In
the fifth European Parliament, the centre-right European People's party (EPP) and the
liberal ELDR could coalesce to form a simple majority that excludes the second
largest group (PES). As Hix et al. (forthcoming) confirm, the largest party group in
the fifth Parliament, the conservative EPP, is more likely to coalesce with its closest
partner along the left-right axis, the liberal ELDR, in order to form a winning majority
than with the second largest group (PES). In other words, the relatively small liberal
party group plays a pivotal role in votes taken under simple majority in the fifth
European Parliament.
At the same time, however, the dominant coalition depends on the majority
thresholds required under different decision-making procedures (Hix, 2001). Because
of relatively low attendance figures in the European Parliament, the simple majority
of EPP and ELDR is different from the absolute majority of all MEPs. Votes taken
under absolute majority usually require the approval of the two largest party groups
(EPP and PES), with the liberal ELDR either voting with this 'grand coalition' or
against it (e.g. Bardi, 1994; Hix and Lord, 1997; Kreppel and Hix, 2003; Benedetto,
2005). Whereas, EPP and ELDR are the main coalition partners in non co-decision
legislation where a simple majority is sufficient, EPP and PES coalesce on co-
decision legislation, which requires an absolute majority of votes in the second
reading of the plenary (Hix, 2001; see also Lane et al. 19995; Hosli, 1997; Nurmi,
1997; Corbett et al, 2005). In terms of party group coalitions, the use of absolute
majority eliminates the pivotal role of the ELDR as coalition partner of the largest
delegation (EPP).
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Figure 2.3 summarises the effect of institutional incentives on representation and
legislation in the European Parliament. Majority rule in committee and plenary and
proportionality rules in committee assignments and report allocation affect how
legislative spoils (i.e. influential and salient committees/reports) are allocated across
party groups. The decision-making rule defines the size of the coalition required to
make decisions about policy proposals before committee and plenary. Both the
allocation of legislative spoils and the use of different decision-making rules
determine the legislative participation and specialisation decisions of MEPs and
therefore, their representational performance at different stages of the policy process.
FIGURE 2.3. LEGISLATION AND REPRESENTATION AS A FUNCTION OF INSTITUTIONAL
INCENTIVES IN POLICY-MAKING AND DECISION-MAKING
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This section has re-defined political representation as a function of party-
political and institutional incentives at different stages of the policy process in the EP.
In line with Pitkin (1967), representation refers to the ability of legislators to respond
to their constituents (here: their national party) by participating in different legislative
activities and specialising in policy areas are important to their party. The next section
combines the findings in Figure 2.1-2.3 to derive a set of hypotheses about the impact
of party-political and institutional incentives on political representation.
IV. Hypotheses
IVa. Political Representation and Committee Decision-making
As the previous section has discussed, the ability to influence legislation is a
result of coalition politics among party groups in legislative activities that fall under
majority rule. By structuring policy incentives that determine participation and
specialisation in the European Parliament, these coalition dynamics also affect the
representational performance of individual legislators.
Hix et al. (forthcoming) present the most sophisticated model of the effect of
coalition dynamics on legislative participation in EP roll-call votes to date (see also
Scully, 1997). As Scully (1997) notes, the European Parliament presents a unique
opportunity to analyse the specialisation decisions of legislators across policy areas
where the Parliament has different degrees of power over outcomes. Both studies find
that participation depends on policy incentives, which vary across political coalitions
within the EP. MEPs who are likely to be on the 'winning side' have a greater
incentive to participate in the formulation of policy and in its adoption.
However, their (as well as Scully's) study is confined to roll-call votes even
though voting sessions in the EP usually deal with a large number of policy areas at
the same time. Once they have paid the costs of attending a voting session, there is
8"
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little point for MEPs to discriminate between different policy areas. Second, voting
does not constitute a large drain on legislative resources. All that is required is for
MEPs to be present at the voting session and to follow the instructions of their party
groups. Again, specialisation in a limited number of policy areas does not make much
sense in the context of roll-call votes. Finally, roll-calls only include a minority of all
voting decisions in the EP (about one third). As Hix (2005) himself admits, if party
groups decide strategically which votes they would like to have by roll-call, there is a
potential problem of 'selection bias' in the sample. Indeed, Carrubba et al. (2004) find
considerable bias across policy areas and party groups in roll-call votes for the fifth
Parliament.
The framework laid out in the previous section allows us to predict the impact
of party-political and institutional incentives at a different stage of the legislative
process: decision-making on the committee floor. As pointed out before, committee
decision-making is subject to majority (open) rule. In order for a particular bill to pass
it must receive the support of a majority of committee and plenary members. Because
MEPs from the majority coalition (whether this is a simple or an absolute majority)
determine legislative outcomes, they have a greater policyincentive to participate in
legislative activities that fall under majority rule. Stated differently, the range of
values and interests represented in committee deliberations is biased in favour of the
majority coalition in committee and plenary. Under open rule, majority MEPSl4 are
better represented than minority MEPs. This result should hold independently of the
ideological composition ofthe majority coalition or its size.
14Theremainder of this text usesthe terms"majority" and ''minority''MEP to distinguish between
legislators whose parties form part of the primary voting majority and thosewhodo not respectively.
Themajority refers to the minimum connected winning coalition required underthe prevailing majority
threshold. The thesistherefore assumes that party groups prefer fewer coalition partners withclose
policy preferences ratherthan largercoalitions thatcovera wider rangeofthe policy spectrum. Note
that this assumption contradicts 8ix (2001)argument that EP coalitions are oftenbuilton an issue-by-
issue basis. The impact ofsuch ad hoc coalition fonnation is investigated briefly in Chapter4.
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Hypothesis 1a: MEPs from the majority coalition in the EP participate in a
broader rage ofpolicy areas than minority l'vfEPs in committee decision-making.
However, as we have seen in the previous section, in addition to being
represented in a wide variety of policy areas, political representation also depends on
the actual responsiveness of MEPs (i.e. their effort to put the political platform of
their national party into practice). In committee decision-making, not all MEPs face
the same incentive to specialise in policy areas that feature prominently among their
national party's priorities.
As noted above, MEPs from the majority coalition can affect committee
decision-making and the content of policy. However, this influence over policy
outcomes is contingent upon high levels of participation in a broad range of policy
areas. If majority MEPs focus on the subset of the most salient policy areas, they
forego some of their influence in areas where they did not participate. Minority MEPs
on the other hand, do not have any power over committee decision-making because
they do not have the support of a voting majority. As a result, they can choose to
specialise in a smaller subset of policy areas without incurring a loss of influence in
areas where they do not participate.
More formally, specialisation in a select number of policy areas that are most
prominent in the national party's platform carries different opportunity costs for
majority and minority MEPs. MEPs who are part of the majority coalition in the
European Parliament must forego some of their influence over legislation if they
choose to specialise III a restricted range of policy areas. On the other hand,
specialisation does not carry this opportunity cost for minority legislators. As a result,
minority MEPs are more likely to focus their efforts in the most salient policy areas.
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Hypothesis 1b: MEPs from the minority coalition are more responsive than
majority MEPs in committee decision-making.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the difference between majority and minority \lEPs in
committee decision-making for a single policy area. The two intercepts show the
effect of majority (open) rule on levels of participation for all values of policy
salience. In terms of representativeness, committee decision-making is biased in
favour of the (simple or absolute) majority coalition. The two slopes show the
difference in responsiveness across party groups. The larger the slope, the more the
specialisation decisions of MEPs reflect the salience of the policy area in terms of
their national party's political platform. Whereas minority groups specialise in salient
policy areas, the majority coalition has an incentive to maintain similar levels of
participation across all policy areas.
FIGURE 2.4. MAJORITY MEPs ARE BETTER REPRESENTED BUT LESS RESPONSIVE
THAN MINORITY MEPs IN COMMITTEE DECISION-MAKING
Minority MEP
Salience
Note: For ease ofinterpretation, the figure shows the relationship between participation and salience as linear. The assumptions
ofthe model only require a weakly positive association between participation and salience (Assumption I, Chapter 2). The
figure refers to a single policy area.
Chapter 4 in the empirical part of the thesis tests hypotheses 1a and 1b on data of
committee attendance records. Membership in the majority coalition in the EP
explains levels of participation in committee deliberation. Because majority MEPs
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have a greater policy incentive to participate in committee decision-making. they are
represented in a wider range of policy areas than their colleagues from minority
groups. At the same time, however, majority MEPs are less responsive than their
colleagues because they do not discriminate in favour of the most salient policy areas.
IV b. Political Representation and Policy Formulation
Like decision-making, policy making in the European Parliament is also subject to
majority rule. Other things equal, participation and specialisation at this stage of the
policy process should therefore be similar to committee decision-making. However,
as discussed above, the difference between policy formulation via committee reports
and decision-making on the committee floor lies in the report allocation procedure.
All party groups, independently of their majority or minority status are represented
equally at this stage of the policy process.
However, similar levels of participation do not necessarily mean that all party
groups write equally desirable committee reports. Not all MEPs have the same
incentives to specialise at the policy formulation stage. Instead, the bidding system
allows majority MEPs to win the most desirable reports because they have the largest
number of bidding points and because they can threaten to reject reports written by
minority MEPs in committee and plenary. In other words, because majority MEPs can
choose which reports will pass at the decision-making stage in committee and
plenary, they can discriminate in favour of the most desirable policy areas.
Time and effort required to write a report are the same across all policy areas and
for all MEPs. 15 However. specialisation in the most desirable (i.e. salient) policy areas
carries different benefits for minority and majority MEPs. Whereas majority MEPs
IS Of course, some reports, namely those that fall under the most influential co-decision procedure.
might require a greater time investment than some smaller own initiative reports. The empirical
analysis in Chapter 5 controls for these differences.
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can influence policy outcomes in the most salient areas, this is not the case for
minority MEPs who do not hold the required majority in committee and plenary. In
contrast to hypothesis 1.b, the proportionality rules governing report allocation
produce the opposite effect at the policy formulation stage. Here majority MEPs are
favoured when it comes to specialisation in policy areas that are most important in
terms of their national party's political platform. The auctioning system, coupled with
open rule in committee and plenary, implies that majority MEPs are more responsive
in policy formulation than their peers.
Hypothesis 2: In policy formulation, MEPs from the minority coalition are
less responsive than majority MEPs.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the difference between majority and minority MEPs in
policy formulation. The two intercepts are the same for both majority and minority
party groups. In terms of representativeness, policy formulation is not biased in favour
of any party group or coalition, irrespective of the majority thresholds at the decision-
making stage. The two slopes show the difference in responsiveness for majority and
minority MEPs. Whereas majority groups discriminate in favour of the most salient
policy areas, the minority only has access to less desirable reports.
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FIGURE 2.5. MAJORITY MEPs ARE MORE RESPONSIVE THAN MINORITY MEPs IN
POLICY FORMULATION
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Note: For ease of interpretation, the figure shows the relationship between participation and salience as linear. The assumptions
ofthe model only require a weakly positive association between participation and salience (Chapter 2, Assumption I). Thefigure
refers to a single policy area.
Chapter 5 empirically tests hypothesis 2 for committee report allocation in the
European Parliament. Unlike decision-making, there are only small differences in
levels of participation across party groups. At the same time, the report allocation
procedure implies that majority MEPs specialise in the policy areas that feature most
prominently in their national party's platform. As a result, MEPs from the majority
groups are more responsive at this stage of the legislative process than their peers.
IV c. Political Representation and Parliamentary Oversight
The previous two sections have focused on legislative activities that are
governed by coalition dynamics among party groups. In the case of committee work,
majority rule creates an incentive structure that encourages participation and
specialisation along the lines of party group coalitions. However, parliamentary
questions at Question-Time in the EP, for instance, are not subject to majority rule.
There is therefore no reason to expect that questioning will follow coalition dynamics
across party groups. Instead, as we have seen above, legislative-executive relations
arc subject to a government-opposition dynamic that pits national party delegations
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against one another on the basis of their representation in the executive. Like for
policy formulation and decision-making, the institutional and party-political incentive
structure that guides the participation and specialisation decisions of individual MEPs
determines their representational performance in legislative activities that are not
subject to majority rule.
As Table 2.1 has indicated, in addition to taking part in legislation, MEPs also
value oversight of the executive (i.e. the Commission). Indeed, scrutiny via inter alia
questions ensures that the chain of accountability between legislature and executive
remains intact. By requesting information from the Commission and publicising its
policies in as many areas as possible, legislators in the European Parliament can draw
attention to potential misgivings and minimise the risk of executive agency drift. Of
course, the value of formal scrutiny varies across MEPs. MEPs who face a high risk
that the Commission will not act in accordance with their preferences are more likely
to monitor the executive than legislators whose policy preferences are very close to
the Commission. In other words, oversight incentives depend on the composition of
the executive and the partisan affiliation ofeach representative.
First, the farther an MEP's preferences are from the executive, the greater the
incentive to oversee the executive in that area. Effective oversight requires
participation .in all policy areas where the executive deviates from the policy
preferences of the legislator. As a result, MEPs with preferences that are far from the
Commission are better represented in legislative oversight than their peers. Taking
Partisan affiliation as a proxy for political preferences, this should mean that MPs
from 'opposition' parties", which are not represented in the Commission, must use
formal channels, such as parliamentary questions, to express their misgivings about
I'Tho remainder ofthe textusesthe terms "governing" and"opposition" partylMEP to distinguish
between partiesIMEPs thatare represented in theCommission andthose thatare notrespectively.
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the executive. 'Governing' MEPs on the other hand can use more informal and less
publicchannels to monitor their peers. As a result, these representatives are less likely
to have recourse to parliamentary questions. Thus, 'governing' MEPs are less well
represented in formal parliamentary oversight than 'opposition' legislators.!"
Hypothesis 3. a: 'Opposition' MEPs are better represented in parliamentary
oversight than their peers from 'governing' parties.
Second, incentives to specialise in particular policy areas at the oversight stage
also depend on the partisan affiliation of MEPs. Like for committee decision-making,
where responsiveness carries an opportunity cost for majority MEPs, specialisation in
parliamentary oversight is costly for 'opposition' parties. In order to hold the
executive effectively accountable for its actions, 'opposition' MEPs must engage in
oversight across a large range of policy issues. For them, focussing on the smaller
number of salient policy areas requires foregoing some of their oversight powers. In
other words, there is a trade-off between parliamentary oversight and responsiveness
for 'opposition' MEPs. For 'governing' MEPs, however, who are less interested in
legislative oversight, this trade-off is less marked. As a result, 'opposition' MEPs are
less responsive than legislators with direct partisan ties to the executive.
Hypothesis 3b: 'Opposition' parties are less responsive in parliamentary
oversight than their peers.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the effect of oversight incentives on representation for
'governing' MEPs (i.e. with direct partisan ties to the Commission) and for
'opposition' MEPs (i.e. without such ties). 'Opposition' parties engage more in
oversight activities than other MEPs. However, 'governing' MEPs are more
I' Other reasons for lower activity levels among governing MEPs might include thatcritical questions
to theCommission might affect the MEP'scareerprospects in thenational party or within the EP.
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responsive because they do not have to formally monitor the executive in less salient
policy areas.
FIGURE 2.6. ' GOVERNING' MEPs ARE LESS WELL REPRESENTED BUT MORE
RESPONSIVE THAN 'OPPOSITION' MEPs IN LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
'Opposition' MEP
Salience
Note: For ease ofinterpretation, the figure shows the relationship between participation and salience as linear. The assumptions
ofthe model only require a weakly positive association between participation and salience (Chapter 2, Assumption I) Thefigure
refers to a single policy area.
Chapter 6 tests these hypotheses for the case of parliamentary questions at
Question-Time in the European Parliament. MEPs from national parties that are not
represented in the Commission participate more at Question-Time than their peers
whose delegations form part of the EU executive. On the other hand, representatives
whose national parties do form part of the Commission specialise in those policy
areas that feature most prominently in their party's political programme.
IVd. Political Representation and Intra-Party Group Politics in the EP
Hypotheses 1-3 predict MEP decisions to participate and specialise In the
legislature based on inter-party competition and institutional incentives at the
committee decision-making, policy formulation and parliamentary oversight stages.
However, representatives also face intra-party group constraints that structure their
ability to act. Where party groups have gate-keeping power over the distribution of
resources to their members, political representation is a reflection of these intra-party
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politics. Indeed, if legislators do not have access to some policy areas at some stages
of the policy process, this restricts their ability to be responsive.
As in most legislatures that are dominated by political parties, MEPs are not
entirely the masters of their own destiny. The role of party groups in the EP varies
across the different stages of the policy process. In some legislative activities, such as
policymaking via committee reports, party groups can act as 'gatekeepers' with sole
power to decide which representatives are allowed to participate and which policy
areas they can specialise in, In these activities, the party group leadership ensures
cohesion by allocating its resources and by rewarding and sanctioning its members to
compel them to toe the party line, Thus, where party groups assume a gate-keeping
role, intra-group relations partly determine who is represented in which policy areas.
Other legislative activities, however, such as parliamentary questions, are open to all
MEPs regardless of party affiliation. In these activities, representational performance
is not affected by intra-party group politics,
There are two ways in which party groups can affect the representational
performance of their members in activities where they have gate-keeping power. First,
parties ensure cohesion by influencing the behaviour of their members through
'distribution of resources' (Weingast and Marshall, 1988). As Hix (2002) points out,
it is the larger national parties in the European Parliament that essentially run the
party groups. Within parliamentary committees, numerous interviews with
practitioners have confirmed that committee chairmanships are among the most
intluential office positions (Whitaker, 2001; 2005). In return for such influence, MEPs
from larger national parties and those holding prestigious parliamentary offices
assume responsibility for some of the less interesting policy areas (Corbett et al.
2003). By contrast, rank and file MEPs from smaller national parties have little power
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over the policy direction and the internal workings of their group. Instead, as Kaeding
(2005) has shown at the level of the member states, they use their limited resources to
focus on the small range of policy areas that are of particular salience to them.
Second, the leadership can also reward loyal MEPs with policy preferences that
are representative of the group as a whole. Even though legislators, on average, are
likely to have more in common with their fellow party members than with the
members of other parties (otherwise they would switch parties), this is not the case on
all issues all the time. On any specific issue, individual members may disagree with
and defect from the policy position of their party group. By screening its members
before allocating important legislative tasks, the party group leadership can identify
rebel backbenchers and reward representatives who toe (or at least are likely to toe)
the party line.
Thus, in legislative activities where party groups can act as gatekeepers, intra-
party group relations affect who can participate and specialise in which policy areas.
Whereas influential legislators participate in a broad range of policy areas, rank-and-
file MEPs from smaller national parties prefer to specialise in the most salient policy
areas. Preference outliers on the other hand do not have access to the most desirable
policy areas.
Hypothesis 4: Where the party group leadership acts as a gate-keeper, intra-
group relations affect the representational performance ofMEPs.
Chapter 5 tests the impact of party group gate-keeping on representation. The
distribution of committee reports among MEPs within each party group is determined
by the relations between individual MEPs and their party group leadership. As a
result, preference outliers do not have access to the most coveted reports. MEPs from
smaller national delegations within each group focus on the reports that are most
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salient to their national party. Intra-party group relations do not have any impact on
representation in committee debates (Chapter 4) or parliamentary questions (Chapter
6) where party groups do not hold gate-keeping power.
This section has developed a set of hypotheses about the link between party-
political and institutional incentives at different stages of the legislative policy process
in the European Parliament to be tested in subsequent chapters. The next section
leaves the individual level to examine the implications of the model for institutional
representation. How does the European Parliament as a whole perform in terms of
political representation? What is the likely impact of various proposals for
institutional reform?
V. Institutional Representation Revisited
This chapter has developed a model of representational performance at the level of
individual MEPs. Representatives participate selectively depending on the
attractiveness of the policy areas under their jurisdiction. Even though the discussion
in this chapter has centred on individual legislators, the model has several
implications for representation at the level of the European Parliament as a whole. If
representation is defined as specialisation in particular policy areas, the values and
interests represented in the EP are likely to deviate substantially from the rules of
proportionality that govern much parliamentary business. If, in tum, proportionality
cannot be taken for granted, this may have important implications for the democratic
legitimacy of the European Parliament (government of the people) and policy
outcomes at the European level.
First. the good news is that representation can occur even when the electoral
connection is relatively weak. The model shows that political representation occurs.
even though MEPs do not care as much about responsiveness as they do about
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engaging in policy, scrutinising the executive or attaining prestigious offices, be it at
the European level ot at home. Indeed, as Table 2.1 (and previous research on other
legislatures) shows, an absolute preference requirement for representation would be
difficult to fulfil. Taking part in policy remains the most important legislative task
according to most representatives across the range of electoral systems that are in
effect in European elections. However, as long as MEPs prefer to specialise in salient
policy areas rather than non-salient ones, they can be responsive without having to
forfeit their other legislative goals. Surely, if the European Parliament, with its
notoriously weak electoral connection satisfies this weak preference requirement, it
should present no particular difficulty for other, more mature legislatures, such as the
US House of Representatives or national parliaments across Europe.
Second, the model shows that institutional rules have a large impact on political
representation. In policy formulation and decision-making, the incentives that
encourage legislative participation and specialisation in the most salient areas are
structured by prevailing majority thresholds. MEPs who form part of a coalition that
can command an effective majority in committee or plenary have a greater incentive
to participate but a lower incentive to discriminate between policy areas than their
peers with little chance of affecting policy outcomes. In parliamentary oversight,
partisan ties to the executive affect the representational performance of MEPs. As the
empirical chapters will confirm, particular institutional arrangements, such as double
open rule in committee and plenary, majority thresholds, proportionality requirements
and party group gate-keeping affect political representation at different stages of the
legislative process.
Third, the model provides substantial clues about the expected impact of
future parliamentary reforms on the representation of European citizens. Reducing
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majority thresholds, for instance, should discourage a larger share of 'minority' ~lEPs
to participate in legislation over which they don't have any policy influence. At the
same time, however, lower thresholds could also increase the number of possible
voting coalitions, and thereby widen responsiveness to a larger range of MEPs at the
fringes of the political spectrum.
Similarly, instituting an electoral system that emphasises ideological (party) over
territorial (country/constituency) attributes compounds the majoritarian nature of
legislative deliberation in the EP. In John Stuart Mill's sense of political
representation as representative deliberation (government of the people), such reforms
undermine the democratic legitimacy of European policy. On the other hand, they
may also bring European policy closer to citizens by encouraging a division of labour
in line with the policy platforms of national parties (government for the people).
Analogously, greater powers for the relatively fractionalised European party
groups could force a larger number of MEPs who do not toe the party group line to
the sidelines. By shutting out dissenting opinion and distributing party resources in
favour of certain MEPs, party groups can playa significant negative role in terms of
political representation. On the other hand, party discipline ensures that EP
policymaking and decision-making remain predictable and, at least to some extent,
consistent over time. Also, in the longer term, persistent attempts by the party group
leadership to sideline preference outliers would encourage a partisan realignment
which could affect predominant coalition patterns.
Fourth, some observers have suggested combating the democratic deficit by
reinforcing the link between the European Commission and the EP, for instance, via
direct election of the Commission President or nomination from among the members
of the European Parliament (Hix, 1997). Clearly. such a reform would drastically
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increase the incentive for MEPs to monitor the Commission. While this would
constitute a great leap towards a federal organisation of the European Union, it might
also become a pyrrhic victory for the EP in terms of the responsiveness of its
members. Given the hypothesised negative relationship between oversight and
representation, tying up valuable parliamentary resources in oversight of the
Commission might not contribute to a truly responsive Parliament.
While most of the empirical analysis in Chapters 4-6 focuses on the level of
individual MEPs, Chapter 7 will consider the important institutional considerations
raised in this section in more detail and in light of the empirical findings of the thesis.
The next section concludes this chapter with a short summary of the model to be
tested in the empirical part of the thesis.
VI. Conclusion
This chapter has re-defined the notion of political representation as responsive
legislative specialisation and modelled the conditions under which individual MEPs
represent their national parties. By defining responsiveness in terms of a 'competence
logic', the thesis makes the theoretical leap to a conceptualisation of representation as
access to power which determines a legislator's ability to respond in Pitkin's (1967)
sense. The concept of political representation is only meaningful if it implies that
legislators engage in policy areas that feature more or less highly among the priorities
of their national party.
Defining representation as responsive specialisation allows for a more
comprehensive theory of political representation that includes a wide range of
legislative activities at all stages of the policy process. Responsiveness is more than a
set of policy positions as evidenced in roll-call votes or a set of proposals adopted by
the legislature. Who is represented where depends on the selective participation of
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individual legislators in different policy areas and at different stages of the legislative
process. Representation is a political objective that structures the participation and
specialisation of individual legislators. While the theory is tested empirically on data
from the European Parliament, it can easily be adapted to allow for a comparative
analysis of representation across a variety of parliamentary democracies.
The model illustrates the uneasy tension between the two dimensions of political
representation: institutional representativeness or "government of the people" and
individual responsiveness or "government for the people". As Hall (1996) concludes
in his study of the US House of Representatives, representativeness in legislative
deliberations is impeded by the responsiveness of elected officials to their
constituency. Unlike existing research, which has addressed these dimensions
separately, this thesis explains the conditions under which political representation
occurs, both as a result of representative participation across the political spectrum
and as a result of responsive specialisation by a select group of MEPs.
Before embarking on major institutional reforms in response to a perceived
democracy deficit it is important to be clear about what the role of the European
Parliament should be. If the answer to this question lies in the representative
deliberation of European issues (i.e. indirect representation), reforms must reduce the
power of party groups, raise majority thresholds and reduce policy and oversight
powers. If, on the other hand, the role of the EP lies in responsive policy-making for a
European Union governed by majoritarian principles, the opposite conclusions are
more appropriate.
The next chapter presents the research design and data used to test the hypotheses
developed above. In the empirical part of the thesis, Chapter 4 analyses responsive
specialisation in committee decision-making. Do MEPs specialise in committees that
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feature prominently in their national party's political programme? What is the effect
of policy incentives on legislative participation and the representativeness of
committee deliberations? Chapter 5 discusses the role of party group control in
determining responsiveness at the policy formulation stage. How do party groups
affect representativeness? The last empirical chapter examines the trade-off between
parliamentary oversight and responsiveness at the EP's Question-Time. Finally,
Chapter 7 concludes with a synthesis of the findings, a comparative analysis of
political representation across all three stages of the legislative process and an
. assessment of the implications of the findings for parliamentary reform in. the
European Union.
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CHAPTER 3 - DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
The previous chapter has presented a theory of political representation in the
European Parliament and developed a set of hypotheses to be tested in the empirical
part of the thesis (Chapters 4-6). This chapter discusses the research design, presents
the data and the statistical tools to test these hypotheses. Section 1 introduces the
debate between quantitative and qualitative research designs and explains the focus on
quantitative methods in this thesis. In a nutshell, it is the nature of the research
question that lends itself to a quantitative design, complemented with qualitative
evidence when appropriate. Section 2 presents the operationalisation of the theoretical
concepts required to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. The thesis
operationalises policy salience as a function of national party manifestos, which
increases reliability and validity compared with measurements that rely on public
opinion surveys or content analyses of media coverage. Finally, section 3 presents the
statistical tools that are used to analyse the data. The multi-level nature of the data
calls for hierarchical random effects modelling, The section discusses the advantages
and risks of this increasingly popular statistical tool compared with standard OLS
regressions with fixed effects,
/. Quantitative versus Qualitative Research Designs
The debate between quantitative and qualitative methods plays a major role in
social science methodology courses in most universities, Still today, much of this
discussion is based on the assumption that these two styles of research are
irreconcilable. Proponents of the quantitative tradition stress its "scientific" nature, its
ability to draw on a large number of cases over several time frames, its abstraction
from particular cases to search for causal explanations and its emphasis on
generalisation and rcplicability (King et al, 1994). On the other hand, supporters of
qualitative research underline the importance of using a wide range of approaches to
study complex social phenomena inductively (e.g. Mertens, 1998). Qualitative
research often focuses on a single or a limited number of key events, such as the
outbreak of a particular revolution or civil war, which are studied in full detail.
Explanatory power arises not as a result of abstraction and generalisation but out of
in-depth knowledge of the phenomenon under study (King et al, 1994).
More recently, however, several scholars have questioned the strict quantitative-
qualitative dichotomy. Indeed, according to King et al. (1994) both approaches rely
on the same logic of inference and both can be equally scientific and systematic.
Rather than limiting oneself to just one of the tools available to social scientific
inquiry, they suggest a choice based on the type of data to be analysed, the kind of
hypotheses to be tested and the conclusions to be drawn. Instead of applying a
particular method to fit all types of data and all sorts of research questions, academic
scholarship should choose its tools depending on the problem it proposes to analyse.
Ragin et al. (1996, pg. 750) make a similar case in their defence of qualitative designs
to address certain research situations where "theories are underdeveloped and
concepts are vague". As they argue, where the demands of quantitative methods
cannot be met, many researchers prefer to use a qualitative design rather than alter
their research questions (Ragin et aI, 1996). Finally, Creswell (2003) finds that
quantitative designs are best suited for testing theory and hypotheses whereas
qualitative designs focus on developing theory and "generating knowledge" (quoted
in Kabeba. 2005).
This thesis proposes to study patterns and trends in the political behaviour of
representatives in the European Parliament. Which MEPs are more or less responsive
to their constituents at different stages of the policy process? What is the effect of
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partisan alignment and the institutional context in the EP on legislative participation
and specialisation? Such an analysis, where comparable numeric data are easily
available, lends itself to a quantitative approach. On the other hand, if the thesis were
more interested in how MEPs from different parties understand their role as
representatives or how institutional variables affect the nonnative role perceptions of
legislators and their connection to the electorate, a qualitative approach might be more
suitable.
While the quantitative approach has a number of advantages for the types of
questions that this thesis addresses, it should be complemented with qualitative
evidence where appropriate. Indeed, as Bauer and Gaskell (2000) conclude, "adequate
coverage of social events requires a multitude of methods and data: methodological
pluralism arises as a methodological necessity" (pg. 4). Much recent methodological
work contends that a "mixed strategy", combining the strengths of both qualitative
and quantitative approaches ensures the largest possible explanatory leverage (e.g.
Creswell, 2003). In any case, the quantitative approach in this thesis requires well-
defined variables and (where necessary) proxies to ensure that its conclusions remain
applicable to the complex political "reality" that describes the connection between
legislative behaviour and party preferences in the European Parliament and in other
legislatures. The next section discusses the measurement of several of the concepts
that are required to test the hypotheses derived in the previous chapter.
II. Variable Measurement
Chapter 2 has introduced a large number of (more or less) abstract concepts that
may affect political representation in the European Parliament, including policy
salience, legislative participation and specialisation, party group affiliation and
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national party representation in the European Commission. This section explains how
these concepts have been translated into variables that can be analysed systematically.
Il.a. Measuring Policy Salience
Among all the variables in this thesis, the measurement of salience is both one of
the most important and one of the most contested. A large number of previous studies
have tried to measure public preferences or the relative importance of different policy
areas to constituents. All of these operationalisations have a number of advantages
and drawbacks. Before going into detail about the choice of measurement used to test
the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, it may be helpful to outline these alternatives
and compare them to the measurement chosen for the empirical assessment in this
thesis.
Public Opinion Surveys
Most existing research measures salience based on public OpInIOn surveys.
Respondents are presented either with a pre-defined list of policy areas (Niemi and
Bartels, 1985), which they have to rank in order of importance or they are asked to
state the "most important problem" (MIP) facing their country/constituency (e.g.
Repass, 1971; Miller, Miller, Raine, and Browne, 1976; Burden and Sanberg, 2003;
McCombs and Shaw, 1972; MacKuen and Coombs, 1981; Jones, 1994; McCombs
and Zhu, 1995; McCombs, 1999; Soroka, 2002; McDonald, Budge, and Pennings,
2004). Both of these approaches have several, widely recognised, drawbacks.
First. it is not clear that people always mean what they say in response to a public
opinion survey. There is a wide range of reasons why survey responses might not
reflect public opinion, such as cognitive problems related to the ordering or wording
of the questions, lack of effort on the respondent's part, the respondent's desire to
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look good before the interviewer and the possibility that the respondent does not have
a fully formed opinion about the policy area at stake.
Second, surveys might not actually measure policy salience. For instance,
respondents may simply make erroneous assessments about the issues they consider
to be salient (see e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Dahlberg, Mork and Agren,
2004).1 While survey questions based on pre-defined lists solve some of these
problems, they also eliminate one of the biggest advantages of the MIP design: the
open-ended nature of the question. Also, as Wlezien (2003) argues, measuring
salience based on responses to MIP confuses the importance of a policy area with the
respondent's perception of the area as problematic. For instance, he finds little
relationship between responses to MIP and responsiveness in the area of defence
policy. Whereas assessments of the most important problem vary dramatically over
time, the actual salience of defence as a policy issue remains stable.
Media Coverage
In response to some of the weaknesses of public opinion surveys, several scholars
have chosen to measure policy salience by analysing mass media coverage of
different policy areas without asking respondents their opinions directly (Weissert,
1991; Epstein and Segal, 2000; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Hobolt, 2004). Content
analysis of newspaper articles (or other media) can indeed give a good picture of the
political debate in a country and distinguish the issues that make it to the forefront of
politics from those that do not elicit much public interest.
However, it is not clear that measures based on media coverage constitute an
effective response to Wlezien's criticism of public opinion surveys. Arguably, as
I In response to thecriticism of public opinion surveys, some studies rely on expert evaluations of party
policy positions (Castles and Mair, 1984; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Ray, 1999; Marks et at,
forthcoming). Inaddition to some of theproblems with public opinion surveys, these expert opinions
often sutTer from a lack ofreliabllity andvalidity (Budge, 2001). ButseeWhitefield et al.(forthcoming)
fora defence of expert valuations as a measure ofparty positions.
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Wlezien (2003) notes, the economy is always reasonably salient even though media
coverage of economic issues will vary substantially depending on economic
performance. Thus, rather than the salience (or importance) of economic issues, mass
media provide just another measure of the 'most important problem' of the moment.
Much like the public opinion surveys discussed above, media coverage is directed at
the very short term and varies substantially over time.
Party Manifestos
As the discussion above has shown, there are three main weaknesses in existing
measurements of salience: first, they confound the importance of particular policy
areas with the public's perception of them as problematic; second, they might not
accurately represent public attitudes and third, they are likely to vary a lot in the short-
term in response to outside events. In response to these criticisms, this thesis proposes
a different operationalisation of salience based on national party manifestos.
The use of party manifestos is based upon the theoretical framework provided by
"saliency theory". Saliency theory contends that parties define their policy
preferences by emphasizing certain policy areas and ignoring others (e.g. prioritising
welfare over defence or vice-versa). In other words, they define their policy positions
based on salient issue identification. As Budge et a1. (1987; pg. 391) contend, "parties
compete by accentuating issues on which they have an undoubted advantage, rather
than by putting forward contrasting policies on the same issues". In other words,
parties identify issues that are salient to their potential electorate and then emphasize
those in electoral competition.
The empirical analysis in this thesis rests on the assumption that party manifestos
are an accurate reflection of what the party stands for in public. According to saliency
theory. manifestos are authoritative statements of the party's intended policy focus for
a full legislative term. They provide an indication about the policy areas that the
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elected representatives of the party intend to focus (specialise) on, once elected and
they are comparable across member states. Using party manifestos makes it possible
to include almost all MEPs in the fifth Parliament without having to rely on expert
assessments or public opinion surveys. This gives rise to an unprecedented dataset
covering 13 policy areas across 80 national party delegations. Most media, public
opinionor expert surveys do not come close to such comprehensive coverage.
In addition, the operationalisation assumes that national parties in the European
Parliament behave as "responsible parties".2 Parties are widely acknowledged to be an
indispensable feature of Western democracy and an essential intermediary between
constituents and policy outcomes. The responsible party model stipulates that parties
formulate clear policy proposals at election time, that they are elected based upon
these proposals and that they attempt to put their proposals into action once they are
elected. In the empirical analysis in this thesis, national party manifestos are assumed
to reflect each party's policy priorities. Under these conditions, political
representation occurs when elected party representatives act upon the policy priorities
they have emphasised in their manifesto.'
Once these assumptions are acknowledged, the operationalisation of salience
based on party manifestos provides a good solution to some of the problems with
existing salience measures. First, manifestos are less short-term oriented than public
opinion surveys or media coverage. Indeed, they form the basis of voting decisions at
election time, which convey a mandate to representatives over an entire legislative
term (4-5 years in most countries, 5 in the case of the European Parliament).
. According to McDonald et at (2004), manifestos even reflect entrenched ideological
2 See Chapter I for fiuther details on the Responsible Party Model in various Western political systems
including the European Parliament.
3 In this sense, the manifesto canbe interpreted as themandate of the party'selected members. Of
coune,manifestos do not provide a comprehensive listof all policy positions thatthe party will
advocate overthe course ofthe legislature.
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differences between parties, which go beyond a single electoral period. Second,
manifestos avoid the confusion between the perception of a policy area as important
or problematic. Party manifestos highlight the party's policy priorities on a wide
range of issues. Irrespective of outside events, issues that are permanently salient,
such as the economy, foreign and social policy will always receive some coverage in
a party's manifesto (single issue parties may be a partial exception here). The extent
of coverage will vary, however, with the relative emphasis (i.e. salience) that the party
wants to place on each issue. Finally, the manifesto-based measure retains some of the
advantages of open-ended public opinion surveys (such as MIP) because manifestos
are drawn up by party officials rather than the researchers themselves.
Of course, however, party manifestos are not a perfect measure of salience. Critics
may question the stipulations of saliency theory or the application of the responsible
party model in the European Parliament. First, the manifesto dataset has been
criticised for its interpretation of party policy positions (Laver, Benoit and Garry
2003; but see Klingemann et al. 1994 for a more positive assessment). This thesis
focuses not on policy positions but on salience. An area is salient if it is prominent in
the manifesto, independently of the actual policy position that the party advocates."
Because the manifesto dataset is based on word counts, it is perhaps better suited to
measure salience of and emphasis on particular policy areas as opposed to policy
positions, which refer to the directionality (left vI right, pro- v, anti-environment) of
the policies that the party advocates.
Secondly, as Laver (2001) points out, manifestos strictly speaking measure stated
policy positions rather than the actual ideal positions of political actors. Large
differences between the content of party manifestos and the ideal positions of the
4 See Arnold and Pennings (2005) fora similu operationalisation of salience based on party manifesto
data.
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party's elected members could affect the legislative behaviour of representatives in
the European Parliament. The empirical analysis in Chapter 4-6 incorporates a
comprehensive set of control variables to account for discrepancies between the stated
priorities set out in party manifestos and the actual priorities of MEPs, including
individual policy preferences, nationality and various features of the electoral system.
Third, some critics may argue that the requirements of the responsible party model
do not hold in the EP. A large number of studies have found that voters do not always
vote for the party that best represents their preferences for strategic reasons (or
because they do not tum out for the vote). If this is the case, manifestos might not be
an accurate description of the mandates of representatives. As Schmitt and Thomassen
(1999) have found however, the basic requirements of the responsible party model
(party cohesion and distinctiveness) are in place in the European Parliament except
for issues dealing with the future development of the European Union itself. The
empirical analysis in this thesis is concerned not with the project for European
unification but with actual policy-making within the European Parliament across a
wide range of policy areas that are traditionally associated with national politics (see
below for a list of the policy areas included in this analysis).
Finally, there seems to be a disconnect between the use of national party
manifestos developed for national elections and legislative behaviour in the European
Parliament. However, this disconnect makes little difference in practice because
I~uropean elections are second-order contests that take place in the shadow of more
important national elections (e.g. Reif and Schmitt, 1980). A large share of European
election manifestos deal with issues of a purely European nature and layout the
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party's general attitudes towards Europe.i Voters derive their opinions about what
differentparties stand for and which parties are closest to their preferences on a wider
range of policy areas from the national political arena. Finally, even if there is a
discrepancy between policy priorities at the supranational (ED) and domestic levels, a
sophisticated empirical analysis can, at least partly, control for some of these
differences by incorporating a range of controls for individual MEPs, member states,
. European party groups and electoral systems.
Given their advantages over other measures in terms of validity and reliability, the
empirical analysis in this thesis operationalises salience based on national party
manifestos. National party positions for most major European parties are available on
the data-CD accompanying Budge et al.'s (2001) cross-country study of party
manifestos. Salience for thirteen policy areas is constructed as the percent of each
party manifesto dedicated to each policy area, irrespective of the policy position the
party advocates. For example, if a particular national party advocates both the
expansion of some aspects of the welfare state and the limitation of other aspects, the
percentage of the manifesto devoted to the welfare state is the sum of the percentages
devoted to each policy position.
The policy areas used in the empirical analysis are defined to overlap with the
committee jurisdictions in the European Parliament. No saliency data were available
for the committees on petitions, legal affairs and the two budgetary committees
(Budget and Budgetary Control). Table 3.1 lists the thirteen policy areas for which a
value for salience could be constructed and their abbreviation as used throughout the
text. The coding frame used to match party positions with these policy areas is in
, In 2004 for instance European green parties combined their efforts to develop a pan-European
election manifesto thatdoes notso much specify policy priorities across a wider range of areas as it
sets outthecommon denominator among all European green parties represented in the European
Parliament.
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Appendix A. Appendix B lists all 80 national party delegations included in the
empirical analysis and the salience of each policy area for each party. Finally
Appendix C presents correlations between the salience of the different policy across
all MEPs included in the dataset.
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TABLE 3.1. DEFINITION OF POLICY AREAS IN THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Note: Abbreviations are the same as those used In the European Parliament's committee structure (1999-2004)
Abbreviation Policy Issues
AFCO Constitutional Affairs
AFET Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence
Policy
AGRI Agriculture and Rural Development
CULT Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport
DEVE Development and cooperation
ECON Economics and Monetary Affairs
EMPL Employment and Social Affairs
ENVI Environment, Public health and Consumer Policy
FEMM Women's rights and Equal Opportunities
INDU External Trade, Research and Energy
LIBE Citizen's Freedom and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs
PESC Fisheries
RETT Regional policy, transport and Tourism
..
Figure 3.1 provides a descriptive test of the validity of the salience variable used
in this thesis. The figure plots the median salience and the inter-quartile range of each
policy area to illustrate its relative popularity and the skewness of the distribution
across all MEPs.6 The y-axis represents the percentage of national party manifestos
dedicated to each policy area. Unsurprisingly, Economics and Monetary Affairs
(ECON) turns out to be the most salient policy area, with a median of more than 17%,
followed by justice and home affairs (LIBE) and social affairs and employment
(EMPL). Agriculture and fisheries (AGRI), development (DEVE) and regional
affairs, transport and tourism (RETT) feature least prominently in the party
manifestos. The dashed vertical lines indicate the distance between the first and third
quartiles to illustrate the extent of variation in the salience distribution of each policy
area. With the exception of ECON and LIBE, which are by far the most popular, no
clear hierarchy emerges.
I, Figure 3. I includes all MLPs for whom data were available in order to retlect the size of each national
part" delegation in the EP.
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FIGURE 3.1. MEDIAN SALIENCE OF 13 DIFFERENT POLICY AREAS
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As mentioned above, saliency theory assumes that party manifestos reflect the
emphasis each party places on a range of policy areas irrespective of the actual policy
position that it advocates. However, this is not to say that there should be no
correlation between the direction of the policy that parties advocate in a particular
area and the emphasis that they place on that area. This can easily be illustrated by
way of an example. Assume there are two parties (A and B) with contrasting policy
positions on the issue of taxation. Whereas party A is in favour of higher taxes in
order to fund social welfare programmes, party B would like to reduce tax burdens in
order to boost the economy. In this situation, it is likely that party A will focus on the
social programmes it intends to fund out of tax revenues whereas party B will discuss
the positive effect of its proposed tax cuts on the economy. As a result, there are
differences in the content ofboth party manifestos and in the mandates ofeach party's
representatives. In most European party systems, the policy position of party A
corresponds to a typical centre-left party whereas the position of party B is more
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closely associated with the centre-right. In other words, for this policy area there is a
correlation between salience (emphasis in the party manifesto) and party location on
the left-right spectrum.
In order to test whether there is a systematic correlation between salience and
party policy positions, Table 3.2 presents the results of thirteen OLS regressions with
salience (party level) as a dependent variable and the left-right position of individual
MEPs (Nominate - see below for details), their preference extremity along the left-
right spectrum (Nominate squared) and their nationality as explanatory variables.
Even though salience is measured at the party level, individual MEPs are the unit of
analysis in these regressions in order to examine the effect of an individual's position
on the left-right spectrum on issue salience. If saliency theory is correct, we should
see differences in the policy emphasis of MEPs at different locations of the left-right
spectrum. More specifically, according to saliency theory, parties should emphasise
those policy areas where they have an electoral advantage over their competitors.'
The results in Table 3.2 are consistent with this prediction. In all policy areas, the
left-right position of party members (Nominate) or the extremity of their preferences
(Nominate squared) help explain the emphasis that parties place on each policy area
in their manifestos. A positive coefficient on the Nominate variable in Table 3.2
signifies that parties on the right of the political spectrum place greater emphasis on
the area at hand, a negative score indicates a policy area that is more salient to parties
on the left of the policy spectrum. A positive coefficient on Nominate squared
indicates that parties on the fringes of the political spectrum emphasises the policy
7 Note the disconnect between saliency, measured at the party level andNominate policy positions
measured at the level of individual MEPs. Foreaseof interpretation, Table 32 ignores the multi-level
nature oftile dataset andcontrols for differences in national party sizewith an appropriate variable
(Party SII,). However, this problem is addressed in the main empirical analysis in Chapters 4-6 by way
of a random effects specification. This methodology is described in moredetail in the lut section of
this chapter.
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area more than centrist parties. The opposite is true for policy areas with a negative
coefficient for Nominate squared.
As Table 3.2 shows, substantively, the effect of an MEP's left-right policy
preferences is highest for Economics and Monetary Affairs (ECON), a policy area
that is traditionally associated with parties on the right of the policy spectrum. At the
other end of the spectrum, parties on the left are much more concerned with Women's
Affairs and Equality of Opportunities (FEMM) than their competitors on the right.
There is a similar (though substantively smaller) left-wing bias on foreign affairs
(AFET), employment and social affairs (EMPL), the environment (ENVI) and
development (DEVE). As many would agree, these are policy areas that are
traditionally associated with the left in most European countries.f
Figure 3.2 illustrates the results from Table 3.2 graphically for a selection of
policy areas. First, for justice and home affairs (LIBE) and social affairs and
employment (EMPL), the relationship between policy preferences and salience is
linear. Whereas parties on the left of the policy spectrum tend to emphasize social
affairs compared with parties further to the right, the opposite is true for justice and
home affairs. The economy (ECON) is by far the most salient policy area for almost
all parties, except for the left-wing fringe. Parties on the right emphasise economic
issues more than their rivals on the left, though there is little difference between
centre-right and extreme-right parties. In contrast, environmental issues are, on the
whole, favoured by parties on the centre-left of the spectrum compared with their
rivals on the centre-right. Fringe parties emphasize environmental issues more than
their competitors in the centre. This is perhaps less surprising on the left (where many
Green parties tend to be located) than on the right.
8 Note that in most European countries, so-called green parties whose obvious policy focus is the
environment (ENYI) are located on the left of the policy spectrum (SI.'I.' also Rohrschneider, 1993).
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FIGURE 3.2. LEFT-RIGHT POLICY POSITION AND SALIENCE (SELECTED POLICY
AREAS)
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Figure 3.2 and the results in Table 3.2 on which it is based are consistent with the
prediction that parties make rational choices about which policy areas to emphasise in
their manifestos. The consistency of the results across all thirteen policy areas in
Table 3.2 suggests that measuring salience based on party manifesto data does indeed
make empirical sense. However, the significance of the country dummies in each of
the regressions suggests that, in addition to party affiliation, nationality also has a
significant impact on policy salience. Any empirical analysis built on the manifesto
dataset must therefore account for at least two data levels: the national level and the
individual level. Section 3 in this chapter explains how the analysis in this thesis
proposes to address the hierarchical nature of the data.
This section has explained how salience is operationalised In the empirical
analysis in this thesis and it has presented a number of tests to verify its validity.
However, the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 also require appropriate
measurements for a senes of other important variables, including legislative
participation and specialisation at different stages of the policy process. Because most
of these variables are directly observable (in contrast to salience), their
operationalisation is more straightforward. The remainder of this section describes the
measurement of legislative participation and specialisation at different stages of the
policy process and of all other variables required for the empirical analyses in
Chapters 4-6.
II b. Measuring Legislative Participation and Specialisation
As discussed in Chapter 2, policy formulation in the European Parliament takes
place when individual legislators draft committee reports in particular policy areas.
Committee decision-making occurs during committee meetings throughout the course
of the legislature. Finally, individual legislators can engage in parliamentary oversight
by tabling questions to Commission and Council at Question-Time. This section
explains how legislative participation and specialisation in these three policy areas
have been operationalised.
Existing Research on Policy formulation, Decision-making and Oversight
Table 3.3 lists the three stages of the policy process, the legislative activity
associated with each stage and the characteristics of each activity in terms of the
independent variables of the study. While there has been extensive research on roll-
call votes both in the European Parliament and in other domestic legislatures, the
three legislative activities discussed in this thesis have remained largely understudied.
First, theories of committee participation and their empirical evaluation have been
confined to the US House of Representatives (e.g. Hall, 1996), with only few very
recent applications to the EP. There are to date no empirical studies of participation at
committee meetings in the European Parliament. In other words, committee decision-
making in the EP has been completely ignored by academic scholarship. All
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scholarship on parliamentary decision-making in the EP to date has been confined to
roll-call votes. By analysing the effect of participation and specialisation within
committees, the thesis contributes to our understanding not only of political
representation but also of the processes at work at this stage of the legislative process.
In contrast, several studies have analysed report allocation in the European
Parliament (Hoyland, 2006; Mamadou and Raunio, 2003; Kaeding, 2005, 2004).
However, most of this literature focuses on comparing the number of reports that
MEPs sign up for and it treats all committee reports as equally desirable, with the
exception of some more recent pieces that distinguish between co-decision and non
co-decision reports (e.g. Hoyland, 2006). Because they ignore qualitative differences
between committee reports (such as their salience), these studies do not help us
understand the responsiveness of individual rapporteurs to their national party.
Finally, there are very few studies of parliamentary questioning in the EP (e.g.
Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Raunio, 1997). Virtually all of the existing research focuses
on the British House of Commons, with the exception of one largely descriptive
cross-national study, which covers several parliaments across Europe (Wiberg, 1995).
While Raunio (1997) distinguishes several features of questions, including their topic
and target audience, his study focuses on describing legislative participation and
specialisation in written questioning and does not consider the implications of these
decisions for political representation.
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TABLE 3.3. CASE SELECTION AND VARIATION IN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ACROSS
STAGES OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Leeislative Stage Activity Inter-Party Politics Intra-Pam' Politics
Majority LegisIative/Executive Party Group
Rule Relations Gate-keeping
Policy Committee YES
Formulation Reports
NO YES
Decision-making
Committee YES NOAttendance NO
Parliamentary Parliamentary NO YES NO
Oversight Questions
Variation on the Independent Variables
Apart from a relative lack of existing studies on these three legislative activities.
committee reports, attendance and parliamentary questions also offer interesting
variation on the main independent variables identified in Chapter 2. This variation
allows us to make assessments of the relative importance of coalition politics,
legislative-executive relations and party group gatekeeping on political representation
across the three stages of the legislative process.
First, as discussed in Chapter 2, party groups do not have control over who puts
which oral questions before Council and Commission. The level and content of
questions is entirely up to individual MEPs. At the same time, party groups have
substantial influence over report allocation. While individual MEPs can express their
preferences and encourage their group to bid on certain reports, the final allocation of
legislative spoils lies with the party group leadership (such as the group co-ordinator
within each committee). Finally, once committee positions have been assigned, party
groups have no gate-keeping power over the participation and specialisation decisions
of their members within their committees.
Second, there is variation across the stages of the legislative process in inter-party
politics as well. Whereas committee decision-making and report drafting are governed
primarily by majority rule and coalition formation across party groups, parliamentary
questioning is dominated by legislative-executive relations between individual f\lEPs.
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•their national parties and the European Commission. Again, holding other
indePendent variables constant, this variation enables comparisons of the relative
importance of these different aspects of inter-party politics on the political
representation of European citizens.
The scarcity of academic scholarship (on all legislatures) that goes beyond roll-
call voting is surprising, especially given the relative ease of access to the relevant
data for the European Parliament. Indeed, in comparison with many national
assemblies, the European Parliament is a relatively open legislature that is concerned
with its perceived transparency and openness to the public. As a result, most of the
data for this study (e.g. basic data on rapporteurships, details of questions at each
plenary session and attendance at committee meetings) are publicly available from the
Parliament's website www.europarl.eu.int. The remainder of this section describes
these data in more detail, explains how they have been collected and coded and how
they are used in the empirical analysis in Chapters 4-6.
Policy Formulation: Committee Reports
Data on policy formulation in Chapter 5 include all reports in thirteen EP
committees between September 1, 1999 and January 1, 2002.1 The analysis assumes
that all reports are allocated at a single point in time at the beginning of the fifth
legislature. Without altering the substance of the conclusions of the analysis, this
assumption greatly simplifies the analysis.' There are few theoretical indications that
report allocation differs substantially between parliaments or over the course of a
single legislature. As the party group leadership acquires better information about the
policy preferences of its rank-and-file members, report allocation may increasingly
reflect the expertise and background of individual MEPs. As a result, intra-party
II would like to thank Bjorn Hoyland forsharing these data.
2 Note that thesame assumption underlies thedataset in Hausemer (forthcc:ming 2006) andit is implicit
in the vast majority of existing research on EPreports. Foranexception, seeHoyland (2006).
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group politics may playa smaller role in the second half of each parliamentary term.
Hoyland (2006) finds evidence for a government-opposition dynamic between
Council and EP. National parties that are represented in the Council write more co-
decision reports than 'opposition' MEPs. Since the composition of the Council may
vary over the course of the legislature, such a dynamic may entail variation in EP
report allocation over time. However, as Hoyland (2006) acknowledges, this effect is
eclipsed by the importance of the party groups. PES representatives are "more active
than governing parties as co-decision rapporteurs" (pg. 30). Nevertheless, a larger
dataset over the full parliamentary term could help to evaluate the impact of
information updates and national party competition on report allocation.
However, several exogenous factors, including committee reforms between
legislatures, mid-term turnover and ED enlargement, could obfuscate the conclusions
of a study over a longer period of time. First, the 1999 committee reform reduced the
number of committees from 20 in the fourth Parliament to 17 in the fifth EP. This was
raised back to 20 in 2004 when subcommittees were introduced to ease pressure on
further enlargement of the committee system (McElroy, 2006). Since the jurisdictions
of the committees were altered with every reform, comparisons across parliamentary
terms are difficult.
In addition, committee positions are assigned at the beginning of each legislature
for 2.5 years. About 30 percent of MEPs are re-assigned in the second half of each
legislature (McElroy, 2006). Limiting the study to 2.5 years allows us to treat the
entire period of analysis as a single point in time, in contrast to a complex time-series
analysis over several half terms. Empirically, almost half (450/0) of all reports written
in the fifth Parliament were undertaken in the first 2.5 years of the legislative term.
122
As a result of these concerns and after a careful consideration of the costs and
benefits of extending the timeframe of the analysis, the thesis is limited to the first
half of the fifth Parliament. Each observation in the dataset corresponds to one report.
There were 1,096 reports in the first 2.5 years of the fifth Parliament of which 904
were written in the thirteen committees included in the analysis. Due to lack of data
on salience, 82 observations had to be excluded, which leaves a total of 822 reports.
Table 3.4 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent variable used in the empirical
analysis in Chapter 5.
TABLE 3.4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE IN POLICY
FORMULATION (COMMITTEE REPORTS)
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Report Salience 822 7.07 6.57 0 54.58
Table 3.5 shows a breakdown of the dataset by policy area. Most reports (133)
were written in the environment committee whereas the committee on women's rights
and equal opportunities (FEMM) only produced 16 pieces of legislation in the 2.5-
year period under analysis. As discussed in the previous section, reports on economics
and monetary union (ECON) were on average most salient compared with a very low
average salience for agriculture reports.
123
TABLE 3.5. NUMBER OF REPORTS AND AVERAGE SALIENCE ACROSS POLICY
AREAS
Average Number ofPolicy Area Salience (% Reports
of manifesto)
ECON 18.51 91
LIBE 9.4 98
EMPL 9 57
AFET 7.8 68
INDU 5.83 90
ENVI 5.6 133
CULT 5.49 31
AFCO 4.46 27
FEMM 3.43 16
RETT 3.13 77
PESC 2.65 53
DEVE 2.41 24
AGRI 1.83 57
Total 7.07 822
Abbreviations: AFET = Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy; AGRJ = Agriculture and Rural
Development; CULT = Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport; DEVE = Development and cooperation; ECON =
Economics and Monetary Affairs; EMPL = Employment and Social Affairs; ENVI = Environment, Public health and Consumer
Policy; FEMM = Women's rights and Equal Opportunities; INDU = External Trade, Research and Energy; LIBE = Citizen's
Freedom and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs; PESC = Fisheries; RETT = Regional policy, transport and tourism
Decision-Making: Committee Attendance
Data on committee attendance were collected from meeting minutes available on
the European Parliament's website. Committee members are coded as either present
(1) or absent (0). The resulting dependent variable in Chapter 4 (Attendance) is the
percentage of committee meetings that each MEP attended. The study is limited to the
first half of the fifth European Parliament for similar reasons to those cited for
committee reports in the previous section. There is one attendance record for every
committee member' MEPs who joined more than one committee, appear as one
observation for each committee of which they are a full member or a substitute. The
Petitions committee was excluded from the analysis because attendance records were
not available for that committee on the EP's website. This leads to a total of 1,068
.1 Note that this is different from the chapter on policy formulation and the chapter on parliamentary
oversight where the units of analysis are committee reports and questions respectively. In comparison,
participation and specialisation in committee meetings is measured at a higher level of aggregation.
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observations. Table 3.6 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent variable used
in the empirical analysis in Chapter 4.
TABLE 3.6. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION AND
SPECIALISATION IN COMMITTEE DECISION-MAKING (ATTENDANCE)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max(N)
Committee 1,068 0.44 0.31 0 1Attendance
Table 3.7 shows a breakdown of the dataset by policy area. The largest committee
under analysis is foreign affairs (AFET) with 120 members whereas the committee on
fisheries (PESC) only has 40 members that are included in the dataset. Average
attendance was highest in the committee on constitutional affairs (AFCO) with 520/0
and lowest in the committee on women's rights and equal opportunities (FEMM) with
a mean of 36.80/0 of committee members.
TABLE 3.7. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND AVERAGE ATTENDANCE
ACROSS POLICY AREAS
Policy Area Attendance (%) Observations
AFCO 52 56
AGRI 51 72
RETT 51 108
ENVI 49 107
ECON 46 83
PESC 46 40
LIBE 45 80
CULT 41 62
EMPL 41 104
AFET 40 120
DEVE 39 64
INDU 39 110
FEMM 37 62
Total 44 1068
Abbreviations. AFET = Foreign Affairs. Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy; AGRJ = Agriculture and Rural
Development: CULT = Culture, Youth. Education. the Media and Sport: DElE = Development and cooperation; ECO.\' =
Economics and Monetary Affairs; EMPL = Employment and Social Affairs; EX 1'/ = Environment. Public health and Consumer
Policy: FEAt,\! = Women's rights and Equal Opportunities; INDU = External Trade, Research and Energy: LlBE = CI1I=en's
Freedom and Rights. Justice and Home Affairs; PESC = Fisheries: REIT = Regional policy, transport and tourism
Oversight: Parliamentary Questions
Finally, the chapter on parliamentary oversight covers questions at Question-Time
for the entire five-year term of the fifth Parliament (1999-2004).4 During that period
4,209 questions were tabled, 2,719 of which to the Commission and the rest to the
Council. The analysis is confined to questions addressed to the Commission, as it is
the only European institution with an exclusively 'executive' role. Also, as Corbett et
al. (2003) have noted, questions to the Commission are generally considered to be
'more useful' than those addressed to the Council.
Each observation in the dataset represents one question and is characterised by
attributes pertaining to the question itself (e.g. date, topic, etc.), its author (e.g. name,
party affiliation, nominate score, etc.) and his constituency (e.g. country, salience of
topic). The topic of each question was ascertained from the subject line detailing the
policy issue that the question addresses. Every question was coded as pertaining to
one of the 14 policy areas for which salience data are available. If the subject was
unclear or touched on more than one policy area, the full question was analysed to
determine the primary topic. Questions pertaining to the budget, legal, inter-
institutional affairs or enlargement were excluded from the dataset because no
salience data were available for these policy areas. Table 3.8 presents descriptive
statistics for the dependent variable used in the empirical analysis in Chapter 6.
TABLE 3.8. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION AND
SPECIALISATION IN PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT (QUESTIONS)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Question 1,666 5.09 6.54 0 54.58Salience
I'able 3.9 shows a breakdown of the dataset by policy area. The largest number of
questions was tabled on the environment (ENVI) followed by foreign affairs (AFET).
~ Bccausc the concerns with mid-term turnover and committee reform do not apply for parliamentary
questions. the dataset CO\L'rS the entire 5-year term of the fifth European Parliament.
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Over the same time period, there were only 23 questions by MEPs on issues dealing
with women's rights or equal opportunities. Average salience was highest on
economics (ECON) and, more surprisingly, on the environment (ENVI), which
suggests that MEPs whose parties emphasise environmental issues were particularly
active at this stage of the legislative process.
TABLE 3.9. NUMBER OF PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS AND AVERAGE SALIENCE
ACROSS POLICY AREAS
Policy Area Average Salience Number of(%) of manifesto) Questions
ECON 54.58 46
ENVI 44.24 376
AFET 38.85 278
CULT 30.55 100
LIBE 20.38 92
EMPL 19.53 153
FEMM 17.76 23
AFCO 14.58 32
RETT 14.12 77
INDU 12.34 61
AGRI 7.73 119
DEVE 5.57 49
PESC 4.48 56
Total 54.58 1,666
Abbreviations: AFET = Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy; AGRJ = Agriculture and Rural
Development; CULT =Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport; DEVE =Development and cooperation; ECON =
Economics and Monetary Affairs; EMPL = Employment and Social Affairs; ENVI = Environment, Public health and Consumer
Policy; FEMM = Women's rights and Equal Opportunities; INDU = External Trade. Research and Energy; LIEE = Citizen's
Freedom and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs; PESC = Fisheries; REIT = Regional policy, transport and tourism
This section has provided an overview of how the empirical chapters
operationalise legislative participation. There are wide variations in participation
across MEPs and across the three stages of the legislative process under analysis. In
addition, as predicted in Chapter 2, there is considerable variation in the average
salience of each policy area at different stages of the legislative process.
Aside from measuring legislative participation and specialisation at different
stages of the policy process in the European Parliament, the empirical analysis
requires the collection of a substantial number of explanatory variables. Most of these
variables are described in more detail below.
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Il.c. Other Variables
Policy Influence
First, the empirical analysis requires controls for the influence of the European
Parliament in the policy area where MEPs formulate policy and decide on existing
proposals. Due to the layout of the two datasets, two different measures of policy
influence are required. However, in both cases the influence of the European
Parliament is measured as a function'of the legislative decision-making procedure that
is used. As noted in the previous Chapter, the European Parliament acts as an equal
co-legislator with the European Council on legislation that falls under the co-decision
procedure. The EP has substantially less influence in other decision-making
procedures.
At the policy formulation stage (Chapter 5), influence is measured using a dummy
variable, which assumes the value 1 if the report at hand falls under the co-decision
procedure and the value 0 if it does not. Because the units of analysis at the decision-
making and oversight stages are different, this variable cannot be used in Chapters 4
and 6. Instead, a committee's policy influence is measured as the percentage of its
reports that fall under the co-decision procedure. The higher this percentage the more
power the European Parliament has in the policy areas under the jurisdiction of the
committee.
Left-Right Policy Positions
Hypotheses 1 and 2 relate to the partisan affiliation of MEPs. MEPs who are
members of the same party are likely to have policy preferences that are closer to one
another than to members of other parties.S In order to verify that the estimated party
, Indeed, if a legislator's preferences areconsistently closer to a party other than their own, they are
likely to swap allegiance. In thenational context, there is ample evidence of MPs crossing the floor or
setting uptheir own parties. In thecontext of theEuropean Parliament, party switching is somewhat
more compUcated. However, there aremany examples where entire national party delegations decided
to leave their party group, either to setupa new group (e.g. the creation of thecentrist ALOE inthefIA
BP), m..e with another group (e.g. FormEuropa's accession to theConservative EPP-EO) or to join
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effect is due to partisan affiliation rather than individual policy preferences, all
chapters control for the individual policy positions of MEPs along the left right
spectrum.
These distance measures are based on Nominate scores for the period July 1999-
January 2002, which are available online." Nominate uses MEP roll call voting
records to determine ideal points for individual legislators across three dimensions
(see Hix, 2001 for further details about Nominate methodology). The first dimension
is usually interpreted as reflecting a left-right cleavage whereas the interpretation of
the other two dimensions is less clear-cut (see for instance Hix et al., forthcoming).
The left-right position for each party group (national party/plenary) is constructed as
the median Nominate score of all group (national party/plenary) members. Finally,
policy distance from the party group (national party/plenary) is the squared difference
of an MEP's individual Nominate score and the Nominate score for his or her party
group(national party/plenary).
Other Variables
Several additional variables at the individual, party and country levels are
included in the analysis. First, party size is the number of MEPs for each national
party included in the analysis. Party group affiliation in the three largest groups is
coded as a dummy variable, which assumes the value of 1 for MEPs who are
members of the EPP, ELDR or PES respectively and 0 for other legislators. Though
MEPs from all party groups are included in the analysis, the empirical tests in Chapter
2 focus on the three largest groups, which are most influential in the European
Parliament and have a much more developed party structure than the smaller groups at
the fringes of the political spectrum.
1ft existing group (e.g. UKTory leader David Cameron's proposal to leave the Christian Democratic
EPP fortheanti-European UBN).
6 See http://personal.lse.ac.uklhixlHixNouryRolandEPdata.HTM.
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Chapter 6 requires a set of variables that describe legislative-executive relations
between MEPs, their national parties and the European Commission. MEPs from
national party delegations that are directly represented in the European Commission
are coded as having their 'own' commissioner (Party has 'Own' Commissioner=l)
compared with MEPs without direct Commission representation (Party has 'Own'
Commissioner=O). If an MEP from a national party with a commissioner enquires
about 'their' portfolio, the question is treated as a question to their own commissioner
(Question to 'Own' Commissioner=l) compared to questions that do not fall within
the jurisdiction of the party's commissioner (Question to 'Own' Commissioner=O).
Finally, Question w/in Committee Jurisdiction is coded 1 for questions that fall within
thejurisdiction of the author's own committee portfolio.
Chair/Vice-Chair and Substitute are dummy variables that measure an MEP's
office status within his committee.' The appropriate variables are coded 1 if an MEP
is either a committee chair, vice-chair or substitute and 0 if he/she is not. Incumbency
is also a dummy variable coded 1 for MEPs who were re-elected in 1999 and 0 for
freshmen. Number of questions, reports and committees joined are continuous
variables that evaluate the level of participation for each MEP at each stage of the
policy process.
Finally, all models reported in Chapters 4-6 control for differences across national
electoral systems. Previous research has found that the size of electoral districts and
leadership control over representatives determine the importance of 'cultivating a
personal vote' (Carey and Shugart 1995). MEPs elected under open lists in a
decentralised candidate selection process have a greater incentive to get the vote out
7 Ofcourse, committee rank canalsobedefmed as a continuous variable ranging from the lowest rank
(substitute) to the highest (chair). However, sucha specification complicates the interpretation of the
rearession coefficients. Also it does not,on thewhole, make a significant difference to theempirical
results. Indeed, in the absence ofanyempirical distinction, chapters 4 andScombine the two primary
committee leadership positions (chair andvico-cbair) intoa single dummy variable.
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than MEPs whose re-selection depends primarily on the party leadership.f The effect
of district magnitude is more ambiguous and may work in favour or against personal
vote-seeking (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Data on ballot structure, candidate selection
and the size of electoral districts are taken from Farrell and Scully (2002) and Hix
(2004). District magnitude is a continuous variable whereas ballot and candidate
selection are coded 0 for openldecentralised systems, 0.5 for order/mixed systems and
1 for closed/centralised systems respectively.
III. Model Estimation for Hierarchical Data: A Random Effects
Specification
As the discussion above has shown already, the datasets used to test the
hypotheses in Chapter 2 feature different units of analysis, dependent and explanatory
variables at different data levels. Committee reports are the primary unit of analysis at
the policy formulation stage, parliamentary questions are analysed at the oversight
stage and individual committee members form the unit of analysis at the decision-
making stage of the policy process. More importantly, all datasets include variation at
the level of individual MEPs, national party delegations, party groups and countries.
Some of these different levels of data are nested within one another: individual
representatives are affiliated with national parties, which are elected in the different
member states that make up the European Union. In other words, there is a hierarchy
between the different data levels.
Such hierarchical datasets present several challenges for traditional statistical
analysis. Specifically. they give rise to 'nested sources of variability', which are
differences in the variation of the dependent variable across and within levels of the
data (sec e.g. Snijders and Bosker, 2004 for more detail). In other words, hierarchical
data distinguish between variation at the level of the primary unit of analysis and one
8 I thank Rick Whitaker for this observation.
131
(or several) additional levels that provide the 'context' within which this variation
takes place. For instance, nationality might be an important factor in explaining
legislative behaviour measured at the level of individual MEPs. Ignoring the layered
nature of the data and the possible clustering it engenders at different levels may omit
an important explanatory element and undermine the accuracy of the model's
estimation (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002).
However, once the challenges of nested variability are resolved, multi-level
analyses are particularly rewarding because they allow for inferences about the
relative impact of the explanatory variables at each data level and they provide an
estimation of the 'residual variability' for each level, with potentially interesting
interpretations.
Most statistical research in the social sciences uses ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimations with dummy and interaction variables to account for contextual variation
at different levels of data. As Steenbergen and Jones (2002) point out, however, such
dummy variable or interactive models have important weaknesses. On one hand,
dummy variables can account for data clustering at different levels but they do not
provide much explanatory leverage." On the other hand, interactive models, which
allow predictions about the relative effect of different explanatory variables across
data levels, do not provide a satisfactory solution to the problems associated with data
clustering.
More fundamentally, in some instances it can prove very impractical (and even
technically impossible) to account for all contextual variation with dummy and
interaction variables. In the case of the datasets described in this chapter, for instance,
it is virtually impossible to incorporate a dummy variable for every MEP who engages
lj A similar caveat applies to models with so-called "robust standard errors". While these models adjust
the standard errors to take into account data clusters, they do not allow for substantive interpretation of
these hierarchical multi-level effects.
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in parliamentary questioning or for every committee member who writes one or more
reports in a particular committee. Because we cannot account for data clustering at the
level of individual MEPs or committee members, using OLS in these cases requires
the assumption that all observations are independent from one another at the
individual level. Clearly, this assumption is not justified in the case of committee
members who write more than one report over the period of analysis (in a single or in
different committees) or for MEPs who table several questions over the course of the
legislature (in a single or several different policy areas). Ordinary least squares (OLS)
is not an appropriate modelling technique for hierarchical data where the
independence assumption does not hold and where the use of dummy variables is
impractical.
Due to these weaknesses, this thesis adopts an alternative estimation technique,
which has enjoyed growing popularity in political (and other social) sciences: multi-
level modelling with hierarchical random effects. Multi-level modelling with random
effects relaxes the assumption of traditional OLS specification that the covariance
between individual observations equals 0 (i.e. it relaxes the assumption that all
observations are independent from one another). Indeed, to get back to our previous
example, if MEPs from the same countries exhibit similar patterns of legislative
participation and specialisation in the EP (e.g. as a result of a particular political
culture), then this covariance is not zero.
By using a random effects specification, we can estimate a model that explains
patterns of representation in the European Parliament at the individual level while
taking into account the 'contextual' effects of nationality. Formally, the basic multi-
level model is easily derived from the standard OLS model. Let the response Ylj be the
133
representational performance of MEP i, from country j. Xi) is an explanatory variable
of interest. The model we would like to estimate is:
(Where):
(By Substitution):
.
Equation (2.0) describes a hierarchical model with a single random effect for
nationality. The first part of the model resembles the standard OLS technique with its
fixed parameters 80 and 81. The second part of the model, which contains the error
terms, is different from ordinary least squares however. UOj represents random
variation at the country level (level two) whereas eij is the error term associated with
the individual (level one). For each observation, the model allows the regression error
to vary depending on the individual and the country that he or she is from.
Using equation 2.0, we can compare the representational performance of
individual MEPs within their country and across all member states represented in the
European Parliament. The covariance between individuals from the same country is
not assumed to be zero. However, the model still assumes that the covariance between
individuals from different countries (u], Uk), the covariance between error terms of
individuals from different countries (eij, eik) and the covariance between a country
effect and an individual in a different party (u], eu) is zero.
The empirical chapters in this thesis use a random effects specification similar to
that in equation (2.0). Of course, with a larger number of explanatory variables, the
equations needed to test the hypotheses derived in Chapter 2 are more complex. In
addition, some of these estimations will include more than one random effect to
account for possible data clustering at multiple levels. However, these extensions do
not fundamentally alter the workings of the basic model presented in equation (2.0).
134
The next section summarizes the discussion in this chapter and the hypotheses to be
tested in the remainder of the thesis.
IV. Summary
This chapter has presented the research design and data to be used in the empirical
part of this thesis and it has introduced the statistical tools that allow us to test the
hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. The thesis adopts a quantitative design because its
research questions are more suitable for statistical analysis than for a qualitative
approach. Nevertheless, qualitative evidence will be used when appropriate to
corroborate the quantitative results or refine interpretation of the findings.
Most of the data for the analysis are easily available online from the European
Parliament's website which makes it possible for future researchers to replicate and
build on this study. Defining salience as a function of national party manifestos
overcomes problems of reliability and validity that affect studies based on public
opinion surveys (such as MIP or closed ended questions) and content analysis of
media coverage. In addition, masuring issue salience based on national party
manifestos does not rely on a dataset that is specific to the European Parliament,
which facilitates further study on other legislatures or different (or even multiple) time
frames.
Finally, the chapter introduces an increasingly popular technique for addressing
the multi-level nature of the datasets to be analysed in this thesis. Instead of the more
common ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) with fixed effects, a hierarchical
model with random effects is used. Statistically, using a random effects specification
makes sense because all three datasets in this study are organised around multiple
levels, including individual MEPs, their partisan affiliation and nationality.
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Interpretation of the estimated random effects allows us to assess the differential
effect of the explanatory variables on political representation at various data levels.
This chapter concludes the first part of the thesis. Chapter 1 has charted the
evolution of political representation across time and derived an alternative
conceptualisation based on the idea of responsiveness. Chapter 2 has developed a
model of political representation as a function of institutional and party-political
incentives at different stages of the legislative process. Finally, this chapter has
operationalised the concepts in Chapter 2 and set the stage for a sophisticated
empirical analysis.
The second part proceeds with the empirical analysis to test the hypotheses
developed in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 focuses on committee decision-making to examine
which MEPs participate and specialise in which committee meetings. Chapter 5
analyses political representation in policy formulation via committee reports. Chapter
6 moves away from the committee structure in the European Parliament to discuss
how MEPs oversee the Commission and represent their constituents at Question-
Time. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the findings and a discussion
of their implications for democracy in the European Parliament and in other
legislatures.
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PART 2
CHAPTER 4 - POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
AND COMMITTEE DECISION-MAKING
Many observers to the European Parliament have complained about the low
attendance at its plenary sessions. Even some MEPs are dissatisfied with the
attendance of their peers. As one internal report finds, participation at plenary in 2001
was only 49% with some countries represented on average with less than 30% of their
MEPs. Also, 27.8% of legislators did not partake in roll-call voting at all. I In response
to such embarrassingly low attendance, the European Parliament introduced an
"attendance allowance" payable to all MEPs who sign in on the day of a plenary
meeting. This fee is of course a regular object of ridicule for the European media.
Conscious of its public image, the Socialist party group PES even expelled Austrian
MEP Hans-Peter Martin for accusing his colleagues of abusing the system by signing
in just to tum around and get on the next plane horne.'
Apart from public perceptions, attendance at plenary, committee meetings and
other legislative business also has important implications from a democratic
perspective. As Chapter 2 has noted, political representation is a function of
representative participation and responsive specialisation, which in tum are
conditioned by party-political and institutional incentives. First, only legislators who
participate actively in committee business can put their party's policy priorities into
practice. If attendance at committee meetings is consistently biased in favour of MEPs
from some parties or party groups, this could have serious consequences for the
I Johansson. Jan, Jonas Sjostedt, Jonas and Berivan Ongorur. Voting Procedure in the European
Parliament 200 I: An empirical analysis, EP document. DV\472933, 30.05.~002.
(vguengl.org/medialibrary/files/1_472933ENvl.pdf)
2 See Ilans and the Cookie Jar, Guardian, April 8. 2004,
(http://politics.guardian.co.ukleu/commentlO.9236.1188262.00.html)
democratic foundations of the European Parliament. Unrepresentative attendance
could affect the content of committee decisions, steer parliamentary debate in a
direction that it would not otherwise have taken or shut out dissenting opinion in
committee deliberations.
Second, however, defining representation as responsive specialisation also implies
that patchy attendance records are not equally detrimental to the representational
performance of all legislators. There are several reasons why legislators might choose
not to attend all parliamentary business all the time. Rather than levels of
participation, it is the quality of an MEP's engagement at different stages of the policy
process that determines responsiveness. Because MEPs specialise in policy areas that
help them fulfil their legislative objectives, responsiveness should be explained by
examining the incentive structure that determines why MEPs engage in certain policy
areas rather than others. What are the representational consequences of this selective
participation at the committee stage?
This chapter analyses the implications of MEP decisions to participate in
committee decision-making and specialise in certain policy areas for political
representation in the European Parliament. As Chapter 2 has shown, political
representation requires both representative committee deliberation as well as
responsive legislative participation. In order to evaluate the representational
performance of the European Parliament and its legislators in committee decision-
making, we must therefore take into account both the participation and the
specialisation decisions of individual MEPs. By comparing the committee work of
MFPs to initial committee composition, we can draw conclusions about the impact of
selective participation on the political representation of national parties at this stage of
the policy process.
The chapter is organised into five parts. The next section briefly introduces the
committee structure of the European Parliament and demonstrates the effect of the
assignment procedure on committee composition and representativeness. Section 2
goes beyond assignments to explain participation within committees and the
representativeness of committee deliberation in the EP. Section 3 addresses the
second dimension of representation, responsiveness, by analysing legislative
specialisation in policy areas that feature prominently in each party's political
programme. Section 4 specifies a multivariate test of some of the hypotheses on the
representativeness of committee deliberations and the responsiveness of committee
members developed in Chapter 2. Finally, Section 5 synthesises the findings and
evaluates their impact on political representation in committee decision-making in the
European Parliament.
I. Representation and the Committee Assignment Procedure
in the European Parliament
This section describes the composition of parliamentary committees as a result of
the assignment procedure in EP and evaluates incentives for individual legislators to
specialise in some committees rather than in others. By setting the rules for committee
composition and structuring incentives for legislative specialisation, the assignment
procedure has important implications for political representation at the decision-
making stage in the European Parliament.
The number, size and responsibilities of the different committees are decided
immediately after the election of a new Parliament. After each European election,
committee positions are distributed among the party groups in proportion to the
number of seats they hold in the Parliament. Party groups then ask their MEPs to
submit requests and assign available positions based on those requests. However,
these assignments are substantially constrained by the EP's own internal rules of
procedure. Most importantly, Rule 152 mandates that "the composition of the
committees shall, as far as possible, reflect the composition of Parliament". Thus. the
number of positions available to each party group is limited by the size of their
delegation. Committee requests that would undermine this proportionality
requirement cannot be granted. In line with Krehbiel's (1991) informational theory of
committee government, such proportionality rules favour heterogeneous committees
and should, therefore, produce policy outcomes that reflect the preferences of the
legislature as a whole. As Raunio (1997) finds, for instance, heterogeneous
committees produce reports that cut across party cleavages and foster oversize
majorities in the plenary. Assuming that all committee members participate equally,
the proportionality requirement in the assignment procedure clearly favours
representative committees that mirror the divisions within the plenary and European
society as a whole.
However, there is no reason to assume that all MEPs will participate equally in all
the committees to which they have been assigned. Indeed, attendance is not even
limited to actual committee members only. As Rule 183 of the Rules of Procedure
stipulates, "unless a committee decides otherwise, members may attend meetings of
committees to which they do not belong but may not take part in their deliberations".
Also, even if most legislators stick to their assignments, the average MEP joins two
committees, which leaves at least some room to choose which policy area to
participate in. If there are large variations in the attractiveness of different committees
in the EP, these should reflect upon patterns of participation. Both policy influence
and salience should playa role in committee specialisation.
First, as pointed out before. the European Parliament is a developing legislature
with different levels of influence in different policy areas. The amount of legislative
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powerthat accrues to the Parliament is largely a function of different decision-making
procedures. It is widely recognised that the EP has most of its power in areas
governed by the co-decision procedure where it is an equal co-legislator with the
Council of Ministers (see for instance Crombez, 1997). It has much less power over
policy issues that fall under the co-operation or consultation procedures. As a result,
similarly to what has been found on roll call votes (Scully, 1997; Hix et al.
forthcoming), participation in committees with a high percentage of co-decision
legislation may be more desirable to MEPs than participation in committees without
much effect on policy.
Second, the salience of the policy areas that fall under the jurisdiction of each
committee also affects incentives for MEPs to participate and specialise. As Hall
(1996) finds in the context of the US House of Representatives, specialisation in line
with constituency concerns is common. Certainly, if as Chapter 2 has shown, political
representation is one of the main legislative objectives of MEPs, assignments to
jurisdictions that feature prominently in the party's electoral manifesto should be
more desirable than other posts.
Finally, differences in committee size define the scarcity of positions in each
policy area. As Corbett et al (2003) note, it is not always possible for the groups to
accommodate their members' committee requests because some committees are over-
subscribed while others are less popular. The introduction of substitute positions
alleviates the problem of over-subscription by effectively doubling committee size. At
little disadvantage compared with full members, substitute positions are a safety
mechanism for those who are unhappy with their primary assignments (Corbett et al,
2003). Nevertheless, not all MEPs can get into their preferred committee and the party
group leadership usually has to make some difficult choices.
TABLE 4.1 PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT By
A 'TTRACTIVENESS OF ASSIGNMENT (1999-2002)
COMMITTEE CHAIR MEMBERS INFLUENCE SALIENCE ATTRACTIVE~ESS(A) (B) (C) Rank [(B*C)A)
ECON RANDZIO- 45PLATH Christa 28 15.62 1
ENVI JACKSON 60Caroline 59 6.39 2
CULT GARGANI 35Giuseppe 26 7.76 3
EMPL ROCARD 55Michel 31 9.87 4
RETT HATZIDAKIS 59 54Konstantinos 3.44 5
WESTENDORP
INDU Y CABEZA 60 26 4.66 6
Carlos
FEMM THEORIN Maj 40 14 5.37 7Britt
DEVE MIRANDA 34 22Joaquim 2.32 8
AFCO INAPOLETANO 30 11 3.94 9Pasqualina
LIBE WATSON 43 3 10.97Graham 10
BARINGDORF
AGRI Friedrich- 38 8 1.57 11
n' ~.
vv
AFET BROK Elmar 65 1 7.66 12
PESC VARELA 20 0 1.57 13Daniel
BUDG WYNN Terence 45 47 n.a -
JURI PALACIO Ana 35 49 n.a -
PETI GEMELLI 30 0Vitaliano n.a -
CONT THEATO 21 1 n.a -Dietmut
Note.' Members is the total number ofcommittee positions excluding substitutes; Influence is the percentage ofcommittee
legislation that fell under the co-decision procedure in the first halfofthe fifth Parliament (1999-2002), Salience is the (non-
weighted) average salience ofeach committee across all national parties included in the study: Abbreviations: AFET = Foreign
Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy; AGRl = Agriculture and Rural Development; CULT = Culture,
Youth, Education, the Media and Sport: DEloE = Development and cooperation; ECOX = Economics and Monetary Affairs:
FJfPL = Employment and Social Affairs: ESI'I = Environment, Public health and Consumer Policy: FE,\!.\{ ~ Women's rights
and Equal Opportunities; INDU = External Trade, Research and Energy; UBE = Citizen's Freedom and Rights, Justice and
Home Affairs: PESC = Fisheries; REIT = Regional policy, transport and tourism
Table 4.1 lists the seventeen committees of the fifth Parliament (1999-2004) in
descending order of attractiveness. The ranking is based on the committee's salience,
its policy influence and the number of available positions. According to this measure,
the most attractive committees deal with economics and monetary affairs, followed by
the influential environment committee, culture and employment and social affairs. Of
the 13 committees for which salience data could be computed, fisheries, agriculture
and foreign affairs score lowest.
The ranking differs substantially from other studies, which do not take salience
into account (e.g. McElroy, 2001). Partly, this is due the relative crudeness of the
measurement in Table 4.1. Nevertheless, the ranking does illustrate how variation in
terms of policy influence and committee salience could affect incentives for
legislative participation and specialisation across policy areas. Clearly, if salience,
policy influence and committee size affect participation, the most attractive seats are
likely to induce greater specialisation than less attractive ones.
As Chapter 2 has shown, such differences in legislative participation have a
substantial effect on the representativeness of legislative deliberation and the
responsiveness of individual MEPs. While the distribution of posts may predict
heterogeneous committees that reflect a wide range of societal interests, it is important
to take into account the extent to which these posts are actually used by MEPs. Rather
than committee assignments per se, legislative participation and specialisation within
committees determine the values and interests that the European Parliament
represents. Given the distribution of committee posts, what induces some MEPs to
participate more than others? What is the effect of differential levels of committee
participation on political representation in Europe?
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1/. Representativeness and Legislative Participation by MEPs
Representative committee deliberations require participation from a broad range
of committee members. If some members consistently abstain from participation in
committee work, this can affect the range of values and interests that are represented
in the policy areas under the jurisdiction of the committee. Figure 4.1 describes
distribution of average attendance figures across committee members. The figure
shows, first of all, that there is considerable variation in attendance across the full
range of possible values along the X-axis (0-100%), which indicates that legislators
make individual choices about how many of their committee meetings to attend and
which policy areas to focus on. As predicted in Chapter 2, MEPs participate in some
policy areas but not others, with potential implications for the representative nature of
committee deliberation. The picture in Figure 4.1 confirms the need to identify the
incentives that lead to such radical differences in participation.
Second, average attendance is more or less normally distributed around its mean
(44%), with most MEPs attending slightly less than half of their meetings. These
numbers resemble those cited earlier on participation in plenary sessions and they
raise similar concerns about the democratic legitimacy of committee decision-making.
If less than half of all legislators participate in decision-making, policy outcomes at
the European level could deviate substantially from the preferences of the electorate.
Even more worryingly, a large share of committee members boast attendance figures
that are close to zero. Indeed, ~ committee members only attended 14 percent of their
committee meetings. A substantial number of MEPs seems uninterested in, at least
some of, the committees to which they have been assigned.
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FIGURE 4.1. DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE ATTENDANCE ACROSS COMMITTEE
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In order to evaluate the impact of such voluntary abstention on political
representation, we have to determine, first, which MEPs decide to opt out of
committee work and, second, whether there are differences across policy areas. Figure
4.2 shows variation in average attendance across all seventeen parliamentary
committees. The budgetary control committee (CONT) has the highest average
attendance, followed by the committee on regions, transport and tourism (RETT),
constitutional affairs (AFCO) and agriculture (AGRI). The regional committee is one
of the larger committees and quite influential though it is not among the most coveted
assignments in Table 4.1 (see also McElroy, 2001).
All remaining committees have attendance figures below 50%, which means
that, on average, their members attend less than half of all meetings. At the low end of
the spectrum, women's rights (FEMM), trade, research and energy (INDU),
development (DEVE) and foreign affairs (AFET) have average attendance records
that do not exceed 400/0. The least attended committee (FEMM) is small and generally
considered not very attractive in terms of salience or policy influence. However, trade.
research and energy (INDU) is one of the larger and most influential groupings in the
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the discussion has assumed that all meetings of a particular committee are equally
important. Of course, depending on the precise matter to be discussed, some meetings
may be of much greater relevance to a large range of members within a particular
committee than others. For instance, it is likely that some debates on the controversial
chemicals directive REACH in the environment committee exercised a wider draw on
the members of that committee than an own-initiative report on the regulation of
animal transport in Denmark.
Figure 4.3 completes the picture of committee participation by showing the
average deviation of attendance between meetings from the mean for each committee.
The committee on foreign affairs (AFET) boasts the highest variation in attendance,
followed by regional (RETT) and social affairs (EMPL). Fisheries (PESC), women's
rights (FEMM), development (DEVE) and budgetary control (CONT) have much
lower variation. A large average deviation indicates that a large number of MEPs
attend the most interesting meetings but decide to miss out on other debates that are of
less interest to them. Lower variation, on the other hand, suggests substantial
specialisation in particular policy areas on the part of a minority and near-exclusion of
the majority of committee members.
There is a somewhat larger difference in within-committee variation than in mean
attendance across committees. However, the ranking primarily reflects differences in
committee size, with the largest committees showing the largest deviations from mean
attendance. Committees with clearly defined jurisdictions, such as fisheries, have
generally lower variation in attendance than those that cover several policy areas, such
as foreign affairs, human rights, common security and defence policy (AFET) or
regional policy, transport and tourism (RETT). This explanation does not, however,
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salience of different committees as measured in party manifestos and attendance at the
level of national party delegations in the European Parliament. For each national party
included in the analysis, the graph plots the average attendance of its members against
the average salience of their committee positions.
There is a clear positive relationship between attendance and salience. The
correlation between salience and attendance at the national party level is 0.6, which is
quite significant. National parties whose MEPs sit in committees that feature
prominently in electoral manifestos have better attendance records than parties that
did not gain access to salient committees. Attendance varies from its theoretical
minimum (0) to almost 90%, with most parties attending 30%-60% of their committee
meetings. The figure indicates that legislators specialise in particular policy areas in
order to respond to the priorities set out in their party's manifesto. Given a set of
assignments, MEPs target their legislative participation to those policy areas that are
most important in terms of their party mandate. Legislators who were not assigned
any salient positions scale back their engagement and focus on other legislative
activities at different stages of the policy process.
FIGURE 4.4. AVERAGE COMMITTEE ATTENDANCE AND SALIENCE OF COMMITTEE
ASSIGNMENTS, BY NATIONAL PARTY
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Of course, Figure 4.4 is slightly misleading in that it does not take into account the
size of each national party. Instead, every national party is represented by one
observation, independently of the size of its delegation in the EP. The party with the
highest salience and attendance record in the dataset, for instance, is the Basque
nationalist PNV, which only has a single representative in the EP. Omitting the PNV
in Figure 4.4 strengthens the association substantially. A more sophisticated
multivariate analysis is required to take into account factors such as party size that
maydistort the correlation between salience and attendance.
Finally, Figure 4.5 switches units of analysis once again to take a closer look at
the impact of committee specialisation on the representational performance of party
groups. The bars compare the average responsiveness of an MEP from each party
group to the average responsiveness of all MEPs. If legislative participation were not
affected by partisan factors, the proportional committee assignment procedure should
ensure that MEPs from all groups are equally responsive. Instead, the figure shows
that responsiveness varies substantially across party groups.
First, the two party groups that are closest on the left-right spectrum and form a
simple majority in the Parliament (EPP and ELDR) are over-represented in salient
committee meetings. Indeed, the pivotal group (ELDR) on most votes is over-
represented by more than 30% in meetings that are salient to its national parties.
While the EPP is slightly more over-represented than the PES, the difference does not
appear to be very significant.3 In contrast, party groups on the extreme left and right
are least active in the most salient areas. With the exception of the Greens, which
3 However, the picture may become clearer once we account for thedifferent majority thresholds
required forco-decision andnon-codecision legislation. Because co-decision legislation requires an
absolute (rather than a simple) majority in the second reading in theplenary, voting coalitions in theEP
vary considerably across procedures (Hix, 2001). Amultivariate analysis (see next section) is required
toaddress thisproblem.
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IV. Political Representation in EP Committees: A Multivariate
Analysis
While the descriptive results in Figures 4.1-4.5 support some of the hypotheses
developed in Chapter 2, they must be interpreted with care. The tables and figures
presented thus far only consider bivariate associations without controlling for other
factors that might alter the relationship between attendance and salience, such as
differences in the power of the Parliament across policy areas, national electoral
systems or the distribution of committee positions across party groups. In order to
explain political representation at the decision-making stage in the EP, a more
sophisticated multivariate analysis is required.
Table 4.2 shows the results of three multivariate regressions with committee
attendance as the dependent variable and country and individual-level random
effects." Model (1) includes all thirteen committees under study. Because differences
in policy influence and the institutional rules that govern decision-making across
committees could affect the specialisation decisions of MEPs, model (2) is limited to
the least influential committees where less than 1 in 4 reports fell under the co-
decision procedure whereas model (3) includes only committees with more than 250/0
co-decision reports. 5
As explained in Chapter 3, the random effect specification in Table 4.2 IS
suited for multi-level data that covers individual MEPs from different countries. This
suggestion is confirmed by the second to last row in Table 4.2, which shows the
probability that there is no statistically significant difference between the random-
effects regression result and an OLS regression with the same independent variables
which does not take into account the multi-level nature of the data. Nevertheless, the
4 See Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of random effects models.
5 The 25% threshold was chosen because it splits the dataset in two more or less equal halves.
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results are very similar across a range of different specifications of the model,
including ordinary least squares (OLS) with fixed country effects.
TABLE 4.2. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH RANDOM INDIVIDUAL AND
COUNTRY EFFECTS, DEPENDENT: COMMITIEE ATTENDANCE
(1): All (2): Low Policy (3): High Policy
Committees Influence Influence
Coeff Std .Err Coeff Std .Err Coeff Std .Err
0.002 0.021**
0.004 0.023**
0.004 0.035**
Responsiveness
Salience
PES*Salience
Substitute * Salience
Policy Incentives
Co-decision
PES
EPP
ELDR
Electoral System
Ballot
Candidate
District
Other Controls
Distance from median
MEP
Distance from Party Group
ChairNice-Chair
Substitute
Party Size
Incumbent
Number of Committees
Constant
0.013**
0.019**
0.032**
0.105**
0.080*
0.099**
0.157**
0.009
0.035
-0.001
0.215**
0.040
0.004
-0.384**
0.000
-0.021
-0.017
0.477**
0.036
0.033
0.030
0.042
0.045
0.065
0.001
0.046
0.098
0.024
0.017
0.001
0.015
0.014
0.069
0.061
0.116**
0.138*
0.026
0.008
-0.001
0.205**
-0.191
-0.028
-0.364**
-0.001
-0.050*
-0.010
0.504**
0.005
0.008
0.008
0.049
0.042
0.062
0.057
0.081
0.001
0.067
0.137
0.033
0.028
0.002
0.022
0.019
0.090
0.012**
0.014**
0.030**
0.100*
0.081*
0.177**
-0.007
0.086
-0.001
0.233**
0.237
0.029
-0.394**
0.001
0.007
-0.012
0.425**
0.003
0.005
0.005
0.044
0.040
0.055
0.056
0.084
0.001
0.060
0.132
0.034
0.024
0.001
0.020
0.019
0.090
.019
.023
0.011
Random Effects
Country 0.058** 0.015 0.068** 0.022 0.069**
MEP 0.072** 0.014 0.088** 0.024 0.086**
Residual 0.191** 0.006 0.182** .012 0.185**
N 887 404 483
Prob >chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
~g Rest. Likelihood 87.46 19.50 26.82
Notes: • significant at 0.05 level, •• significant at O. OJ level; unit ofanalysis: individual committee members; See Chapter 3for
details on random effects methodology; low policy influence refers to committees with less than 25% codecision legislation; high
policy influence refers to commillee with more than 25% codecision legislation; estimates for Country, ME? and Residual are
the respective estimated standard deviations ofthe country, ME? and residual random effects; frob >chi2 shows the probability
ofno difference between the random effects specification shown here and an OLS specification without random or fixed effects
for country and ME?
First of all, in both models, the main effect of salience is positive and highly
significant. In model (l) a 1 percent rise in a committee's salience raises attendance
records by 1.3 percent. The salience variable remains statistically significant at the 10/0
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level in all three models though, substantively, it is more than three times as important
in the least influential committees than in the most influential ones. Clearly, in
committees where the European Parliament does not have much power over policy
outcomes, salience is a larger incentive for specialisation than in committees that
induce specialisation also because of their leverage over policy outcomes.
Nevertheless, in both cases, the results confirm the bivariate picture in Figure 4.4.
MEPs specialise in committees that are important in terms of their representational
mandate, even once other incentives, such as policy influence and electoral incentives
are taken into account.
Secondly, the models include two interactive terms that determine whether the
relationship between salience and committee attendance is different for different sub-
groups of legislators. Are there some MEPs who specialise more in policy areas that
feature prominently in their party's political programme (i.e. are more responsive)
than others? Chapter 2 suggests that minority MEPs should be more responsive in
committee decision-making because they can focus their efforts on the most salient
areas without losing their policy influence in other areas.
First, PES*Salience investigates the relationship between party group affiliation
and responsiveness. Compared to all other party groups, MEPs from the largest
'minority' group, the PES, tend to direct their committee participation to a greater
extent to salient policy areas than MEPs from other party groups. Indeed, in the first
model, the relationship between salience and attendance is more than twice as strong
for Socialists than for all other groups. Unlike EPP and ELDR, whose MEPs have a
strong policy incentive to participate in all areas because their groups command a
simple majority on the committee floor, PES representatives focus more on
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representation. As models (2) and (3) show, the difference in responsiveness across
party groups is particularly marked in the less influential committees.
The second interactive term, Substitute *Salience examines the effect of committee
rank on responsiveness. In all three models, substitutes are considerablv more
.
responsive than full committee members. The positive association between attendance
and salience is almost three times as large as for full committee members. Just like
'minority' MEPs with little influence over policy outcomes, substitutes are more
selective in their committee participation than other legislators. Responsiveness to the
public priorities of their national party motivates the participation of substitutes to a
greater extent than that of rank and file committee members. This result is consistent
with the hypothesis that substitute positions are used to accommodate the committee
requests of MEPs who did not get into their preferred committees as full members
(Corbett et aI, 2003).
The relationship between salience and attendance defines the strength of an
MEP's responsiveness. However, apart from such responsive specialisation on the
part of individual legislators, the participation of MEPs also affects the range of
values and the interests of European citizens the European Parliament represents in
committee deliberations. By altering the composition of committee meetings,
differences in policy incentives determine the range of interests that are represented
on the committee floor.
First, in line with the findings of previous research on roll-call votes, MEPs
participate more in policy areas where they have an impact from a policy perspective
(Scully, 1997; Hix et al., forthcoming). As pointed out before, the European
Parliament has most of its power over policy in areas governed by the co-decision
procedure. If MEPs are interested in swaying actual policy outcomes in their favour.
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they will participate more in these policy areas. Table 4.2 confirms that representation
across all political formations is higher in policy areas where the Parliament has
significant decision-making powers.
The results quantify the effect of institutional power on participation in different
policy areas. In model (1), a 1% increase in the share of legislation that falls under the
co-decision procedure in each committee raises the average participation rate across
all MEPs by 10%, which is a substantively very important effect. However, because it
affects all political formations equally, institutional power does not alter the
ideological composition of committee meetings. Meetings that address policy areas
where the EP plays only a consultative role are less well attended on average but their
composition is not less representative of the plenary from an ideological perspective.
Second, party group affiliation affects policy incentives for participation at the
committee stage. Open rule in committee and plenary enforces a 'tyranny of the
majority' and reduces the incentive for minority MEPs to participate in their
committees. As model (1) demonstrates, members of the 'majority' groups and, more
specifically, the pivotal group within the majority, have better attendance scores than
their peers from 'minority' groups. EPP and ELDR attend a larger share of their
committee meetings than representatives of any other party group. Compared with
these 'majority' groups, the largest 'minority' formation (PES) has a lower level of
attendance in model (1). In Figure 4.6 different attendance levels across party groups
are reflected in the intercepts. The ELDR has the highest level of attendance
irrespective of the salience of the policy area, followed by the EPP and the PES.
Models (2) and (3) also distinguish between committees with large and small
shares of co-decision legislation. As in model (1), the ELDR is most likely to
participate in its meetings in all types of committees. However, the share of co-
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decision legislation does seem to affect the attendance patterns of the two largest
groups PES and EPP. While the PES does not form part of the simple majority in
most non co-decision legislation, it can form part of the winning coalition under co-
decision.
As pointed out above, most of the time, the Parliament decides by simple majority
of those present at the time of the vote. However, in the last stage of the co-decision
procedure, the EP holds a veto right over legislation only if an absolute majority of
legislators opposes the bill under consideration. Due to generally low attendance at
plenary sessions, an absolute majority can only be achieved if the two largest groups
EPP and PES vote together. As a result, under co-decision, PES, EPP and ELDR, all
have a policy incentive to participate in committee decision-making. Whereas the PES
is less represented in policy areas governed by simple majority voting, there is no
statistically significant difference in the attendance patterns of EPP and PES under co-
decision, where an absolute majority is required. Clearly, the institutional rules that
govern decision-making in the European Union have a considerable effect on the
representativeness of committee deliberation in the European Parliament.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the predicted effect of policy salience on attendance at
committee meetings for the three largest party groups. The 'majority' groups, EPP
and ELDR, have strong policy incentives to attend all committees irrespective of their
salience because they determine committee decision-making under open rule. The
minority Socialists on the other hand focus their participation on policy areas that
feature prominently in their manifestos because they have little effect over actual
policy outcomes in most areas. As a result. the slope of the relationship between
salience and attendance is steeper for PES MEPs than it is for the simple majority
coalition of EPP and ELDR. The extent to which representatives adjust their
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legislative participation in response to constituency concerns depends on their party
group affiliation. Figure 4.6 illustrates that the responsiveness of individual Ml.Ps is a
direct function of party group coalition dynamics in the European Parliament.
FIGURE 4.6 PREDICTED EFFECT OF POLICY SALIENCE ON COMMITIEE ATIENDANCE
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Third, individual policy preferences affect legislative participation decisions. In all
three models in Table 4.2, preference outliers have better attendance records than
MEPs who are close to the median of the committee and plenary floors, once partisan
factors are taken into account. The models predict that the most extreme MEPs
(Nominate_Squared= 1) attend more than 20% more committee meetings than their
colleagues. Indeed, the committee floor is one of the only opportunities for MEPs to
voice their opinions freely without endangering the cohesion of the group by
defecting in roll-call votes. In other words, MEPs who defect from their party groups
in eventual plenary votes are likely to make their position known already at the
committee stage."
6 Note that this observation also questions the representative nature of roll-call votes as a sub-sample of
all plenary votes. Because likely defectors bring up their opinions at the committee stage. the party
group leadership is likely to be well aware of the positions of its members. It will use this information
to make strategic decisions about whether or not to request a roll-call.
Once the partisan effect created by open rule and majority thresholds is taken into
account, preference outliers engage more in all policy areas than their more moderate
peers. In terms of representativeness, MEPs from the political fringes are over-
represented in committee deliberations. While institutional rules make sure that
committee decision-making reflects the partisan balance of power in the EP,
deliberations remain heterogeneous due to the active participation of the most extreme
representatives. In both cases, moderate MEPs from 'minority' groups (i.e. PES
representatives) are most disadvantaged on the committee floor.
Finally, the estimations in Table 4.2 also control for several variables that can
affect legislative specialisation decisions or distort the relative importance of
responsiveness and policy incentives. Substitutes have much lower attendance records
than full members. As Corbett et al (2003) observe, substitutes can attend committee
meetings but are allowed to vote only if they have been designated beforehand to
replace an absent full member. In comparison, full members can attend committee
meetings, participate in deliberations, bid for committee reports, introduce
amendments and vote on existing legislation. In model (1), substitutes attend fully
38% fewer committee meetings than their peers. All models also control for the
possible effects of incumbency, party size and the number of committees that each
MEP has joined. None of these variables assume statistical significance.
At the country level, differences in electoral systems do not seem to affect
attendance records. District magnitude does not assume statistical significance, which
confirms existing research that has deplored the weak electoral connection in the EP.
Similarly, concerns for reselection by the national party do not affect the participation
of MEPs at the committee stage. The coefficients on ballot structure and candidate
selection are not significant in any of the models, which seems to question Kreppel's
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(2002) emphasis on reselection as an important factor in EU legislative politics.
However, re-selection may playa much more prominent role in legislative activities
over which national parties have more direct control, such as report allocation for
instance (see Chapter 5).
While the models are unequivocal about the lack of influence of electoral rules for
MEP behaviour, they do not include any other country-level variation. One advantage
of random effects regressions is that they produce residual estimates akin to the fixed
effects in OLS for each level in the data without requiring the use of dummy
variables." These random effects account for variation in committee attendance across
countries that is not covered by the independent variables in the model. By comparing
estimated random effects to the country's mean attendance, we can evaluate the
explanatory power of the model for each country.
Figure 4.7 plots each country's mean attendance (x-axis) against the residual
country effect estimated in model 1. If the model did not explain any cross-country
variation in attendance, both series should be perfectly correlated and all observations
should lie on the 45-degree line that is represented in the figure.f The farther an
observation is from the 45-degree line, the greater the explanatory power of the model
for that country. In other words, the distance between each observation and the 45-
degree line measures the extent to which a country's MEPs respond to institutional
and party-political incentives in their decisions to participate in EP committees. For
countries that lie above the line, the residual country effect for participation in
committee decision-making increases once party-political and institutional incentives
are taken into account whereas the opposite is true for countries that lie below the '+5-
degree line.
7 See Chapter 3 for further details. . .
8 Note that there is not a .t5-degree inclination in the Figure because the two axes are scaled differently.
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First of all, there remains a fair amount of cross-country variation in estimated
participation even once the incentive structure within the EP is taken into account.
However, the difference in the scale of the two axes shows that the model has reduced
this 'unexplained' variation from about a 35% range in attendance (25-60%) to about
a 20% range (35-55%). Stated differently, the correlation between mean attendance
and estimated mean attendance at the country level is 0.61, which indicates that the
model explains about 39% (1-0.61) of all cross-country variation in committee
attendance.' The model makes a clear contribution to explaining observed differences
incommittee attendance across member states.
Apart from the rather vague notion of 'political culture', there does not seemto be
an immediate explanation for why MEPs from some countries are better represented
in committees than their peers, once the incentive structure within the EP is taken into
9 Note thatthis number does not represent theoverall explanatory power of themodel. It refers purely
to the country level of thedata andmeasures thedifference between mean attendance andestimated
mean attendance, once the independent variables inthemodel aretaken into accountAlso, this figure
isbased on only 15 observations (1 percountry) andshould therefore be interpreted with care.
account. German MEPs have the highest unexplained attendance followed by the
Dutch and Austrians. Italy, the UK and Portugal on the other hand attend the fewest
meetings. Generally, Mediterranean countries fall into the bottom half of the figure,
which indicates a possible North-South divide in terms of representation at the
committee level in the European Parliament. With the UK also in the bottom half of
the figure, cross-country variation could also be a reflection of public attitudes
towards the usefulness of legislative politics or the general trustworthiness of the
European Parliament. In any case, if committee decision-making has an impact on
policy outcomes at the European level, these countries are likely to be most
disadvantaged by community policy.
III. Discussion and Conclusion
The results of the empirical analysis in this chapter show how the participation
and specialisation decisions of MEPs affect their responsiveness and the
representative nature of committee deliberations. First, specialisation in salient policy
areas determines responsiveness. Similar to what Hall (1996) finds in his study of the
US Congress, MEPs direct their attention to salient policy areas. This is particularly
true for legislators with little incentive to participate in a broad range of policy areas,
such as MEPs from the main 'minority' group PES or committee substitutes. The
results support hypothesis 1b in Chapter 2, which predicts that minority groups are
more responsive. MEPs from the largest 'minority' group focus their resources on
those areas that feature prominently in the manifesto. Such responsiveness is most
beneficial to MEPs with lower incentives to engage in a broad range of policy areas
where they might have power over outcomes.
Second, the representativeness of committee decision-making depends on
incentives for participation in different policy areas. Even though EP power over
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policy induces MEPs to attend their committee meetings, this 'co-decision effect' is
less marked than in previous studies on roll-call votes (Hix et al, forthcoming; Scully.
1997). Partisan affiliation, which conditions who has an impact over policy under
different majority thresholds, encourages some MEPs to engage extensively at the
committee stage whereas others prefer to save their time and energy for other aspects
of parliamentary business. The results support hypothesis 1a in Chapter 2, which
identifies influence over policy as a key incentive for participation in the EP.
In sum, the analysis shows that participation and specialisation in salient policy
areas differ across MEPs. Whereas participation across a broad range of policy areas
is particularly attractive to MEPs from the majority groups who have considerable
influence over policy outcomes and committee decisions, responsive specialisation is
most attractive to MEPs from the largest 'minority' group who can focus their efforts
on fewer policy areas without endangering their majority on the committee floor. In
other words, whereas the 'majority' coalition is best represented across a large range
of policy areas, 'minority' groups are likely to be most responsive.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the empirical analysis in this chapter.
Most importantly, perhaps, the impact of committees cannot be evaluated if the
legislative participation and specialisation decisions of individual MEPs are ignored.
Party-political and institutional incentives structure the behaviour of rational
legislators. The main task for studies of political representation consists of identifying
the incentives that guide legislative participation and specialisation. Such an analysis
makes it possible to evaluate the impact of different institutional environments on the
responsiveness of individual legislators and the representative nature of parliamentary
business. In the case of committee decision-making in the European Parliament. for
instance, the proportionality enforced by the rules of procedure is undennincd by
party-political incentives, open rule and majority thresholds. Party group coalition
dynamics determine the range of values and interests that the European Parliament
represents and the strength of the connection between representatives and their
parties.
Second, instead of the "great legislative trade-off' between representation and
governance described by Shepsle (1988) in the context of the US House of
Representatives, there is a more complex interaction between the dual roles of
parliament. Shepsle posits that "at some point" an increase in representation will
require a decrease in the ability of the legislature to govern effectively. In the
European Parliament, Neuhold (2001) takes up a similar idea by highlighting the
"tension" between the increasing specialisation of policymaking in committees and
the need for MEPs to stay in touch with their constituents. According to this vertical
conception of the dual role of parliaments, policymaking and representation are
separate and incompatible goals that require representatives to make difficult choices
about the relative importance of each for their legislative work.
In direct contrast, this chapter has shown that specialisation is one way for MEPs
to actually be responsive. How else, but through effective policymaking can
legislators act as good representatives? The relationship between policy and
representation is not vertical from citizens over legislators to policy, as most previous
research has assumed, but horizontal: MEPs are responsive because they make policy
in line with their national party's political programme. Legislative participation and
specialisation arc integral parts of the process of political representation. Both policy
outcomes and representational performance depend on the participation and
specialisation decisions of individual MEPs, which in tum are shaped by institutional
and party-political incentives in the European Parliament.
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Third, however, the chapter has unveiled a tension between two inherently
conflicting facets of political representation itself: the representativeness of
parliamentary deliberation and the responsiveness of legislators to national party
concerns. Government of the people requires the participation of MEPs from across
the political spectrum in a broad range of policy areas. Government for the people on
the other hand requires specialisation in a limited number of particularly salient
policy areas. As the chapter has demonstrated, this 'great legislative trade-off
between representativeness and responsiveness is largely a matter of institutional
design and the incentive structure it creates.
Fourth, the chapter provides considerable evidence for the distributional approach
to committee government developed in the US (see Shepsle and Weingast, 1994 for a
comprehensive review). The distributional approach focuses on assignments to
explain committees as a means of increasing the re-election prospects of their
members (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987). Legislators try to gain control over certain
policy issues by setting up and joining relevant committees. Membership is governed
by self-selection and committees tend to be homogeneous and staffed with high
demanders and preference outliers. The empirical results in this chapter extend the
logic behind self-selection to the study of committee participation rather than mere
assignments. The findings show that MEPs specialise in their committees in response
to the political priorities defined by their national parties. Preference outliers are better
represented than MEPs who are close to the median on the committee/plenary floor.
In contrast the evidence for Krehbiel's (1991) informational theory of committee
government is less conclusive in the EP. According to this view. committees are
created and staffed to help the legislature make decisions and increase its leverage
over the executive. By bringing together members with an interest or background in
specific policy areas, committees foster legislative specialisation and increase the
power of the legislature over government. They are likely to be heterogeneous and
mirror the preference structure of the entire parliament. While Krehbiel's assessment
fits well with the proportionality rules that govern the committee assignment
procedure, it finds little support in the analysis of legislative participation and
specialisation decisions in this chapter. Clearly, committee participation varies
substantially across MEPs depending on the party-political and institutional incentives
that they face. A heterogeneous committee composition does not entail representative
committee decision-making. Unequal participation rates undermine the informational
quality of committee decision-making and the credibility of the committee as a
representative of the plenary.
Finally, the results corroborate theories of coalition formation along ideological
lines in the European Parliament (e.g. Hix et aI., forthcoming). There are large
differences in the legislative behaviour of MEPs from different party groups. Open
rule in committee and plenary enforces majoritarian decision-making at the committee
stage in the EP. As a result, MEPs from the majority groups can amend reports and
influence parliamentary deliberation, under simple majority. On the other hand,
'minority' MEPs have lower policy incentives and participate less than their peers.
The chapter has tested the effect of such policy incentives for two sets of institutional
decision-making rules. While a simple majority of EPP and ELDR is most active on
the committee floor for legislation that does not fall under the co-decision procedure,
the co-operation of EPP, PES and ELDR is required for co-decision legislation, which
mandates an absolute majority in the second reading in the plenary.
By implication. representation at the committee stage is the result of political
competition along an ideological left-right cleavage rather than along territorial
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divisions (see also Hix et al. forthcoming). Voters who share the policy preferences of
the majority groups in the EP are better represented in committee deliberations than
those who support the smaller 'minority' groups. Given their strong policy incentive.
MEPs from the 'majority' coalition (EPP and ELDR) are less selective in their
involvement in committee business than their peers from the 'minority'. In contrast,
the main minority group (PES) is more responsive because it can focus on salient
policy areas, rather than having to participate in as broad a range of policy areas as
possible.
In sum, this chapter has shown that political representation In parliamentary
committees is determined by institutional and party-political incentives. Unlike
previous research, the results paint a picture of the European Parliament as distinctly
non-consensual, where rational legislators make choices about how best to allocate
their time and resources among myriad legislative activities and policy areas. The
institutional rules and the party-political environment in which legislative
participation and specialisation take place affect whose values are represented on the
committee floor. All MEPs are interested in engaging in salient policy areas.
However, open rule favours the participation of MEPs from the larger party groups
who command a simple majority in the plenary and are therefore most influential over
the actual policy content of committee decisions. Finally, lack of party group control
over the participation decisions of its members precludes the leadership from
sanctioning MEPs who voice their dissent with their group's position on the
committee floor.
Studies of political representation must go beyond describing the composition of
the legislature to identify the incentives that motivate legislative participation and
specialisation in the EP and to evaluate their impact on the representativeness of
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parliamentary business and the responsiveness of individual legislators. Of course, not
all legislative activities are set within the same institutional context or impose the
same structure of opportunities and constraints on individual MEPs. The next chapter
analyses political representation in one of the most important committee activities in
the European Parliament: the allocation of rapporteurships over which the party group
leadership has substantial gate-keeping power.
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CHAPTER 5 - POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
AND POLICY FORMULATION1
This chapter analyses the effect of legislative participation and specialisation on
political representation in policy formulation at the European level. The distribution
of committee reports, maybe more than any other legislative activity, determines
whose values and interests are represented in policy outcomes at the European level.
Though deprived of formal agenda-setting power due to open rule in committee and
plenary, rapporteurs can exploit their informational advantage vis-a-vis other MEPs,
represent the position of committee and the Parliament as a whole in public, and
interact with lobbyists and other interest groups to develop policy proposals that are
closer to their preferences than the committee and plenary floor median would
suggest. This chapter evaluates the impact of the incentive structure that governs
committee report allocation on political representation in EP policymaking.
As Chapter 2 suggests, political representation is a direct function of individual
participation and specialisation in line with party-political priorities. The
representativeness of parliamentary business depends on the range of legislators that
participate at each stage of the policy process. Given their important role in policy
formulation, committee reports that are consistently biased in favour of MEPs from
some parties or party groups could undermine the democratic legitimacy of EP
policymaking. The representativeness of policymaking in European Parliament is
especially important given the political bias in committee decision-making identified
in Chapter 4.
I Note: An earlier (condensed) version of this chapter will appear in European Union Politics Vol. 7,
Issue -l (2006)
However, representation is not necessarily best served by a strictly proportional
allocation of reports. Like for committee decision-making (see Chapter 4), there are
various reasons why legislators might choose to opt out of active policy making in
some of their committees. Responsiveness requires that MEPs specialise in policy
areas that feature prominently in the manifesto that sets out their party's political
priorities. The quality of an MEP's engagement determines their individual
responsiveness.
This chapter assesses political representation at the policy formulation stage in
the European Parliament. Which MEPs sign up for committee reports in the EP? And.
given their membership in different parliamentary committees, which MEPs are most
responsive? First, the report allocation procedure enforces a proportional distribution
of reports among party groups. As a result, unlike for committee decision-making,
there should only be small differences in levels of participation across party groups.
Nevertheless, like for decision-making, specialisation in the most salient reports
follows coalition dynamics in the EP. Due to open rule in committee and plenary,
majority MEPs are privileged in the competition for the most salient reports both
under co-decision and in other decision-making procedures. Finally, unlike committee
decision-making, the gate-keeping role of party groups allows their leadership to
allocate reports among individual MEPs. As a result, the distribution of the most
desirable reports follows a logic of group cohesion.
The chapter is organised into 4 parts. The first section briefly describes the
procedure for report allocation and the incentive structure it creates for participation
and specialisation in policy formulation in the European Parliament. Section 2
presents evidence to illustrate the breadth of participation in committee reports and
the representntivcness of policy formulation in the EP. Section 3 focuses on legislative
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specialisation to determine which MEPs are most in line with the policy priorities that
their national party stands for in public. Finally, Section 4 synthesises the findings and
evaluates their impact on political representation at the policymaking stage in the
European Parliament.
I. Committee Reports in the European Parliament
Topics for reports are either forwarded from the Councilor the Commission under
the different decision-making procedures or they arise at the initiative of an individual
MEP. Bills forwarded to the Parliament by Commission or Council under the co-
decision, co-operation, consultation or assent procedures are assigned to one of the
parliamentary committees for consideration. So-called own-initiative reports may
address an entirely new policy area, a Commission communication on which the
Parliament has not been consulted or a motion for a resolution tabled by an MEP in
the plenary (Corbett et aI., 2003).
In order to limit committee workload, MEPs must have prior approval before
undertaking an own-initiative report. In 1994, quotas were introduced to reduce
committee workload to two own-initiative reports at anyone point in time.
Nevertheless, the workload of the Parliament has increased substantially in the past
decade in tandem with its policy influence (Corbett et aI. 2003). As Table 5.1
illustrates, the number of reports has risen by 20% over the 10-year period from 1994-
2004. One in five reports in the fifth Parliament fell under the co-decision procedure,
where the European Parliament acts as a co-legislator with the Council of Ministers
(Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000; Crombez, 2001). Most reports in the fifth Parliament are
written in the environment committee followed by justice and home affairs. In the
previous legislature, economics and environment were vastly more prolific than other
committees.
TABLE 5.1. NUMBER AND TYPE OF REPORTS By COMMITTEE (4TH AND 5TH
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS)
1994-1999 1999-2004
Committee Total Number Number of Committee Total Number Sumba of
ofReports Co-decision ofReports Co-decision
Reports Reports
Economic 288 73 ENVI 263 152
Environment 207 86 LIBE 254 19
Transport 165 27 JURI 229 82
Ext Econ ReI 129 1 INDU 219 50
Foreign Affairs 127 0 ECON 190 35
Legal Affairs 117 45 ECON 176 -,)
Agriculture 115 3 ·AFET 153 !
Energy & Research 113 17 AGRI 147 15
Fisheries 112 0 RETT 147 78
Budgets 104 2 BUDG 144 10
Employment 99 12 PESC 133 0
Civil Liberties 97 4 EMPL 109 30
Budgetary Control 84 2 DEVE 73 18
Culture 75 30 AFCO 56 3
Development 73 4 CULT 51 25
Regional Policy 70 2 FEMM 45 8
Rules of Procedure 35 0 PETI 23 0
Women's Rights 32 2
Institutional Affairs 24 0
Petitions 12 0
................................._................................................... ....................................................... ............. . .............._........._. ....................... ..............._..._................._................-........- ........•.. .-..-_. ..•.........-.__.........-.......--.
TOTAL 2,078 310 TOTAL 2,412 530
Share ofCo- 15% Share ofCo- 22%
decision Reports decision
Reports
Sources: Corbett et ai, 2003; www.europarl.eu.int; Abbreviations: AFET = Foreign Affairs, Human RIghts, Common Security
and Defence Policy; AGRI = Agriculture and Rural Development; BUDG = Budgets; CONT = Budgetary Control; CULT =
Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport; DEVE = Development and cooperation; ECON = Economics and Monetary
Affairs, EMPL = Employment and Social Affairs; ENVI = Environment, Public health and Consumer Policy; FEMM = Women's
rights and Equal Opportunities; INDU = External Trade, Research and Energy; LlBE = Citizen's Freedom and Rights, Justice
and Home Affairs; PETI = Petitions; PESC = Fisheries. RETT = Regional policy, transport and tourism
As Chapter 2 has mentioned, reports are auctioned off to the party groups within
each committee according to the size of each party group delegation. Group co-
ordinators then allocate the reports they have won to 'their' MEPs. As a result, subject
to their personalities, "co-ordinators have the potential to dominate committee
activities and usurp the position of chair" (Whitaker, 2001, pg. 81). The bidding
system favours a proportional allocation of reports among party groups according to
the size of their delegation in each committee. Indeed, Benedetto (2005) explains the
distribution of reports among party groups and member states as part of an
"institutionalised consensus" (pg. 85) within the EP. Mamadouh and Raunio (2001)
find that intra-party group allocation is largely proportional to the size of national
parties whereas "partisan interests drive the allocation process" (pg. 2) across groups.
As a result, report allocation, unlike participation in committee meetings (Chapter 4).
is quite representative of the plenary floor.
Once nominated, the rapporteur is in charge of researching, writing and defending
his text in the committee where it is voted upon by all members under open rule.
Armed with committee approval, the rapporteur then presents his text in the plenary
where he defends it on behalf of the committee, again under open rule. Finally,
rapporteurs follow up on the evolution of the report throughout the decision-making
procedures, make recommendations for a possible 2nd reading and, under the co-
decision procedure, take part in the Conciliation Committee on behalf of the European
Parliament.
Despite their prominent and prestigious role, individual rapporteurs have no
formal power over the content of their reports. As discussed in the previous chapter,
open rule ensures that reports do not stray far from the median MEP in the legislature,
regardless of the party affiliation or policy preferences of the rapporteur. If a draft
report deviates from their preferences, the majority pivots in committee and plenary
can reject and/or amend it at will. The committee even has the right to withdraw its
confidence in the rapporteur, though this does not happen very often. The incentive to
delay or reject legislation that does not conform with the preferences of the majority
pivot is of course strongest for the most salient reports. Thus, from a policy
perspective, majority MEPs have a greater incentive to sign up for the most desirable
reports than the minority groups.
However, the rapporteur may accumulate substantial informal power over the
contents of some reports. Indeed, as Mamadouh and Raunio (2003) point out, by
accumulating policy expertise, building consensus among party groups and
negotiating with the Council and the Commission, individual rapporteurs can acquire
considerable leverage over policy outcomes at the European level. However, this
informal power is likely to be most significant in policy areas that are highly technical
and of little salience to the majority of MEPs. Indeed, on the most salient reports, the
party groups that did not obtain the report often nominate a shadow rapporteur who is
in charge of following the development of the report. The institution of shadow
rapporteurs weakens the informal power of the main rapporteurs in the most salient
policy areas by reducing their informational advantage over the rest of the committee
and plenary. Again, there is little incentive for minority MEPs to sign up for the most
desirable reports where they have little power over policy outcomes.
The discussion illustrates that the desirability of a report to different MEPs
depends crucially on its salience and on the majority status of their party group within
committee and plenary. Because the power of rapporteurs to affect policy outcomes is
minimal, especially in the most salient policy areas, majority MEPs have a stronger
incentive to bid on those reports than legislators from minority groups. As Benedetto
(2005) recognises, the selection of rapporteurs determines the range of political
opinions that are represented in the policy positions of the European Parliament.
Similarly, Mamadou and Raunio (2001) call for research on the effect of committee
report allocation on EP legitimacy.
Despite these calls, no study to date systematically investigates the consequences
of report allocation for political representation in the European Parliament. The next
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section examines the consequences of legislative participation and specialisation for
representativeness and responsiveness in committee report allocation.
II. Representativeness and Participation in Committee Reports
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of co-decision and other reports among party
groups within the European Parliament. The auction system within each committee
should ensure that every party group gets a fair share of reports. The figure confirms
that there are no large deviations from proportionality in the number of reports that
each party group receives. While the largest party group (EPP) is over-represented in
both types of reports, the difference between its share of reports and seats is less than
8 percentage points. The only other group with a significant deviation from
proportionality is the Greens, which are almost 4% over-represented on co-decision
reports. However, this is likely to be due to their focus on the relatively influential
environment committee. None of the other groups deviate by more than 2.5 points
from their share of seats in the EP. Thus, as far as party group representation is
concerned, the report allocation procedure produces a fairly representative picture of
participation in policy formulation in the European Parliament.

number of MEPs that they have. Smaller countries on the other hand focus on the
restricted range of issues that are of most importance to them.
Figure 5.2 shows the share of co-decision and non-codecision reports by country.
As pointed out before, co-decision reports are generally much more attractive because
it is under this procedure that the European Parliament has most power over actual
policy outcomes. Co-decision reports are also more prestigious because they require
the rapporteur to negotiate extensively with the Council, including in the elaboration
of a joint text in the conciliation committee at the 2nd reading. Finally, co-decision
reports are much more scarce than other reports, which include non legislative own
initiative reports.'
The figure shows that there are wide discrepancies in report allocation across
countries. Among Finnish and Luxembourg MEPs, half of all reports fall under the
co-decision procedure compared with less than 20 percent in the Mediterranean
countries (except Greece). In general, there is a clear North-South divide in the
allocation of co-decision and other reports, which may reflect the relative emphasis of
Northern member states on environmental policy, most of which falls under the co-
decision procedure.
2 On theother band, Don co-decision reports arguably allow a larger amount of discretion andagenda-
settin& power to individual rapporteurs.

report allocation is not equal among legislators. The table shows how many
committee members are represented at different levels of participation. In the period
under analysis there were 233 co-decision and 904 other reports to be allocated.
Nevertheless, for each type of report, the majority of committee members did not
participate at all. Among those members who participated in their committee, 109
wrote only one co-decision report. Only a few MEPs participated in more than 2
reports, though one member, Finland's Pia Noora Kauppi, undertook a staggering 6
co-decision reports in the 2.5-year period under analysis.
The distribution of non co-decision reports is slightly more even, with 427 (or
about 1/3) committee members engaged in at least one such report. All 7 MEPs who
were involved in more than 7 non co-decision reports each were chairs of their
respective committees, including environment (Jackson), foreign affairs (Brok) and
fisheries (Varela). Thus, despite proportional report allocation among party groups, a
wide range of interests is not represented in policy formulation at the European level.
TABLE 5.2. LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION IN COMMITIEE REPORTS By TYPE OF REPORT
Level of Participation Frequency
Codecision Other
Reports Reports
0 1,140 889
1 Report 109 239
2 Reports 37 106
3 Reports 17 38
4 Reports 6 20
5 Reports 6 13
6 Reports 1 4
7±~~p~~~~_ ..... 0 7................... ... .......................... -..... --_.-._- .........••......••.•......
A verage Participation 0.18 0.69
(Reports per MEP)
, .Note: Cell Entries show the number ofcommittee members for each level ofparticipation andfor each type ofreport.
Total Number ofeo-decision Reports: 233; Total number ofother Reports: 90-1, Total Number ofcommittee members /.3/6
Table 5.2 illustrates that there are large disparities in participation across
committee members. Despite an allocation procedure that emphasises proportionality
across party groups, most MEPs are not represented in policy formulation in the
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European Parliament. Even though report writing is one of the most prestigious tasks
in the EP, the overwhelming majority of legislators do not write any reports.
Some of this non-participation is voluntary. For instance, preference outliers
within the majority party groups cannot influence the content of reports due to open
rule in committee and plenary. As a result, these MEPs might prefer to participate at a
different stage of the policy process where they can voice their opinions instead. On
the other hand, it is the party group leadership (in the form of the committee co-
ordinator) that allocates reports to individual members. As a result, intra group
politics are likely to playa role in the decision as to which MEPs are allocated which
reports. If some MEPs are consistently excluded from policy formulation, this restricts
the range of values and interests that the European Parliament represents and affects
the content of European policy and the quality of committee deliberation.
Table 5.3 reinforces the impression that auctioning committee reports according to
party group size does not ensure representativeness in the formulation of European
policy. The overwhelming majority (185) of MEPs who were engaged in more than
one report made all their contributions in a single policy area. 85 wrote more than half
of their reports in one area, and only 59 MEPs wrote less than half of all reports in one
policy area. Thus, even among those MEPs who do participate in policy formulation,
the vast majority focus on a single policy area.
The specialisation that is apparent in Table 5.3 could indicate that MEPs choose to
participate in committee reports only if they already have expertise in the field.
Indeed, existing expertise can lower the costs of gathering the information required
and formulating a particularly technical report. In addition, party groups may prefer to
delegate the task of policy formulation to their most competent members. In any case,
most rapporteurs are highly specialised in a single policy area, which suggests that
policy formulation is dominated by a restricted range of values and interests in the
European Parliament.
TABLE 5.3. POLICY SPECIALISATION AMONG COMMITIEE RAPPORTEURS
Share of Committee Reports Frequency
on a Single Policy Area
Number ofMEPs
100% 185
50% 131
0-50% 59
Note: Cell Entries show the number ofMEPs for each level ofpolicy specialisation
While Figure 5.1 has shown that the auction system does allocate every party
group its fair share of committee reports, this does not mean that all MEPs are equally
able to participate in policy formulation. Intra-group allocation may differ widely
from pure proportionality, especially when differences in the types of reports that are
available are taken into account. The distribution of reports in Tables 5.2 and 5.3
questions the effectiveness of proportional allocation rules in ensuring a fair
representation of all sections of European society.
The analysis so far has shown that report allocation within party groups is
anything but proportional. Some MEPs write multiple reports in policy areas over
which the European Parliament has substantial amounts of power whereas others
abstain entirely from this stage of the policy process. Because the party group
leadership plays a gate-keeping role in the allocation of reports among its members,
intra-group politics are likely to affect the participation and specialisation of MEPs in
policy formulation.
Such disproportionality can have a significant effect on the representativeness of
committee deliberations and endanger the representational performance of the
European Parliament as a whole. However, the impact of the legislative specialisation
that is apparent in the figures and tables presented thus far depends on the relationship
between report allocation and policy salience. In addition to studying levels of
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participation, it is imperative to examine how legislative specialisation in particular
policy areas affects the responsiveness of individual MEPs. In other words, which
MEPs specialise most in salient policy areas?
III. Responsiveness and Specialisation in Policy Formulation
The previous section has shown that participation in committee reports is
ideologically quite representative due to the auction system that is in place within
each committee. However, there are also stark discrepancies in levels of participation
across MEPs and across member states. Chapter 2 predicts that differences in
participation within each party group reflect the group leadership's concern with
maintaining cohesion. In addition, the chapter distinguishes between reports of
different desirability. Whereas the bidding system in each committee ensures that the
number of available reports is distributed proportionally to each group's size within
the EP, it does not account for differences in the quality of these reports.
Hypothesis 2 in chapter 2 suggests that the allocation of the most desirable reports
should vary systematically across party groups to reflect coalition patterns within the
European Parliament. Due to open rule the majority coalition in committee and
plenary can threaten to reject any reports written by a minority MEP. The threat of a
committee or plenary veto reduces the incentive for MEPs from minority groups to
engage in the most coveted policy areas. As a result, majority groups obtain the most
desirable committee reports whereas minority legislators must content themselves
with the 'leftovers'.
Differences in patterns of representation between policy formulation and decision-
making are explained by differences in institutional incentives. The auctioning system
ensures minority MEPs a certain level of participation in all committees. Combined
with open rule, proportional allocation provides an incentive for the majority coalition
to use its power obtain the most desirable rapporteurships because it can veto reports
that deviate from its preferences. Contrary to committee decision-making where
minority MEPs have an incentive to discriminate between policy areas, the opposite is
the case at the policy formulation stage. The majority coalition is more responsive
than the minority because it focuses on the most salient policy areas.
Table 5.4 summarises the output of two random effects regressions with report
salience as the dependent variable. In order to control for differences in the policy
power of the European Parliament and institutional decision-making rules, regression
(l) includes only co-decision reports whereas model (2) covers all committee reports.
An MEP's ability to write reports depends in large part on the number of committees
that he has joined as well as his background and expertise. Therefore, both regressions
incorporate random individual effects.' The regressions also control for differences
across electoral systems and the rapporteur's rank within the committee responsible
for each report, both of which might affect the incentive to sign up for salient reports.
3 Incorporating a random country effect did notchange the results for co-decision reports.
Unfortunately this specification did not lead to anysolution fornon-co-decision reports. Inclusion of
country d~ies alsodid not change the results significantly. Forease of interpretation Table 5.4 is
limited to a single individual random effect.
TABLE 5.4. RANDOM EFFECTS REGRESSION - DEPENDENT: REPORT SALIENCE
Co-decision Reports Other Reports
Coeff Std. Error Coeff Std. Error
1.473
1.369
1.791
1.025
0.443
0.811
0.145
1.377
2.276
0.015
2.120
6.362
0.040
0.308
0.092
-2.463
0.002
-1.577
4.323
0.017
1.580
0.629
0.143
3.630**
-2.608**
-0.112
0.932
0.763***
2.350
2.157
2.636
2.203
3.248
0.027
2.800
,----------
1.385
0.934
1.242
0.203
6.271
0.064
-1.061
1.313
0.348
0.726***
6.235***
4.571**
3.826
-16.431***
-0.193***
Inter Party Group
EPP
PES
ELDR
Intra Party Group
Distance from Party Group
Size
Individual
ChairNice-Chair
Substitute
Incumbent
Number of Repoits
Electoral System
Ballot 4.371**
Candidate -5.019
District -0.031
Constant 7.062**
--_ _.._-_._-..- _ ___..
Random Effects
Individual 6.406** 0.480 6.390**
Residual 1.843** 0.150 2.298**
N 212 610
Prob>chi2 <0.001 <0.001
1.!B Rest. Likelihood -598.387 -1742.75
Notll: ...; significant at 0.0/ level, •• significant at 0.05level; unitofanalysis; committee reports; a specification withcountry
andindividual random effectsdid not leadto a solution; See Chapter 3for details onrandom effectsmethodology; Estimatesfor
Country, MEP andResidual are therespective estimated standard deviations ofthecountry, MEPandresidual random effects;
Prob >chl2 shows theprobability ofno difference between therandom effectsspecification shown hereandan OLSspecification
withoutrandom orftxed effectsfor country and MEP.
The findings confirm that the allocation of salient committee reports is a result
of committee decision-making rules. First, model (1) shows that when an absolute
majority ofMEPs is required to pass legislation (as is the case under co-decision), the
two largest party groups (pES and EPP) obtain the most salient reports, whereas the
liberal ELDR's output does not differ from that of the smaller party groups.
Substantively, EPP reports are 6.2% more salient than those of minority MEPs,
whereas the PES is involved in policy areas that are almost 4.6% more salient.
Second, however, in model (2) the ELDR writes reports that are 3.6% more salient
than all other party groups reports. Indeed, reports that do not fall under the co-
decision procedure require a simple majority to pass in the plenary, which makes the
ELDR pivotal for both EPP and PES.
Open rule in committee and plenary reduce the incentive for groups that are part
of the minority in the EP to sign up for committee reports. Similarly to participation in
committee decision-making (Chapter 4), if there were no auctioning system to enforce
a proportional allocation of reports, MEPs from minority groups in the EP would
reduce their participation in policy formulation and focus their efforts on other stages
of the policy process. While the auctioning system makes participation more
representative of the plenary floor, it does not eliminate the majoritarian effect of
open rule. Indeed, MEPs from the simple and absolute majority coalition in each
committee obtain the most desirable non-codecision and codecision reports
respectively. In other words, due to open rule in committee and plenary, majority
MEPs are more responsive than their peers.
Committee reports in salient policy areas are less attractive to MEPs who do not
form part of the majority coalition because they will be outvoted in the committee and
in the plenary. The further a party group is located from the largest delegation in the
ideological (left-right) policy space, the less likely it is that its MEPs have access to
salient reports. The legislative output of each party group depends on its value, in
terms of policy preferences, as a coalition partner to the largest group. In other words,
an MEP's ability to represent the policy priorities of his national party is determined
not only by the size of his party group (as would be the case under a strictly
proportional allocation procedure) but also by coalition patterns along the left-right
spectrum.
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Apart from competition across party groups, Table 5.4 also shows considerable
evidence for the effects of intra-party group politics on responsiveness. Because party
groups have gate-keeping power over policy formulation, the allocation of the most
desirable committee reports reflects the agenda of the party group leadership.
First, on co-decision reports, preference outliers are less responsive than MEPs
who toe the party line. Every 0.1 increase in an MEP's policy distance from his party
group leads to a 1.6% drop in report salience. Because the leadership is concerned
about protecting the brand name of the party group and maintaining its credibility,
legislators who often defect from their group in roll-call votes are less likely to be
assigned salient reports than their colleagues. The leadership screens candidates ex
ante to make sure their reports reflect the opinion of the group as a whole. In addition,
party leaders use their power to allocate reports ex post to reward MEPs who have
toed the party line and to sanction defectors. Rebel MEPs are less likely to be
assigned salient reports and, therefore, are less responsive than legislators whose
policy preferences are in line with the rest of the party group.
Second, MEPs from smaller national parties write more salient co-decision reports
than legislators from larger parties. As Kaeding (2005) has found, MEPs from smaller
member states (and national party delegations) focus their participation on the most
salient policy areas. MEPs from the larger parties on the other hand must participate
in a wider range of policy areas, including some that feature less prominently in their
manifestos. The party group leadership supports this self-selection on the part of the
smaller national parties in order to give every MEP a stake in the operation of the
group as a whole. The effect of national party size is only significant for the more
important reports under the co-decision procedure.
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Third, the committee leadership writes less salient non-codecision reports than
regular committee members. There is no statistically significant difference between
the responsiveness of full members and that of substitute committee members. For
most reports, especially under co-decision, there is sufficient demand among the
committee's rank and file. However, as Corbett et al (2003) explain, it is part of the
duty of committee chairs to assume responsibility for reports that none of the rank-
and-file members want to take on. In contrast, regular committee members and
substitutes focus their legislative participation on the most salient policy areas,
especially when the report is of less importance from a policy perspective.
Finally, neither the electoral system variables nor incumbency are consistently
significant in both estimations, which confirms much previous research that has
questioned the value of seniority and re-election incentives in the European
Parliament (e.g. Bowler and Farrell, 1995). Like for committee decision-making none
of the variables that describe the domestic political system seem to structure
participation or specialisation in the European Parliament.
The results in Table 5.4 demonstrate the importance of left-right coalition
dynamics and intra-party group politics for political representation in the development
of policy at the European level. Report allocation differs from committee attendance
in that it distributes legislative spoils (salient reports) through a bidding system based
on the size of each party group. This system encourages the (simple or absolute)
majority coalition to specialise in the most salient reports and induces high levels of
responsiveness within the parliamentary majority. In contrast, in committee decision-
making, majority MEPs are less likely to specialise in order to maintain their majority
in a broad range of policy areas. Here, the majority coalition boasts lower levels of
responsiveness than the minority in committee decision-making (see Chapter 4). In
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addition, rank-and-file preference outliers and MEPs from large national delegations
are disadvantaged in the allocation of salient reports within their party groups.
Table 5.4 distinguishes only between co-decision and other reports. However, Hix
(2001) finds that voting coalitions in the plenary differ not only as a result of
institutional rules but also across policy areas along ideological lines. He finds that
EPP and ELDR vote against the PES on most expenditure and social policies, PES
and ELDR form a coalition against the EPP on issues related to justice and home
affairs and the environment, and all three party groups tend to agree on votes related
to foreign affairs and international trade (Hix, 2001).
In order to verify whether the partisan effect on responsiveness identified in Table
5.4 holds when we distinguish between different types of policy areas, Table 5.5
produces the results of an OLS regression (with robust standard errors) that analyses
the effect of different voting coalitions on responsiveness at the policy formulation
stage," Due to the low number of reports in each policy area, the regressions include
only party group dummies and a control dummy to distinguish between co-decision
and other reports. The interaction between ELDR and co-decision accounts for the
ELDR's reduced role in policy areas that are governed by an absolute majority
requirement in the plenary.
4 Uafortunately, a random effocts specification similar to Table 5.4didnot lead to a solution forall
three DOlicv areas.
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TABLE 5.5. IMPACT OF VOTING COALITIONS IN THE PLENARY ON RESPONSIVENESS,
OLS REGRESSION WITH ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS, DEPENDENT: REPORT
SALIENCE
.... Trade & Foreign Expenditure Policies Environment, JusticeAffairs & Home Affairs
INDU&AFET EMPL. AGR!, PESC. REIT EXI'I & LIRE
Coefficient Robust Coefficient RobustSE SE Coefficient Robust SE
EPP 0.751 1.220 2.33 1.251 - -
PES 0.039 1.284 - - -0.285 0.577
ELDR 3.232 1.714 9.024*** 4.335 5.183*** 0.580
Co-decision -0.729 0.772 -1.580 1.379 -1.240 0.662
ELDR* Codecision 0.510 2.210 -10.546*** 5.098 -5.099*** 1.022
Constant 6.113*** 1.201 9.941 *** 0.838 7.479*** 0.535
N 158 225 231
R-Squared 0.06 0.06 0.09
Note. OLS Regression with robust standard errors, ....... significant at 0.01 level; ...... significant at 0,05 level. AFET = Foreign
Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy; AGR! = Agriculture and Rural Development; ECOS '
Economics and Monetary Affairs; EMPL =Employment and Social Affairs; ENVI = Environment. Public health and Consumer
Policy; INDU = External Trade, Research and Energy; LIRE = Citizen's Freedom and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs. PESC
= Fisheries; REIT = Regional policy. transport and tourism
Note first of all that the R-squares for all three estimations are very low. The party
group effects do not, by themselves, explain a large amount of variation in the
responsiveness of MEPs when these three policy areas are considered separately.
Second, in models (2) and (3), the interaction between co-decision and ELDR is
negative. As expected, liberal MEPs obtain less salient reports in policy areas where
their group does not playa pivotal role. The coefficient is not significant for trade and
foreign affairs partly because there are only very few co-decision reports in these
areas.
However, the point of these OLS regressions is not to explain as much variation in
report salience as possible. Rather, we would like to examine the extent to which
differences across these three policy areas mirror voting coalitions in the plenary.
First, neither of the three party group dummies is significant on issues related to trade
and foreign affairs where the major party groups tend to vote together in the plenary.
Without major disagreements over policy between the party groups in this area. there
is no partisan effect on the distribution of salient reports. Second, the liberal ELDR
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writes the most salient reports in models (2) and (3). In both of these areas the ELDR
is the pivotal coalition partner for either the EPP on expenditure policy or the PES on
environment and social affairs.
These results confirm Hix' (2001) finding that there are different voting coalitions
in different policy areas along ideological lines. Where the ELDR is pivotal
(expenditure policies, environment, justice and home affairs), it manages to obtain the
most salient reports. Where it is not pivotal (co-decision reports and foreign affairs &
trade), this partisan effect disappears. Voting coalitions in the plenary affect
responsiveness on report allocation because they shift incentives for certain party
groups to sign up for the most salient reports.
The findings of both random effects and ordinary least squares regressions
indicate that representation is determined by institutional and party-political
incentives. Clearly, coalition patterns in the European Parliament have stark
consequences for the range of values and interests that are represented at the policy-
formulation stage. The distribution of salient reports reflects the need for EPP and
ELDR to co-operate on non-co-decision reports and for EPP and PES to coalesce
under co-decision to maintain a majority in committee and plenary. Minority MEPs,
on the other hand, write less salient reports because they are unlikely to be able to
move policy outcomes away from the median legislator due to double open rule in
committee and plenary.
Like the previous chapter on committee decision-making, the findings also
confirm recent research on roll-call votes, which has identified left-right politics as the
predominantcleavage in the EP (Hix et al., forthcoming). Committee report allocation
is only proportional as long as all reports are considered of equal relevance to all
MEPs. When differences in the desirability of committee reports are taken into
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account a picture of intense competition along the left-right spectrum emerges that
contradicts the conceptions of a consensual legislature that have been applied to the
European Parliament (e.g. Benedetto, 2005).
IV. Political Representation in Parliamentary Committees:
Policy Formulation v. Decision-making
The results in the previous section and the findings in Chapter 4 demonstrate the
importance of left-right coalition dynamics and intra-party group politics for political
representation at the European level. By structuring incentives for participation and
specialisation across party groups, open rule and the report allocation procedure affect
which values and interests are represented at the European level. Majority MEPs are
more responsive than the minority in policy formulation, but less so in committee
decision-making. Moreover, whereas participation in policy formulation mirrors the
composition of the plenary, committee decision-making is dominated by majority
MEPs.
But how can the Parliament's representational performance in decision-making
and policy formulation be compared? First, we can compare the distribution of salient
tasks at these two stages of the policy process. Does the fairer representation of all
party groups at the formulation stage lead to a wider representation of citizen
concerns? Or do majoritarian specialisation in the most desirable policy areas and
intra-party group politics undo the egalitarian effect of the auctioning system for
committee reports?
Figure 5.3 compares the Lorenz curves for responsiveness in policy formulation
and decision-making to the distribution of committee assignments. These curves take
into account both participation and legislative specialisation to evaluate how
reprcsentational performance is distributed across committee members. The dotted
line represents a situation of perfect equality where all committee members represent
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theirconstituents equally well. The Gini coefficients for each of the three distributions
give a quantitative interpretation to the inequality described by the Lorenz curves. The
Gini coefficient measures the area between the (dotted) line ofperfect equality and the
distribution in question. A Gini coefficient of 1 denotes perfect inequality with one
committee member reaping all the spoils (i.e. an L-shaped distribution), a coefficient
of 0 indicates perfect equality among legislators (i.e, a straight line).
The figure clearly shows the impact of political competition across party groups
on representation. Despite the proportional auctioning system, policy formulation is
by far the most unequal of the three activities. Salient reports are distributed very
unequally, compared with attendance at salient meetings and assignments to
committee posts that address salient policy areas. The Gini coefficients provide
further evidence to support the picture in Figure 5.4 with G=O.81 for policy
formulation, 0.69 for decision-making and only 0.35 for committee assignments,
which are governed by proportionality rules.
FIGURE 5.3. INEQUALITY Of REPRESENTATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN POLICY
FORMULATION, DECISION-MAKING AND COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS
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In sum, Figure 5.4 shows that there is a move away from equality in political
representation between committee assignments, decision-making and policy
fonnulation. Representation in policy formulation is the most unequal stage of the
policy process. Political competition for the most desirable legislative tasks, fostered
by majoritarian institutions and party group gate-keeping, undermine the
proportionality rules inherent in the auctioning system. The results question the
effectiveness of these rules in enhancing the representativeness of parliamentary
deliberation and the responsiveness of individual MEPs. Instead, the representation of
a wide range of interests can only be ensured by providing individual MEPs and their
party groups with an institutional or party-political incentive to participate in the EP
and to specialise in areas that allow them to put their party's stated policy priorities
into practice.
v. Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has examined the consequences of committee report allocation for
political representation in the European Parliament. In line with the hypotheses in
Chapter 2, the analysis demonstrates that the legislative participation and
specialisation of individual representatives have important consequences for
representation. Institutional and party-political incentives condition how much MEPs
participate in policy formulation and which policy areas they specialise in. These
patterns, in turn, determine whose political opinions are represented in the
parliamentarydebates that the legislature engages in and the policy positions it adopts.
Both inter- and intra party group dynamics determine an individual legislator's
ability to be responsive. First, party groups compete for reports on the basis of their
delegation size. As a result, participation in policy formulation is ideologically much
more representative than participation in committee decision-making examined in
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Chapter 4. This finding confirms existing research, which has stressed the
proportional nature of policymaking in the European Parliament (Benedetto, 2005;
Mamadou and Raunio, 2003).
However, while there is little scope for ideological competition in the number of
reports awarded to each party group, there are large differences in the characteristics
of these reports. Under simple and absolute majority rule, specialisation in the most
salient reports favours the majority coalition in the European Parliament because it
can push its reports through committee and plenary. Minority MEPs, on the other
hand, have little policy incentive to spend time and resources on reports that will be
amended or vetoed in plenary and committee anyway (hypothesis 2).
Finally, the party group leadership distributes its reports among its members in an
attempt to maximize cohesion. As a result, there are significant discrepancies in levels
of participation across member states. Moreover, MEPs from large national
delegations, the committee leadership and preference outliers within each party group
are less responsive than their party group colleagues, especially in the areas where the
European Parliament is most influential over policy outcomes.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the results in this chapter. First, any
assessment of legislative politics in the European Parliament must take into account
the salience of different policy areas. Most studies of committee reports in the EP
have focussed on levels of participation in different policy areas (Kaeding, 2004;
2005; Hoyland, 2006; Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003; Hix et al., forthcoming; Raunio,
1997). The results presented here, however, show that participation and spefialisation
depend significantly on the Parliament's influence and the salience of different policy
areas as captured in party manifestos. Studies of representation are only meaningful if
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they define the desirability of different legislative tasks in terms of both policy
iidluence and salience.
Second, the model explains disproportionalities in the allocation of salient reports
across party groups in terms of the incentive structure created by institutional rules
and party-political competition within the parliament. Chapters 4 and 5 have shown
that there is considerable inequality in the representational performance of individual
committee members at all stages of the policy process. Despite a proportional
auctioning system, these inequalities are more marked in policy formulation where the
parliamentary majority has a strong incentive to specialise in the areas that feature
prominently in their party's manifesto. In contrast, inequality is lower in committee
decision-making, which encourages minority groups to focus on the most salient
areas. While proportionality rules may restrict the dominance of majority rule within
the EP, they do not reduce representational bias because they fail to address the
incentive structure that encourages legislators to participate in and discriminate
between different policy areas.
Third, the analysis also provides insights into the internal workings of EP party
groups. The findings confirm Kreppel' s (2002) conclusion that there are considerable
constraints in the way the party group leadership allocates its resources.
Disproportionalities in the allocation of committee reports within party groups are a
result of the leadership's concern with maintaining cohesion. As Kaeding (2005)
notes, MEPs from some member states focus their resources on a limited number of
policy areas of interest to them whereas others are represented in a much wider range
of areas. In order to maintain cohesion, group co-ordinators allow loyal rank-and-file
members and MEPs from smaller national parties to sign up for the reports that are
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most salient to them. These results can be interpreted as a sign of weakness for the
party groups, which are forced to use their legislative resources to maintain cohesion.
The results described in this chapter also have a number of implications for future
parliamentary reform. In line with recent studies, the distribution of legislative spoils
is based on the closeness of left-right policy preferences across party groups (e.g. Hix
et al., forthcoming). This inter-party group competition is likely to increase in
importance as the European Parliament acquires further political influence (see Hix et
al., forthcoming for a similar interpretation in his analysis of roll-call votes over time).
Similarly, a switch from open to closed rule in committee and plenary would
strengthen the role of the rapporteur and increase competition for salient reports
between the majority coalition and other party groups in the EP. At the same time, this
simple reform would reduce the majoritarian advantage in policy formulation and
allow rapporteurs from minority parties to have a stronger influence on policy
outcomes.
Alternatively, higher majority thresholds in committee and plenary would increase
the responsiveness of centrist party groups on both sides of the policy spectrum.
However, widening the range of MEPs that can affect policy outcomes could also
increase cohesion problems within a parliamentary majority that is made up of several
party groups. Lower cohesion in turn would further weaken the party groups, which
are already under pressure as the European Union continues to enlarge and becomes
politically more heterogeneous.
The empirical results presented in this chapter confirm the hypotheses developed
in Chapter 2. As for committee decision-making, the interaction between policy
influence and representation is not a straight-forward trade-off. Instead representation
occurs when MEPs specialise in policy areas that feature prominently in their party
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manifestos. These specialisation decisions depend, among other things, on the policy
influence of the EP in that particular area and the party-political constellation in
plenary and committee. A proportional allocation mechanism coupled with open rule
in committee and plenary strongly affects which MEPs write the most salient
parliamentary reports. Second, intra-group allocation of committee reports follows a
logic of cohesion. The party group leadership uses its power over report allocation to
reward loyal MEPs and give a stake to all its members in the operation of the group.
Chapters 4 and 5 have focused on policy making and decision-making within
parliamentary committees in the EP. Of course, not all legislative work takes place
within committees. The next chapter discusses representational performance in
parliamentary oversight outside the committee structure via questions at Question-
Time.
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CHAPTER 6 - POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
AND PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
Chapters 4 and 5 have analysed political representation in policy formulation
and committee decision-making.' However, in addition to committee work, one of the
most important tasks of the EP since its inception consists of scrutinising the
functioning and policy outputs of other European institutions, such as Commission
and the Council of Ministers. As Rittberger (2005) notes, the oversight powers of the
EP have increased in tandem with growing concerns among member state
governments about the European Union's democratic deficit. Similarly. Hix (1997)
argues that nomination of the Commission President by the European Parliament
might help reduce the democratic deficit by increasing the oversight powers of MEPs.
In any case, as the only directly elected supranational institution, the European
Parliament's oversight fulfils an important role in the democratic process of the
European Union.
There are varIOUS ways III which the European Parliament can exercise
scrutiny. First, over time the EP has acquired substantial powers over the appointment
and dismissal of the Commission, though they have remained short of direct election
of the executive by MEPs (Hix, 2002; 1997; 1996; Magnette, 2001; 2000; Westlake,
1998). Second, the Parliament also plays a pivotal role in overseeing the
implementation of the EU budget (Jun, 2003). Finally, the EP has the power to
question Council and Commission on existing policy via a range of questioning
procedures (Raunio, 1997; Corbett et al., 2003). By forcing the executive to assume
I Note: An earlier (condensed) version of this chapter is currently under review with the Journal of
Legislative Studies
JeSPOnsibility for its actions across all policy areas, MEPs can act as the 'voice of
their constituents' and thereby lend legitimacy to the policy process.
This chapter examines selective participation (government of the people) and
specialisation (government for the people) in parliamentary questions in the European
Parliament. Compared with other scrutiny instruments, questions are relatively free
from party group control and allow individual legislators to decide which policy areas
are debated on the plenary floor. Additionally, questions take place outside the
committee structure of the EP. As a result, unlike policy formulation and decision-
making, incentives to scrutinise are not governed by majority rule but by legislative-
executive relations. As Chapter 2 predicts, rather than party group coalition dynamics,
it is national party ties to the executive that determine incentives to hold the
Commission accountable for its actions.
The chapter is organised into five parts. The first section discusses existing
research on parliamentary questions in the British House of Commons and the
European Parliament. Section 2 examines MEP participation at Question-Time to
explain whose interests and values are represented in parliamentary oversight. Section
3 addresses legislative specialisation in parliamentary questions: how responsive are
MEPs at the oversight stage in the EP? Section 4 compares the distribution of
representational performance at the oversight stage in the European Parliament to the
committee assignments, that were at the heart of the previous two chapters. What are
the differences, if any, between political representation at the committee stage and in
parliamentary oversight? The final section concludes with a summary of the results
anda discussion oftheir implications for democracy in the European Union.
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I. Existing Research on Parliamentary Questions
Parliamentary questions have received surprisingly little attention in the academic
literature. Few studies of legislative politics mention questions and even fewer authors
incorporate them in a systematic theoretical and empirical analysis. Most research
deals with the British House of Commons (Chester and Bowring, 1962: Franklin and
Norton, 1993; Judge, 1974) or, more recently, a cross-section of national political
systems (Wiberg, 1995). Nevertheless questions are a well-developed legislative tool
that fulfils a wide range of important parliamentary functions in democracies across
Europe.
The UK House ofCommons
Most research on parliamentary questions analyses the functions that questions
assume within the legislature and the wider political system. In the UK, questioning
has a long tradition, elicits extensive media coverage and is firmly entrenched in the
political process. In an extension of Chester and Bowring's (1962) early study,
Franklin and Norton's (1993) seminal work on MPs in the British House of Commons
distinguishes between the seven uses listed in Table 6.1.
TABLE 6 1 FUNCTIONS OF PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS. .
Function Questions perform this function
Well So-So Poorly
Representation
Taking up Constituency Interests 50% 38% 13%
Publicizing Backbench MPs & Their 63% 19% 9%
Concerns
Scrutiny
AttackinglDefending Workings of Govt 45% 45% 9%
Depts
35%Holding Ministers Accountable 32% 42%
Information
28%Getting Information on Policy, Work of 50% 22%
Govt
Getting Hard-to-Obtain Information 32% 26% 38~ 0
Policy Influence
47%Influencing Govt Policy & Actions 38% 13%
Adaptedfrom Franklin and Norton (/993), Data based on a sun't'.\' ofMPs tn the U';, House ofCommons
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As Table 6.1 illustrates, legislators use questions to elicit information from the
executive, check ministers, hold them accountable for their actions and, more
generally, raise the public stature of MPs. These uses square well with the role of the
legislature as the central link in a chain of delegation that connects citizens to their
government. First, by publicizing the concerns of constituents and backbenchers,
questions link voters to their representatives in the legislature. Second, questions also
help reduce agency drift in the delegation of executive powers by monitoring
government departments and facilitating their accountability. Finally, questions can be
used to collect information about the government and its actions and to partake in
actual policymaking.
However, questions are not equally well suited for all of these functions. As Table
6.1 shows, a large majority of MPs in the British House of Commons agree that
questions are a good representational tool (Franklin and Norton, 1993). 50%
acknowledge their use in taking up constituency interests and fully 63% believe they
help publicise the concerns of backbenchers by prompting the government on salient
policy issues. This is especially true when questions elicit a lot of media interest, such
as is the case at Prime Minister's Questions in the British House ofCommons.
The second most popular function for parliamentary questions is oversight both of
the executive as a whole and of individual government officials. Fully 90% of
respondents in the House of Commons affirm questions are useful to attack or defend
government departments while 74% believe they can hold individual ministers
accountable. In the only cross-national analysis of its kind, Wiberg (1995) emphasises
the crucial role of parliamentary questions in overseeing the executive. He finds that
while parliaments do not have much impact on the content and initiation of
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legislation, they do exercise "control by communication" VIa various forms of
parliamentary questioning.
Third, a large majority of MPs think questions play an important role in keeping
them informed about the actions of the executive. To some extent, this informational
role simply facilitates parliamentary oversight. Indeed, effective scrutiny requires that
the legislature be able to request information from the government about its activities.
In practice, however, information that requires extensive research on the part of the
executive is confined to written questions (Franklin and Norton, 1993). Raunio (1996)
notes that written questions are most useful for detailed information, some of which
may require background research. In most parliaments, including the EP, requests for
statistical information and background research are explicitly banned from the oral
question procedure (Rule 109, Annex II).
Finally, MPs are well aware that questions afford them only minimal influence
over actual policymaking. 47% of MPs in the House of Commons think questions
perform this role poorly, the highest percentage of any category in Table 6.1.
Nevertheless, 38% of UK representatives attribute at least some policy role to
questioning. Any investigation into the motivation for tabling questions must take this
policy role into account.
On the whole, however, Franklin and Norton's analysis of the UK House of
Commons shows that most legislators find questions useful primarily in terms of
representation and oversight. The public visibility, easy access and issue specificity of
parliamentary questions make them particularly suitable for political representation
and parliamentary oversight of the executive. Legislators choose to ask questions in
particular policy areas rather than others in an attempt to bring up issues ofconcern to
their constituents or in order to hold the executive accountable for its actions.
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Questions in the European Parliament
If there is little academic research at the level of national parliaments, we know
next to nothing about questions in the European Parliament. There are three
questioning procedures in the EP, including one for written questions, oral questions
with debate and Question Time. Written questions can be tabled by any member and
are usually published within six weeks together with their answers in the Official
Journal. Oral questions can only be tabled by committees, political groups or at least
32 members. Replies are followed by a debate and may lead to the adoption of a
resolution.
Finally, Question-Time was introduced in 1973 and modelled after PMQ in the
British House of Commons. It is held at every part-session at a time designated by the
Conference of Presidents. Each MEP may ask one question per month to Council and
Commission. Questions are submitted in writing to the President, who rules on their
admissibility and the order in which they are taken, at least one week before they are
asked. Admitted questions are distributed to all MEPs and forwarded to Council and
Commission. MEPs whose questions cannot be asked at the scheduled part-session
because of time constraints can postpone their questions or request a reply in writing.
As Cohen (1979) notes, this means that MEPs actually receive a better and more
reliabke "service" from Community institutions than MPs in the UK House of
Commons.
That parliamentary questions are useful, at least in the perception of those
legislators who participate at Question-Time, is underlined by the prominent coverage
they receive on the personal websites of MEPs where they inform constituents about
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their parliamentary work.i Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford, for instance,
complains about the UK's Europe Minister Douglas Alexander 'dodging' questions
put to him at Question-Time with the Council of Ministers. As she points out, 'I will
just have to tell my constituents that [..] you can't get a straight answer out of New
Labour'. Similarly, conservative spokesman for health John Bowis cites extensively
from the questions he tabled on his homepage. Finally, Labour spokesman for
employment Claude Moraes includes a detailed description of his questions to
Commission and Council in his newsletter, which is sent directly to his UK
constituency.
Nevertheless, we know very little about the motivations of MEPs for tabling
questions in particular policy areas. First, in a very early study, Cohen (1979) looks at
the development of and use of Question Time before the first direct elections in 1979.
He finds that British MEPs tend to make disproportional use of the procedure but
expects direct elections to bring about wide-ranging changes. Second, in a study of the
third parliament (1989-1994), Raunio (1996) finds little evidence of party group or
national specialisation. MEPs appear to use parliamentary questions for much the
same reasons as members of national legislatures. Also, a large number of questions
deal with matters of concern to local constituents as opposed to a pan-European
citizenry. The example of Baroness Ludford above corroborates the suspicion that
questions in the Europesan Parliament often are addressed to a national party-political
audience rather than to all European citizens. However, there is some evidence that
MEPs prefer to table questions about issues within the jurisdiction of the committees
in which they sit (Raunio, 1996). Third, Bowler and Farrell (1995) detect similar
21bo examples citedherereferto the UKwhere the practise of informing constituents viapersonal
homepagee is mostdeveloped. However, many MEPs from other countries alsouse personal websites
tostay in touch wi~ domestic constituents.
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evidence of legislative specialisation III their study of oral questions III three
committees.
This chapter presents empirical evidence to demonstrate which values and
interests are represented and how responsive MEPs are to the stated policy priorities
of their national parties in parliamentary oversight. The next section focuses on the
legislative participation decisions of MEPs at Question-Time. Which MEPs are most
active in scrutinising the Commission? How does this affect political representation at
this stage of the policy process?
II. Representativeness and Legislative Participation at
Question-Time
As Corbett et al (2005) point out, parliamentary questions have become more and
more popular over time. More than 4,200 questions were brought before Commission
and Council at Question-Time in the fifth Parliament. Figure 6.1 shows the number of
questions to the Commission in 13 policy areas over the full five-year term of the
Parliament (1999-2004). Environment was by far the most popular topic, followed by
questions on foreign affairs and industry. Regional affairs, employment and
agriculture still elicited more than 100 questions between 1999 and 2004. Questions
on economics and the monetary union, constitutional affairs and women's rights were
least abundant.
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Question-Time session, they become more and more active in policy formulation and
decision-making over the course of the term. As a result, some representatives
substitute greater involvement in committees for lower activity at Question-Time.
FIGURE 6.2. NUMBER OF QUESTIONS AT QUESTION-TIME IN THE FIFTH EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT (1999-2004)
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Table 6.2 shows participation at Question-Time in the fifth European Parliament
at the individual level. More than half of all MEPs (323) did not table any questions
over the full five-year period under investigation. A large number of legislators
participated between 1 and 5 times and 21 representatives were responsible for 30 or
more questions each. The record is detained by the Greek communist MEP
Alexandros Alavanos and his Spanish socialist colleague Maria Izquierdo-Rojo, who
tabled48 questions each to the Commission.
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TABLE 6.2. DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONS AT QUESTION-TIME ACROSS MEPs
(1999-2004)
Number of Frequency
Questions (Number of
MEPs)
0 323
1-5 188
6-10 45
11-15 24
16-20 18
21-25 7
26-30 4
30+ 21
.................. ......................._._.....__......_-------.-------_ ...._..• ........._. .................---...._..........._...- .......... _---_..--.- ... _.
Average Number of 2.6
Questions per MEP
Note: Cell Entries show the number ofcommittee members for each level ofparticipation andfor each type ofreport.
Total Number ofQuestions; 1666; Total Number of.\f£Ps: 630
Participation at Question-Time is highly selective, with some MEPs engaging
extensively whereas half the legislature opts out completely. This distribution
confirms previous research where the sample of questions under study is similarly
skewed (e.g. Raunio, 1997). As predicted by Hall (1996), the representational
consequences of such an uneven distribution could be stark. If MEPs address policy
issues that are of concern exclusively to their constituents, the political opinions of up
to 50% of European citizens are not represented at all compared with a small minority
whose values and interests dominate parliamentary oversight.
So far we have established that, despite ease of access and relatively low
opportunity costs, a large number of MEPs choose not to exercise their right to
participate at Question-Time. This may reflect a belief that parliamentary questions
are of limited usefulness given the low awareness of plenary sessions in the European
Parliament within the general public. However, other legislators make extensive use
of questioning as a representational and oversight tool. Whatever the reasons for
diffcrcnt participation levels, the range of opinions voiced at Question-Time and the
interests expressed in parliamentary oversight of the Commission do not reflect the
composition of the European Parliament as a whole.
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Chapter2 hypothesises that oversight is particularly valuable to MEPs with a high
risk of agency loss from the Commission's behaviour as an executive agency. The
risk of agency loss is highest for MEPs without direct representation in the
Commission via their national parties. In contrast, legislators whose parties have their
'own' commissioner are likely to be closer to the Commission in terms of policy
preferences and they dispose over alternative, less formal, ways to influence the
executive and express discontent with its policies. As a result, Chapter 2 predicts that
'opposition' MEPs without direct partisan ties to individual commissioners are more
likely to use Question-Time as an oversight tool than their peers.
Table 6.3 confirms this prediction. MEPs whose national parties were not
represented in the Commission tabled a total of 1,453 questions compared with only
1,117 by legislators with direct ties to the executive.' In other words, there is a 30
percent difference in participation between MEPs from 'governing' parties and
representatives from 'opposition' parties. Although the terms 'government' and
'opposition' are less applicable in the EP, the distribution in Table 6.3 corresponds to
similar findings on the connection between questioning and legislative-executive
relations in national political systems (Chester and Bowring, 1962; Franklin and
Norton, 1993).
.J Note that these numbers cover all questions to theCommission, irrespective of policy area. Much of
the rest of theanalysis in thischapter is based on the restricted sample forwhich data on issue salience
were available (seeChapter 3 fora description of this dataset).
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TABLE 6.3. NUMBER OF QUESTIONS AND NATIONAL PARTY TIES TO THE
COMMISSION
National Party Ties to the Number of
European Commission Questions
Governing Parties 1,117
Opposition Parties 1,453
..................._..........._..............__. ....................._-_..._-_._-•.._-_._.._._..._.
.............. ..... .- -.-....................-...........__.._-.....- .. _.._-
Total 2,570
Note: includes all questions and all MEPs. Governing parties include all ME?s from all parties that sit in the Commission:
Opposition parties include all ME? from all parties that do not sit in the Commission
Finally, Figure 6.3 analyses questioning activity at the national level. Cross-
country research has shown that parliamentary questions playa much more important
role in some countries than in others. For instance, it is no coincidence that academic
studies of questions have focused on the British House of Commons (Franklin and
Norton, 1993) and the Nordic states (Wiberg, 1994). In these systems, parliamentary
questions are regularly covered by the media and they are much more visible to the
general public than in other EU member states.
Figure 6.3 suggests that domestic political culture may also have something to do
with levels of participation at Question-Time in the EP. However, a word of caution is
required: for small member states, average figures are not always meaningful because
they are based on a small number of legislators and questions. For instance, 250/0 of
Greek legislators did not participate at all at Question-Time over the course of the
fifth Parliament. Nevertheless, Greece has one of the highest average participation
rates because seven of its MEPs tabled more than 30 questions to the Commission
each. In comparison, the effect of such extremely active MEPs is much smaller in the
larger member states. Despite this caveat, MEPs from Anglo-Saxon (UK and Ireland)
and Nordic states (Sweden, Denmark, Finland), on the whole. ask more questions than
their colleagues from continental Europe. with the notable exceptions of Greece and
(to a lesser extent) Spain. Irish legislators are by far the most active with an average of
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18 questions per MEP for the full fifth term of the EP. This compares with less than 2
questions per MEP for the 6 founding members of the European Union (France,
Germany, Italy and the Benelux) and Portugal.
Nevertheless, it is unclear from Figure 6.3 which national attributes explain these
differences. The six founding members of the EU include some of the most pro-
European publics in the Union. Since one of the main functions of questioning is the
ability for backbenchers to voice their dissatisfaction with the executive, these
countries may actively choose to refrain from participating at Question-Time.
Arguably, with little to criticise the strongly pro-European Commission for, MEPs
from the founding members may simply opt out of parliamentary oversight
irrespective of their direct partisan ties with the executive. In contrast, the Anglo-
Saxon and Nordic member states are often seen to be much more eurosceptic, with
strong anti-European parties, such as the Danish/Swedish June movement or Britain's
UKIP. In countries where European integration itself is contested, oversight of the
supranational executive may assume greater importance. If participation at Question-
Time reflects a more general concern with parliamentary oversight, Figure 6.3
suggests that there is a stark bias against the pro-European founding member states at
this stage ofthe policy process.
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this preference might lie in the evolution of responsiveness over the course of the
legislative term. Arguably, as European elections draw closer and as MEPs become
more experienced, they will improve their responsiveness.
Figure 6.4 shows the average responsiveness of questions tabled at each Question-
time session in the fifth Parliament. Whereas there are some sessions where MEPs
were less responsive than before, the majority of sessions show a positive change in
responsiveness. Responsiveness grows over time as MEPs become more acquainted
with parliamentary procedures and as they come closer to the next European elections.
However, the average increase in responsiveness declines steadily over time until the
cumulative average reaches a mere 0.96 percent at the end of the legislature just
before the 2004 EP elections. In other words, there was a marginal improvement in
responsiveness over the course of the legislative term. Responsiveness grows at a
declining rate over the course of the term, with no discernible spike before European
elections.
FIGURE 6.4. CHANGE IN AVERAGE RESPONSIVENESS OVER TIME (ALL QUESTION-
TIME SESSIONS IN THE FIFTH EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT)8..,.......-----------------------...,
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However, as Chapter 2 has shown, political representation is not the only
motivation for participating and specialising at Question-Time. Indeed, the theory
predicts a trade-off between responsiveness and oversight in parliamentary questions.
On one hand, responsiveness requires MEPs to table questions in policy areas that
feature prominently in their manifestos. On the other hand, effective oversight
requires that legislators hold the executive responsible in the wide range of policy
areas where they face a risk ofagency loss.
As a result, MEPs with a large incentive to monitor the executive are less
responsive than legislators without such an incentive. The trade-off between
representation and oversight depends on the partisan ties between MEPs and the
Commission. Legislators whose national parties sit in the Commission are likely to
have closer policy preferences and better access to the executive. As a result, Chapter
2 predicts that MEPs from 'governing' parties are more responsive than MEPs from
'opposition' parties.
In order to provide a first test of this prediction, Table 6.4 shows the average
responsiveness of ME~s with direct access to the Commission via their national
parties and legislators without such partisan ties. As the table shows, controlling for
questions on the environment, MEPs who do not sit in the Commission are less
responsive than MEPs whose national parties do have a commissioner. However, the
relationship is reversed for questions on the environment. Here, MEPs whose parties
do not sit in the Commission are more responsive than their peers with direct access to
the European executive. MEPs with access to the Commission table more questions
on the environment than the salience of this policy area would predict.
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TABLE 6.4. AVERAGE RESPONSIVENESS AND PARTISAN TIES TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
All Policy Areas
(except Environment)
Environment
'Governing' Parties
'Opposition' Parties
Avg. Avg.
Responsiveness Responsive ness
7.30 3.99
(0.25) (0.14)
6.21 8.52
_ ...___.___ _ {9.:28)___ __ __._....(OJ}L._
Differencei;'·Me~;,s 1.09* -4.52*
Note: standard errors In parentheses; • significant at O.Of/eve/;
Thus, there is only mixed support for the hypothesis in Chapter 2 that direct access
to the Commission reduces the incentive to scrutinise the executive and allows
representatives to focus on salient policy areas. The difference between environmental
questions and all other policy areas is striking. Several alternative (though not rival)
explanations can be tested in a more sophisticated multi-variate analysis.
First, it is of course possible that MEPs who do not sit in the Commission are
affiliated with parties that care more about the environment than MEPs with direct
access to the Commission. Most green parties for instance (except for the German
greens who formed part of the German government in 1999 and are therefore
represented in the Commission) do not have access to the Commission and they
presumably serve a constituency that is environmentally aware.
In addition, environmental issues are different from other policy areas at the
European level because it is here where the European Parliament and the Commission
have been most influential in shaping policy outcomes. As a result, all MEPs.
irrespective of their partisan ties to the Commission and the salience of the policy area
at home, may want to be involved in environmental policy.
In order to test these hypotheses. Table 6.5 shows the result of a logistic
regression with random individual effects and a binary dependent. which assumes the
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value 1 for environmental questions and the value 0 otherwise. The regression
explains the likelihood of tabling a question on the environment as a function of the
explanatory variables. The results show that MEPs from the Swedish Socialist party,
who are party colleagues of the environment Commissioner Margot Wallstrom are
more likely to raise environmental issues at Question-Time. For MEPs from other
national parties, Commission access does not have a main effect. However, there is a
negative interaction between partisan ties to the Commission and the salience of
environmental issues. In other words, unlike 'opposition' MEPs, legislators with
partisan ties to the Commission table more questions on the environment than the
salience of the policy area would predict. Finally, there is no relationship between
party group membership and the likelihood of tabling a question on the environment.
This may come as a surprise, especially because the Green party group serves an
environmentally particularly conscious constituency.
In any case, the results in Table 6.5 confirm that environmental questions are
governed by different factors than questions in other policy areas. Further research is
required to investigate the reasons behind environmental questioning. Most of the
multivariate analysis in this Chapter however excludes questions on the environment.
The bi-variate results in Table 6.4 support the prediction in Chapter 2 that 'governing'
MEPs (with partisan ties to the Commission) are more responsive at Question-Time
than 'opposition' legislators on non-environmental issues.
221
TABLE 6.5. RANDOM EFFECTS LOGISTIC REGRESSION, DEPENDENT:
ENVIRONMENTAL QUESTION (1 ), OTHER QUESTION (0)
Coef Std. Err.
-0.009 0.021
1.375*** 0.233
-0.020 0.973
0.437 0.395
0.401 0.456
-0.043 0.693
-0.398 0.589
1.108 0.736
-0.430 1.453
-1.693*** 0.365
0.657
0.773
0.154
0.289
0.140
0.050
0.598
-0.302 **
-1.683***
Salience
Commission Access
party sits in Commission
Party holds Commission's Environment
Portfolio'[
Interaction: Party sits in Commission x
Salience
Individual Variables
Member of Environment Committee
Distance from Median MEP
Party Group Dummies
PES
ELDR
GREEN
EUL
UEN
!NO
Constant
Random Effects Coefficients
/lnsig2u -0.067
sigma_u 0.967
rho 0.221
Log likelihood -771.019
Prob >= chibar2 <0.001
N 1,633
Notes: ••• significant at 0.01 level, •• significant at 0.05level, reference categories: UKandEPP;
t 17Ie environment commissioner in theProdiCommission (1999-2004) wasSwedish SocialDemocrat Margot Wallstrom
Coefficients measure the likelihood oftabling a question on theenvironment; unitofanalysis: Questions;
SteChapter 3for details on random effectsmethodology; sigma_u is theestimated standard deviation oftherandom effectfor
'''''/vidual MEPs; rho Isthe tntradass correlation coefficient; Prob >chi2 showstheprobability ofnodifference between the
random effects specification shown hereandan OLSspecification withoul random orfixed effects.
The regression results in Table 6.5 show that Swedish Social Democrats are less
likely than other MEPs to question their party's own commissioner. However, the
table does not tell us anything about the quality of the questions that MEPs address to
their own Commissioner. It is indeed possible that questions to an MEP's own
COmmissioner follow a different logic than those to other commissioners. In order to
investigate this possibility, Table 6.6 investigates the use of planted questions at
Question-Time. As Wiberg (1996) points out, the practice of planting friendly
questions in order to highlight a positive aspect of the government's work is a
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widespread "everyday open secret in all parliaments" (pg. 196). Referring to the
British House of Commons, this observation is confirmed by the Economist
newspaper, which notes that 'the price of putting down a question is, after all, more
like half a pint ofbitter in the members' bar' (Bagehot, 1994 [quoted in Wiberg, 1996,
pg. 196]). Similarly, in the European Parliament, some Commissioners may plant
'suitable' questions among MEPs from their own national party in order to raise
particular issues or call public attention to their work.
Of course, it is difficult to identify which questions are planted by individual
commissioners and which questions are 'legitimate' inquiries about a commissioner's
brief. Table 6.6 shows the difference in responsiveness of questions tabled to
commissioners by members of their own national party and those tabled by members
of otherparties. If there is a significant difference in responsiveness, this suggests that
MEPs have different motivations for questioning their 'own' commissioners than they
do for other members of the executive. The table suggests that this is not the case.
Questions to an MEP's own commissioner are somewhat less responsive than
questions to commissioners from other parties but this difference is not statistically
significant. The lack of a significant difference suggests that we can treat questions to
an MEP's own commissioner similarly to all other questions. There is no discernible
effect of question 'planting' by commissioners among members of their own national
parties to highlight their work.
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TABLE 6.6. AVERAGE RESPONSIVENESS OF 'PLANTED' AND OTHER QUESTIONS
Average
Responsiveness
Question to 6.10
Own Commissioner! (0.79)
Question to 7.37
Different Commissioner" (Q:?6t____
...................... .- .... ,.. . -................. ..... .... .. .................. _..............._......__......_.._---_..._----_.--_.-- ........._.......--_....
-- - ...._-_._--
Difference in Means 1.27(0.83)
Notes. The table includes only MEPs witlipartisan ties to the Commission,
Questions on the environment are excluded; standard errors in parentheses
1N= 670; 11 N = 65
Finally, Table 6.7 examines to what extent committee assignments affect
behaviour at Question-Time. Previous research has found mixed evidence for
legislative specialisation in the use of questions even though legislators are free to
choose the topics of their inquiry. Judge (1974) for instance finds that MPs in the
British House of Commons focus their interventions on a small subset of policy areas.
Similarly, in the European Parliament, Bowler and Farrell (1995) contend that
agriculture committee members tend to ask questions about agriculture but not about
the environment or regional affairs, whereas members of the environment and
regional committees tend to query most about their respective committee jurisdictions.
Raunio (1997) on the other hand finds somewhat less conclusive evidence for
committee specialisation in his study of written questions in the European Parliament.
In any case, if committee specialisation occurs, MEPs who sit on the most salient
committees should represent their party's political platform better than MEPs who are
members of less salient committees. Alternatively, an explanation for the lack of
specialisation is that MEPs use questions to address policy areas over which their
committees do not have jurisdiction, either because they are dissatisfied with their
assignments or because they are concerned about limiting their legislative
participation to the narrow range of policy areas that are covered by their committees.
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In either case, the quality of an MEP's committee assignments can have a positive or
a negative effect on responsiveness at Question-Time.
Table 6.7 shows that about 30 percent of all non-environmental questions at
Question-Time address a policy area that falls within the author's committee
jurisdiction. The remaining two thirds of questions deal with areas outside the
questioner's committees. While non-committee questions are on average marginally
more salient than questions that deal with the author's own committee work, the
difference is not statistically significant at the 10% level. A more sophisticated multi-
variate analysis is required to evaluate the impact of committee specialisation on
political representation at Question-Time. For the moment, however, there is not
enough evidence to support an interpretation of questions as an alternative for MEPs
who are dissatisfied with their influence over policy formulation (Chapter 5) and
decision-making (Chapter 4).
TABLE 6.7. SALIENCE AND NUMBER OF QUESTIONS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE
COMMITTEE JURISDICTION OF THE QUESTIONER
Average Frequency
Salience
Question About Own 6.57 399
Committee (0.34)
Question About Different 6.91 492
Committee
_.___(9~_~~1 ...___ ........__..__._..._-.__.._----_....._ .
........_...................- ................... ........
Difference 0.34 93
(0.41)
•• Note: Environmental questions excluded; standard errors In parentheses
The bi-variate analysis in Tables 6.4-6.7 has shown that, with the exception of
questions on the environment, MEPs with direct access to the Commission via their
national parties are more responsive than their peers. This remains true when they
table questions that are addressed to their' own' commissioner or that deal with their
Own committee portfolios. Neither the planting of questions by an MEP's 'own'
commissioner nor committee specialisation have a statistically significant effect on
responsiveness. While the bivariate analysis has shown substantial evidence of the
impact of national party ties on legislative behaviour and responsiveness at Question-
Time, the tables cannot provide any insights about their relative (statistical and
substantive) significance against alternative explanations such as question planting
and committee specialisation.
In order to address this problem, Table 6.8 summarizes the results of three
multivariate regressions with random effects for countries and individual MEPs and
with question salience as a dependent variable." The models explain the
responsiveness of questioners as a function of legislative-executive relations, party
group membership, the committee organisation of the EP and a range of individual
level control variables. The regression coefficients indicate the effect of a one-unit
change in each explanatory variable on question salience. Chapter 2 predicts that the
questioning behaviour of MEPs is conditioned by their access to the Commission,
rather than party group coalition dynamics as in the case of committee decision-
making and policy formulation. Committee specialisation and the use of planted
questions may act as intervening variables. The results support these predictions.
4 See Chapter 3 fordetails about random effects methodology. Questions on the environment are
excluded from theanalysis.
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TABLE 6.8. RANDOM EFFECTS REGRESSION; DEPENDENT: QUESTION SALIENCE
Modell Model 2: (1) +
Specialisation
Model 3: (2) +
Party Groups
Coej Std.Err. Coej
Std.
Err. Coej
Std.
Err.
6.132*** 1.069 5.681 *** 1.464 6.186*** 1.600
0.216 0.586 0.378 0.511 0.434 0.514
0.010*** 0.004 0.008** 0.004 0.008** 0.004
1.184
0.400
0.093
0.817
1.053
1.478
0.702
0.395
0.131
0.129
-1.345
-0.552
-1.043
-0.961
-0.384
2.842
1.875
5.946
<0.001
-4,115.648
1.168
0.400
0.089
0.668
0.383
0.131
0.110
-1.512
-0.566
2.697
1.876
5.946
<0.001
0.151 *** 0.027 0.149*** 0.027
-2.256*** 0.862 -2.353*** 0.872
-4,119.068
0.709 1.413** 0.613 1.590** 0.734
0.745
0.332
0.128
1.285*
2.912
2.691
5.901
<0.001
-4,135.638
Access to Commission
Party has 'Own'
Commissioner
Question Planting
Question to 'Own'
Commissioner
Committee Specialisation
Question w/in Committee
Jurisdiction
Committee
Influence
Policy Specialisation
Responsiveness of
Previous Question
Number of Policy Areas
Questioned
Party Group Dummies
EPP
PES
ELDR
O~erCon"olVarwbks
Question-Time Session -0.027* 0.014 -0.032** 0.014 -0.031 ** 0.014
Distance from median -0.576 1.376 -0.291 1.200 -0.967 1.705
MEP
Incumbent
Number ofQuestions in
the Same Policy Area
Constant
Random Effects
Country
MEP
Residual
Prob>chi(2)
Log Restricted
Likelihood
N 1,268 1,268 1,268
NOIU: ···.r~dlO.O/ lnel• •• signlfictmldlO.OS _I. ·.rlg1tjftcrmldlO./ lnel
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First of all, the Commission membership dummy has the expected (positive) sign
and it is statistically significant in all three estimations (at the 0.05 level in models 2
and 3, at the 0.1 level in model 1). MEPs with direct representation in the
Commission via their national party are more responsive than their peers whose
parties do not sit in the Commission. This conclusion does not change whether the
model includes only individual level control variables (model 1) or whether it also
includes committee and other specialisation variables (model 2) and party group
dummies (model 3).5 Substantively, in the fully specified model (3), an MEP whose
national party is represented in the Commission tables questions that are on average
1.59% more salient than MEPs who are not represented in the Commission.
Compared with an overall average responsiveness of 6.8%, the effect of direct
partisan access to the executive is highly significant.
The positive effect of Commission representation supports the hypothesis in
Chapter 2, which explains responsiveness at Question-Time with the author's national
party affiliation. MEPs without partisan ties to the Commission face a higher risk of
agency loss and more difficult access to individual members of the Commission. As a
result, they have a strong incentive to rely on parliamentary questions as a tool to
monitor the executive in a broad range of policy areas as opposed to specialising in
salient areas. The results support Jun's (2003) observation that national party ties to
individual Commissioners influence an MEP's attitude towards the EU executive.
Second, models (2) and (3) quantify the impact of so-called planted questions
from MEPs to their own commissioners. In models (2) and (3) the coefficient on
Question to 'Own'Commissioner is negative as expected. However, controlling for all
other independent variables in models (2) and (3), the variable does not assume
SOa the contrary, including these controls marginally strengthens theresults.
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statistical significance." Thus, in continnation of the bivariate results in Table 6.6,
MEPs who tabled questions to their own commissioners are equally responsive as
other MEPs. In terms of political representation, the use of planted questions does not
significantly affect responsiveness.
Third, models (2) and (3) also incorporate several variables to account for the
possibility of committee specialisation at Question-Time. Table 6.7 suggested that
specialisation in policy areas that fall under the questioner's committee jurisdiction
could be detrimental to responsiveness, though the difference in mean responsiveness
between questions dealing with the author's committee portfolio and all other
questions was not significant. Effective representation requires specialisation in
salient policy areas, irrespective of committee assignments. However, the multivariate
analysis shows that MEPs who table question in areas that fall within their committee
jurisdiction are not less responsive than their peers. The coefficient on question within
committee jurisdiction is negative in both estimations but it does not assume statistical
significance at the 0.1 level. Thus, committee specialisation does not appear to make a
significant difference in terms of responsiveness.
However, a second measure of committee specialisation does show a statistically
significant effect. Indeed, MEPs who sit in the most influential committees (i.e. those
with a large percentage of co-decision legislation) are less responsive at Question-
Time than their colleagues whose committees are less powerful in terms of policy
outcomes. This result is consistent with the interpretation that legislators with a strong
committee portfolio are likely to focus on the policy formulation and decision-making
stages of the legislative process, where they can affect the content of policy before it
, Ofcourse, like in Table 6.S the multi-variate analysis cannot positively identify which questions are
pllnted bycommissioners or the national party leadership andwhich questions reflect a 'real' concern
with the Commission's handling ofa particular policy area. Theshort discussion here assumes that
commissioners are most likely to plantquestions with MEPs from theirown national party.
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is adopted by the European Parliament. In contrast, MEPs with less influential
committee positions are more responsive at Question-Time. Thus, models (2) and (3)
suggest that there is a close interaction between the three different stages of the policy
process. Substantively, each 10% rise in the share of co-decision legislation within an
MEP's committee portfolio lowers responsiveness by more than 2%. The quality of an
MEP's committee assignments considerably affects responsiveness at the
parliamentary oversight stage of the legislative process.
Fourth, models (2) and (3) incorporate two additional variables that measure the
effect of specialisation in particular policy areas outside of committees. Even MEPs
who do not specialise in their committees, could have a particular interest in a small
number of policy areas in which they have special expertise for instance. Just like
committee specialisation, this could affect responsiveness depending on the salience
ofthe policy area where the MEP has expertise. The results in Table 6.8 show that the
number of policy areas questioned does not affect responsiveness. MEPs who only
table questions ,on a small number of policy areas are no less responsive than their
peers.
However, there is a statistically and substantively very strongrelationship between
the responsiveness of consecutive questions by the same MEP. Indeed, in models (2)
and (3), the salience of the previous question is the single best predictor of the
salience of the next question by the same MEP. Thus, there are some MEPs who
consistently table questions in the most salient policy areas, even once the number of
policy areas questioned and committee specialisation are taken into account. Clearly,
as the bivariate analysis has already indicated, there are large differences in the
representational performanceofMEPs at the oversight stage ofthe legislative process.
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In sum, the relationship between specialisation and the representational quality of
questions is complex. Committee specialisation might be a small part of the answer
but it does not fully explain representational performance at Question-Time. Instead,
Table 6.8 suggests that it is the quality of an MEP's committee portfolio that
determines which questions he or she asks. More generally, the quality of committee
assignments determines how legislators engage at different stages of the policy
process. Additionally, however, some MEPs consistently table salient questions while
others do not, even once committee specialisation is taken into account. Further
research on parliamentary questions in the EP should try to model committee effects
on questions more thoroughly by, for instance, examining the relationship between
questions and different leadership positions within committees (such as substitute, full
member, vice chair, and chair).
Finally, as expected, none of the party group dummies have any effect on
responsiveness (model 3). This is in stark contrast to Chapters 4 and 5 where party
groups played a major role in the legislative participation and specialisation decisions
of individual MEPs. The lack of significance of the three party group dummies in
model (3) corroborates the prediction that legislative-executive relations in the
European Parliament are subject to a different dynamic than committee work.
Whereas policy formulation and decision-making in committees are governed by
majority rule, which fosters coalition formation among European party groups,
parliamentary oversight is determined by partisan ties to the executive at the level of
national parties. As noted in Chapter 2, this distinction between majority rule and
legislative-executive relations makes the European Parliament a unique natural
laboratory to investigate incentives for MEPs to participate and specialise at different
stages ofthe policy process.
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Finally, a series of additional control variables included in the regression deserve
mentioning. First, the lack of significance of distance to median MEP emphasises that
it is access to the Commission via the national party, rather than individual policy
preferences, that governs legislative-executive relations in the EP. The negative
coefficient on Question-Time session confirms the counterintuitive effect of European
elections (illustrated in Figure 6.4), with lower responsiveness at the end than at the
beginning of the legislature. In a similar vein, there is no difference in the
responsiveness of incumbents and freshmen at Question-Time. Both of these results
may be less surprising in view of the weak electoral connection that links MEPs to
their constituents in the EP. However, the positive coefficient on number ofquestions
in the same policy area indicates that salient policy areas are the most popular
question-topics for MEPs. In other words, legislators do make a conscious effort to
put the political platforms of their parties into practice but they do not adjust their
behaviour in response to electoral stimuli.
IV. Political Representation in Committees and in
Parliamentary Oversight
The results presented thus far suggest that there is a considerable amount of
variation in the representational performance of MEPs at the parliamentary oversight
stage. Representation at Question-Time is highly unequal and it varies primarily along
national party lines. Except for questions on the environment, MEPs whose national
parties are represented in the executive are more responsive than those who are not.
The effect of committee specialisation on responsiveness is more complex.
Legislators with highly desirable assignments are less responsive than MEPs who sit
on less attractive committees. On the whole, the analysis has shown that access to the
European Commission via the national party's own commissioner is a more powerful
explanation of representational performance at this stage of the policy process than
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alternative explanations such as committee specialisation, individual policy
preferences or planted questions by commissioners among their national party's
MEPs.
Thus, political representation is distributed very differently at the oversight
stage, where access to the Commission is the key determinant of MEP behaviour, and
in policy formulation and decision-making, where behavioural incentives are
governed by prevailing majority thresholds and party group membership. The
representational scores used in this analysis are a composite measure of legislative
participation and specialisation in salient policy areas and they are not directly
observable. As a result, the impact of differences in incentives on representational
outcomes is difficult to evaluate in absolute terms.
Instead, by comparing the distribution of representational performance at
different stages of the policy process (e.g. using Gini coefficients), we can compare
the impact on representation of the behavioural incentives that govern parliamentary
oversight and committee work. As mentioned in Chapter 5 already, a Gini coefficient
of 1 denotes perfect inequality with one committee member reaping all the spoils, a
coefficient of 0 indicates perfect equality among legislators. For committee
assignments and questions, the Gini coefficients are 0.42 and 0.86 respectively, which
indicates that salient questions are twice as unequally distributed among MEPs as
salient committee posts.
Figure 6.5 graphically illustrates the effect of incentives at the committee and
oversight stages on the distribution of representational performance across MEPs.
Each Oini coefficient corresponds to the area between the 45 degree line of perfect
equality and the distribution in question. The figure confirms that questions are
distributed much more unequally than committee posts.
233
FIGURE6.S.INEQUALITY OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENTARY
OVERSIGHT AND IN COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS
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As noted in chapters 4 and 5, committee posts are allocated to the party groups
in proportion to their size in the plenary. It is therefore not surprising that
representational performance should be less equal at Question-Time than in
committees. Whereas almost all MEPs are members of at least one committee, the
majority of MEPs do not participate at all at Question-Time. Nevertheless, with
questions not subject to party group gate-keeping and relatively easy to access
compared with other legislative activities, the magnitude of the difference in
inequality is surprising.
The analysis in this chapter has shown that the incentive structure that governs
legislative-executive relations accounts for differences both in participation and
specialisation at Question-Time. Perhaps the most important insight from the
empirical analysis of parliamentary oversight in this chapter is the importance I of
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behavioural incentives for the study of political representation in the European
Parliament (and elsewhere).
v. Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has quantified the consequences of the selective participation and
specialisation decisions of MEPs for the political representation of European citizens
in parliamentary oversight. Parliamentary questions provide a unique insight into the
opportunities and constraints that structure these decisions. Unlike policy formulation
and decision-making in committees, participation at Question-Time is not governed
by majority rule and subject to only minimal national party and party group control.
First and most significantly, the empirical analysis in this chapter shows that the
representational performance of MEPs can be explained as a function of the incentive
structure that governs parliamentary oversight. In confirmation of Chapters 4 and 5,
behavioural incentives affect whether MEPs participate and where they specialise at
Question-Time. These individual decisions in turn determine how European citizens
are represented in parliamentary oversight in the European Union. Because Question-
Time is subject to a different incentive structure (little party control, no majority
thresholds) than parliamentary committee work, this result constitutes a significant
validation of the theory developed in Chapter 3.
Second, the findings are consistent with the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2.
With the exception of environmental issues, legislative specialisation in particular
policy areas at Question-Time is a function of partisan ties to the Commission.
Representatives whose parties form part of the executive use questions primarily as a
representational tool in the most salient policy areas. However, for MEPs from
'opposition' parties, questions also serve to monitor the Commission and minimise
the risk. of agency drift. As a result, legislators from 'governing' parties are more
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responsive (hypothesis 3b) but less well represented (hypothesis 3a) than their peers
who do not have partisan ties to the executive. Unlike in Chapters 4 and 5 where
majority thresholds and party group affiliation were key, legislative behaviour (and
therefore representation) at Question-Time is determined by each MEP's access to the
executive, the European Commission.
Third, the selectivity of participation at Question-Time has a considerable
impact on representational performance. Whereas half of all MEPs do not participate
at all in questioning, some legislators are very active at this stage of the policy
process. In comparison with committee assignments, representation at the oversight
stage is much more unequal. Like in most national parliaments, the 'opposition' (i.e.
without partisan ties to the Commission) participates more at Question-Time than
'governing' parties (i.e. with partisan ties to the Commission) because it has a greater
incentive to hold the executive accountable for its actions (see e.g. Franklin and
Norton, 1993 on the British House of Commons).
Finally, the results also qualify some recent findings in the context of the
European Parliament that emphasise the role of committee specialisation in
parliamentary questioning (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Raunio, 1996). Neither the
bivariate nor the multivariate analyses have found a significant difference in the
responsiveness ofquestions that address an MEP's own committee portfolio and other
questions. However, there is strong evidence that the quality of an MEP's committee
portfolio affects representational performance. MEPs who sit in the most influential
committees are less responsive than representatives with less interesting committee
positions.7
., Inthis context, further research could attempt to trace therepresentational performance of the most
and the least inOuentiai MEPs across all three stages of thepolicy process. Anegative relationship
between influence overpolicy outcomes and representational performance is consistent with the stated
preference ofMEPsfor taking part in legislation overpolitical representation (see Chapter 2)
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On one hand, the results reported here may seem disquieting from the perspective
of political representation in parliamentary oversight. Despite relative ease of access
and low opportunity costs for questioners from across the political spectrum, only a
limited range of values and interests on the plenary floor are represented at Question-
Time. Wide discrepancies in representational performance across MEPs suggest that
the interests of some sections of European society are better represented at Question-
Time than others. These findings raise considerable doubts about the ability of the
European Parliament to fulfil its representational role at the stage of parliamentary
oversight.
On the other hand, the findings explain differences in participation and responsive
specialisation in terms of the incentive structure that governs parliamentary oversight
activities. If the incentives for participation and specialisation at Question-Time are
different from those at other stages of the policy process, the representational bias in
one legislative activity can be corrected by a similar bias of equal magnitude
elsewhere. In other words, constituencies that are excluded from policy formulation
and decision-making may in turn be over-represented in parliamentary oversight and
viceversa.
There is considerable evidence that this is indeed the case. As noted above, the
European Parliament is unique in the division between its internal and external
organisation. Whereas national party ties to the Commission govern legislative-
executive relations, coalition dynamics amongst party groups are most important
under majority rule in committee and plenary. As a result of this sharp distinction
between external and internal incentives, political representation at Question-Time is
dominated by different constituencies than other stages of the policy process
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As we have seen in the previous chapters, the internal organisation of the EP is
largely in the hands of trans-national party groups. Party groups decide over the
allocation of most leadership positions in Parliament, including rapporteurships and
committee positions. Majority rule encourages wide voting coalitions across party
groups. As Kreppel (2002) contends, the gradual increase in EP power has
strengthened the party groups due to their role within the committee system. As a
result, the participation and specialisation decisions of MEPs within committees
follow the party group logic identified in Chapters 4 and 5.
At the same time, national parties are the primary actors in the Parliament's
external relations with both the constituents it represents and its executive agency, the
European Commission. As this chapter has shown, in stark contrast to parliamentary
committees, there is no relationship between party group affiliation and
responsiveness at Question-Time. Instead, Hix (1997) and Jun (2005) confirm that the
legislative behaviour of MEPs vis-a-vis the Commission reflects the importance of
national parties relative to party groups and territorial units (e.g. regions, electoral
districts or countries). As a result, participation and specialisation in legislative-
executive relations follow national party lines. 'Governing' parties with direct
national party ties to the executive are most responsive to their voters at this stage of
thepolicy process while 'opposition' parties are represented in a wider range ofpolicy
areas.
With different constituencies represented at different stages of the policy process,
the overall balance of representation in the European Parliament may be preserved
despite the biases identified in Chapters 4-6. Chapter 7 completes the analysis with a
summary of the results of the thesis and an appraisal of the overall representational
performance of the Parliament as an institution across all three stages of the policy
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process. The chapter also discusses the implications of this thesis for future studies of
representation and legislative behaviour in the wider context of the European Union
and in other legislatures. Finally, the chapter concludes with a number of questions
that the thesis has raised and which should be addressed in future research.
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CHAPTER 7 - POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has shown that political representation in the European Parliament is a
function of party-political and institutional incentives at different stages of the policy
process. The legislative participation and specialisation decisions of individual MEPs,
which affect their responsiveness and the representativeness of parliamentary business
in policy formulation, decision-making and oversight, are determined by majority
thresholds, inter and intra-party group politics and access to the European executive,
the Commission.
This chapter recapitulates the main findings of the thesis, compares the results of
the three empirical chapters and discusses how the theoretical model can inform
institutional reform within and outside the European Parliament. The first section
provides a brief summary of the main argument of the thesis. Section 2 compares
patterns of representation across the three stages of the policy process. Section 3 takes
a closer look at the implications of these findings for institutional reform in the
European Parliament and Section 4 goes beyond the present study to discuss possible
avenues for future research.
I. Summary of the Main Findings
Three main findings emanate from the empirical tests of the model developed in
Chapter 2. First, all empirical chapters confirm that political representation in the EP
is a result of the party-political and institutional environment in which it takes place.
Second, the thesis has established that representation in the European Parliament is
unequal across MEPs, member states, party groups and the three different stages of
the policy process. Finally, the study has discovered a tension between the
representativeness of parliamentary deliberation (government of the people) and the
responsiveness of individual MEPs (government for the people). Finally,
Main Finding 1: Representation in the European Parliament is a Function of
Legislative Participation and Specialisation
The first and most significant finding of the thesis is that political
representation in the European Parliament is a result of the institutional and party-
political incentive structure that governs legislative behaviour at each stage of the
policy process in the EP. Representation depends less on the composition of the
plenary itself (as suggested by studies of descriptive representation) than it does on
the legislative participation and specialisation decisions of individual MEPs at
different stages of the legislative process. These decisions, in tum, are shaped by the
institutional environment in which parliamentary business takes place and by the party
political affiliation of legislators. On the institutional side, the study has shown that
proportionality rules in the report allocation procedure, open rule in committee and
plenary, 'and majority thresholds across policy areas define how MEPs engage in
policy formulation and decision-making within their committees. From a party
political perspective, the thesis emphasises the role of party group competition, intra-
party group politics and national party representation in the European Commission.
First, the bidding system instituted to distribute committee reports among
party groups ensures that all groups have the chance to participate fairly in policy
formulation. With reports allocated according to the size of each group's delegation,
there is little room for larger party groups to monopolise access to this stage of the
policy process. As a result of the proportional nature of the report allocation
procedure, the range of values and interests represented at the policy formulation
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stage in the European Parliament reflects the diversity of opinion within the European
public.
However, as we have seen in Chapter 2, there is more than one dimension to
political representation. While proportional report allocation enforces a representative
allocation of committee reports across party groups, the responsiveness of individual
MEPs may still vary. The findings show that open rule in committee and plenary
create differential incentives for MEPs from majority and minority party groups to
sign up for the most desirable (i.e. most salient) reports. There is little policy incentive
for minority groups to bid on the most salient reports because the majority coalition in
committee and plenary can threaten to amend or reject any proposals that deviate from
its preferences at the decision-making stage of the legislative process. Differences in
decision-making power across party groups due to open rule create different
incentives for MEPs to be responsive at the policy formulation stage.
Of course, the effect of institutional incentives (such as proportional report
allocation or open rule in committee and plenary) also depends on how MEPs interact
with one another on the committee and plenary floor. The findings in this thesis
confirm studies that emphasise national parties and party groups as core determinants
of legislative behaviour in the European Parliament. First, Chapters 4 and 5 have
presented clear evidence for party group competition along the left-right spectrum.
While coalition size depends to some extent on applicable majority thresholds, party
groups form minimum winning coalitions to push legislation through committee. In
the fifth Parliament, a simple majority coalition comprises the largest delegation, the
conservative European People's Party (EPP), and the liberals (ELDR) whereas an
absolute majority requires participation of the second largest delegation, the Party of
European Socialists (PES). Both at the policy formulation and decision-making
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stages, the findings have shown the importance of these coalitions in shaping the
legislative participation and specialisation decisions of MEPs.
Second, in addition to inter-party group dynamics, there is also substantial
evidence for intra-group politics whenever the party group leadership disposes over
gate-keeping power. At the policy formulation stage, party groups distribute the
reports they have won among their members, which allows the leadership to reward
loyal MEPs, sanction defectors and ensure the cohesion of its delegation. As a result,
preference outliers within the group write less desirable reports than their party group
colleagues. In addition, MEPs from smaller national delegations, which have
otherwise little influence over the operation of the party group, are trusted with the
most salient reports. Of course, all of these findings depend crucially on the ability of
the party group leadership to allocate resources to its members. As a result, there is no
evidence of intra-group politics at the decision-making stage or in parliamentary
oversight, where party groups have no gate-keeping power. I
However, party groups are not the only entities within the EP that structure the
behaviour of individual MEPs. Indeed, the study has shown the importance of
national parties for the representativeness of parliamentary oversight and the
responsiveness of MEPs at Question-Time. MEPs whose national parties are
represented in the Commission have lower incentives to monitor the executive via
fonnal and public questioning than their peers from 'opposition' parties. As a result,
these MEPs participate less at Question-Time and they are more responsive. The
study is consistent with research highlighting the role of national parties in granting
budgetary discharge to the Commission (Jun, 2005). Unlike policy formulation and
I Ofcourse the groups do have some indirect power overcommittee decision-making viathe
committee usignment procedure andmid-term committee turnover (McElroy 2001). H~wevert these
po~ 11'0 very blunt compared with the influence of the leadership overreport allocatton.
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committee decision-making, party groups are of little importance in parliamentary
oversight.
Finding 1 shows that party-political and institutional incentives affect which
values and interests are represented at different stage of the political process in the
European Parliament and which MEPs are most responsive. The second main finding
relates to the distribution of representational performance across national parties,
party groups and political persuasions.
Main Finding 2: Representational Performance Varies Across MEPs, Party Groups
and National Parties
Despite proportionality rules enshrined in the committee assignment procedure,
participation, specialisation and representational performance within each committee
varies across MEPs, parties and party groups. In addition, the results show that the
gate-keeping power of the party group leadership and intense competition for the most
desirable committee reports mean that representation is more unequal in policy
formulation than in decision-making. Outside the committee structure, participation
and specialisation are also distributed very unequally. Whereas a large number of
MEPs do not participate at all in parliamentary oversight, other legislators centre most
of their legislative work on questioning the executive.
In order to evaluate the overall impact of inequalities in representational
performance, we must investigate whether and to what extent MEPs who do engage at
different stages of the policy process represent different sections of the political
spectrum. If the same section of the population is over-represented throughout the
legislative process, this could have serious consequences for the legitimacy of
parliamentary business in the European Union. If, on the other hand, the values and
interests that are prominent in policy formulation, decision-making and oversight
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differ substantially, this will mitigate inequality in representational performance at
each separate stage of the policy process.
The theory developed and tested in this thesis has shown that different sections of
the public are represented at different stages of the policy process. At the policy
formulation stage, committee reports are distributed proportionally to party group size
using an auction system. As a result, MEPs from all major party groups are
represented in a broad range of policy areas. However, provided there is a high degree
of party group cohesion and discipline, representatives from party groups that hold a
majority in committee and plenary use their power over policy outcomes in the EP to
specialise in the most salient areas. As a result, they are more responsive than their
peers from groups that do not hold a voting majority in committee or plenary.
At the committee decision-making stage, there is no auctioning system to enforce
proportional legislative participation. Instead, majority MEPs are over-represented in
committee meetings because low attendance levels endanger their majority. In fact, a
lack of discipline and cohesion on the part of majority MEPs could substantially alter
incentives at the policy formulation stage. At the same time, minority MEPs at this
stage of the process are more likely to focus on the most salient meetings. In other
words, in the absence of any incentives to participate in a broad range of policy areas,
minority MEPs are more responsive than other legislators in committee decision-
making.
Finally, the parliamentary oversight stage presents a very different set of
institutional and party-political incentives than committee work. Whereas committees
revolve primarily around party groups, parliamentary oversight links national party
delegations in the European Parliament to the European executive, the Commission.
MEPs from national parties that have their 'own' commissioner have direct access to
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the Commission and lower incentives to scrutinise the executive via formal and public
questioning. As a result, 'governing' parties participate less at Question-Time than
their peers. At the same time, they use questions not as a monitoring but as a
representational tool. For these MEPs, questions are a quick and cost-effective way to
bring salient issues onto the legislative agenda. Representatives from 'opposition'
parties without a commissioner are less in tune with the executive in terms of policy
preferences and they do not have as many access points to the Commission as their
colleagues from 'governing' parties. As a result, these MEPs are more likely to use
parliamentary questioning as monitoring tool and to voice their opposition when the
Commission deviates from their preferences.
In sum, the study of these three legislative activities has uncovered substantial
inequality in representational performance across MEPs, national parties, party groups
and countries. Whether such inequality is bad from a democratic point of view
depends in large part on normative perspectives about the role of the European
Parliament in the legislative process of the European Union and in European politics
more generally.
At the same time, the analysis has also demonstrated that different constituencies
are represented at different sta~es of the policy process. The study has shown that
while representational performance is unequal, so is the 'mobility' of MEPs across the
different stages of the legislative process. Just as an income distribution in economics,
the effect of such mobility is to mitigate the negative impact of inequality. Table 7.1
(further on in this Chapter) provides a glimpse of the potential effect of
representational mobility across different stages of the legislative process. A full-
blown analysis of the impact of representational mobility could be an interesting
avenue for future research. How unequal is representational performance given high
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levels of mobility across time and legislative activities? How does this compare to
other legislatures? Is there evidence for a trade-off between the static concept of
equality and the dynamic concept of mobility across different stages of the policy
process? The research design in this thesis provides a good starting point for further
research in this direction.
Finally, the third main finding of the thesis relates to the interaction between the
two dimensions of political representation. As Chapter 2 explains, "government for
thepeople" and "government of the people" place different demands on the legislative
behaviour of MEPs. Representativeness - or "government of the people" - is the result
of broad legislative participation across the political spectrum; responsiveness - or
"government for the people" - is a function of legislative specialisation in particular
policy areas rather than others. Whereas legislative participation affects whose values
and interests are represented at each stage of the policy process, specialisatiori
determines how responsive legislators are.
Main Finding 3: There is a Trade-offBetween Representative Deliberation and
Responsiveness
There are substantial differences in representativeness and responsiveness across
all three stages of the policy process. In policy formulation, the bidding system among
,
party groups entails that all party groups get a (more or less) fair share of reports
according to the size of their delegation. Differences in levels of participation across
groups are primarily due to differences in the number of seats that each groups holds
within the EP. Thus, an analysis of this first dimension of representation (i,e.
"government of the people") suggests that the range of values and interests
represented at the policy formulation stage reflects the composition of the plenary and
the diversity ofopinion within European society.
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However, the same cannot be said of legislative specialisation at this stage of the
policy process. Institutional and party-political incentives govern MEP decisions to
participate in some policy areas rather than others. Majority MEPs are in a favoured
position compared to their peers from the minority groups because they can use the
threat of amendment and rejection in committee and plenary to secure the most
desirable (i.e, salient) reports. As a result, MEPs from the majority groups specialise
in drafting policy in the most salient areas whereas their minority peers must content
themselves with less salient (and probably also less controversial and more technical)
areas. In other words, "government for the people" is biased towards the majority
groups at the policy formulation stage.
Thus, an analysis of both dimensions of political representation including the
participation and specialisation decisions of MEPs leads to a much more qualified
conclusion about representational performance than studies confined to only one
aspect of political representation. Despite proportional report allocation, only a small
sub-section of European society is represented in the most salient policy areas.
Clearly, a good understanding of how representation works in the European
Parliament requires a thorough analysis of both the level of participation and
legislative specialisation at each stage of the policy process.
In committee decision-making, the institutional incentive structure is quite
different. In the absence of proportionality rules, it is the institutional and party-
political incentive structure that determines to what extent legislators participate.
Because open rule gives MEPs from the majority groups substantial leverage over
policy outcomes, they have a large incentive to participate in a broad range of policy
areas. MEPs from minority groups on the other hand do not have the same influence
over outcomes because they do not have the (simple or absolute) majority of votes
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required in committee and plenary to amend or reject the legislation before them. As a
result, these representatives are more reluctant to attend committee meetings in all
policy areas.2 Unlike at the policy formulation stage, where it is enforced by
institutional rules, the representativeness of committee deliberation is determined to a
large extent by party political competition and the balance of power within the EP. In
other words, at the committee decision-making stage, "government of the people" is
biased in favour of majority groups.
However, while majority MEPs have the upper hand with regards to participation
in a broad rage of policy areas, it is minority MEPs who are most responsive in
committee decision-making. Put differently, "government for the people" is biased in
favour of minority groups at this stage of the policy process. Indeed, with little
incentive to mark their presence across the full range of policy areas in which
committee deliberations are held, MEPs from the minority groups can focus on a
smaller number of meetings where they can be most responsive. The lack of power
overpolicy outcomes under open rule in committee reduces the workload of minority
representatives and allows them to concentrate their efforts on raising the concerns of
those they represent at the decision-making stage. Again, analyses of legislative
participation and specialisation lead to opposite conclusions about the workings of
political representation in the EP.
Finally, in parliamentary oversight, national parties rather than the trans-national
European party groups are the operative unit. Here too, party-political incentives
shape the legislative participation and specialisation of MEPs. Instead of voting
2 Note that thisfinding also shows theconnection between participation in policy fo~ulation (i.e, the
drafting of committee reports) anddecision-making (i.e. their passage through committee ~d plenary).
Itisnot thecase, as some may have speculated, thatMEPs routinely attend only those ~eetiD~ .wh~re
the proposals of theirown party members are discussed. Neither do I!gislato~ focu~ their particI~~n
indecision-making on the proposals of rival groups. A simple analysIs of them~~ve structure wlthm
BP committees as carried out in this study shows thatsuch behaviour would be irrational fiom the
perspective of individual MEPs.
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majorities within the plenary, however, government for and of the people at the
oversight stage of the policy process is tied to legislative-executive relations between
national parties and their representatives in the Commission.
Legislators from national parties without their 'own' commissioner face a higher
risk of agency loss from delegating executive powers to the European Commission
than their colleagues whose national parties are directly represented in the
Commission. As a result, these MEPs are more likely to participate in parliamentary
oversight via inter alia questions at Question-Time. In terms of representativeness,
'opposition' legislators dominate questioning activity in the European Parliament.
However, a closer analysis of the actual policy areas about which MEPs from
different national parties inquire, reveals that there are differences in the legislative
specialisation of representatives from 'opposition' and 'governing' parties as well.
'Opposition' MEPs have an incentive use Question-Time primarily as a monitoring
tool to ensure that Commission does not stray too far from their preferences or to raise
concern about possible abuses of its executive mandate. Effective oversight requires
monitoring of a wide range of policy areas even where in low priority areas where
there is little interest from the national party. 'Governing' MEPs do not have the same
incentive to keep a check on the Commission via formal questioning procedures.
Instead, they can use their questions either to positively highlight the work of 'their'
party's commissioner or to raise issues that feature prominently on the political
priority list of their national party. As a result, 'governing' legislators are more
responsive than their peers without national party ties to the European Commission.
All three empirical chapters have shown a tension between the two dimensions of
political representation: the representativeness of legislative activity at each stage of
the policy process and the responsiveness of individual MEPs. The thesis shows that,
2S0
in order to draw valid conclusions about the workings of political representation in the
European Parliament, it is not sufficient to investigate only the levels ofparticipation
("government of the people") across MEPs (or groups of MEPs). Instead, a
comprehensive assessment of representation also requires a thorough analysis of
responsive legislative specialisation ("government for the people").
This section has summarised the main findings of the thesis. The results
confirm the predictions of the theory developed in Chapter 2. Political representation
in the European Parliament is a result of institutional and party-political incentives in
policy formulation, committee decision-making and parliamentary oversight. There is
substantial inequality in the political representation of European citizens.
Representational performance differs across individual representatives, their parties,
party groups and across member states. Finally, the thesis has uncovered a tension
between representative participation and responsive specialisation at all three stages
of the legislative process. The next section goes beyond the empirical chapters to
compare overall representational performance across the different stages of the policy
process.
II. Comparative Assessment ofRepresentational Performance
As Chapters 1 and 2 have discussed, a large body of literature criticises the
democratic credentials of the European Union and its Parliament. Part of this debate is
based on different normative conceptions of the European Union and the role of the
Buropean Parliament within the institutional set-up of the EU. Instead, this thesis has
addressed the question of how representation in the EU works, and how it can be
improved given public opinion towards European integration and the relative
importance of different policy areas as well as the (historical) institutional set-up of
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the European Union. This section compares the overall representational performance
ofMEPs and across EU member states.
Chapters 4-6 have analysed representational performance separately for each stage
of the policy process. However, the thesis also allows for a comparative assessmentof
the overall performance of different MEPs, member states and party groups across all
stages of the legislative process. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 present an overall ranking of
member states and individual MEPs respectively, according to their overall
representational performance, taking into account both participation and responsive
specialisation
First, table 7.1 ranks member states in terms of the representational performance
of an average MEP from each country in all three stages of the legislative process.
Each score takes into account both differences in levels of participation and
responsiveness.' The scores are standardized to allow for easy comparison across
countries and across the three stages of the policy process. A score of zero represents
the average representational performance across all countries for a particular
legislative activity, a positive score reflects above-average perform~ce and a
negative score means below-average representational performance. In the overall
ranking, Ireland performs best followed by Greece, Sweden, the Netherlands and
Finland. At the bottom end of the table, MEPs from Italy, France, Germany and
Belgium are least in line with the political platforms of their national parties.
With the exception of the Netherlands, the six founding nations of the European
Union (France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries) are at the very bottom of
the ranking! This is despite the fact that these countries generally have the most pro-
European publics. Table 7.1 thus raises considerable doubts about the causal link
, The scores represent the sum of tilesalience of eachreport/question/committee meeting for each
~1EP.
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betWeen political representation in the European Parliament and positive public
opinion towards the European Union as a whole. Effective representation does not
seem to lead to positive attitudes towards the European Union or vice versa.
Of course this ranking does not tell us anything about the behaviour of MEPs from
different countries in other European institutions. It could well be, for instance, that
some countries question the effectiveness of the European Parliament as a law-making
body and prefer to concentrate their efforts on the Council of Ministers. This would
make particular sense for MEPs from the smaller countries, which tend to be over-
represented (and therefore have disproportionate influence over policy) in the
Council. Nevertheless, this interpretation does not explain the neat division between
the six founding fathers of the European Union and the newer member states. The
Table raises questions about the impact of enlargement on political representation.
Does the negative relationship between length of membership and representation hold
for the most recent expansion to Eastern Europe? Similarly, the results qualify social
constructivist explanations of legislative behaviour and attitudes, which contend that
length of membership in a particular institution should lead to greater identification
withthat institution."
Second, the Table also shows that there is a substantial correlation between
representational performance at different stages of the legislative process at the level
of individual member states. Indeed, the seven countries at the bottom of the table
perform below average at all stages of the process, whereas Greece and Sweden
(ranked second and third respectively) can boast three positive scores. Only six
countries (Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland, Austria, Spain and the UK) have both
positive (above average) and negative (below average) scores. The consistency of the
4 Several empirical studies within theconstructivist tradition confirm this finding (e.g. FraDklin and
Scarrow, 1999; Kerr;1973)
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scores across member states signifies that MEPs from some countries are clearly less
interested in political representation in the European Parliament across all stages of
the legislative process. It is not the case that some countries prefer to focus their
efforts on only one stage of the legislative process
TABLE 7.1 COMPARATIVE RANKING OF THE REPRESENTATIONAL PERFORMANCE
FOR AN AVERAGE MEP FROM EACH MEMBER STATE
Rank Country Policy Decision- Parliamentary Total
Formulation Making (B) Oversight (C) Score
(A) (A+B+C)
1 Ireland 3.22 -0.78 2.71 5.16
2 Greece 0.94 1.38 1.44 3.77
3 Sweden 0.40 1.79 1.17 3.36
4 Netherlands -0.48 1.52 -0.62 0.43
5 Finland 0.04 0.58 -0.33 0.29
6 Spain 0.14 -0.17 -0.05 -0.08
7 Austria -0.31 0.25 -0.06 -0.11
8 United -0.17 0.10 -0.22 -0.29
Kingdom
9 Denmark -0.25 -0.31 -0.12 -0.69
10 Portugal -0.56 -0.12 -0.63 -1.31
11 Luxembourg -0.57 -0.10 -0.71 -1.38
12 Belgium -0.39 -0.82 -0.48 -1.69
13 Germany -0.63 -0.39 -0.75 -1.76
14 France -0.70 -1.13 -0.64 -2.47
15
................J!~~y .......... -0.68 -1.82 -0.72 -3.22................_......._...-......._............_..•............_.... ........ ..............._._.._............------.- ......._-_.-...... ...._._.__..-..._.. -.•..._...... - .-.--'--.'---
Min
-
-0.70 -1.82 -0.72 5.16
Max
-
3.22 1.79 2.71 -3.22
Note: Scores are standardised averages ofrepresentational performance for each member state
The difficulty to interpret the ranking in Table 7.1 could of course have yet an
entirely different explanation. Indeed, the predictions of the theory and the empirical
results in Chapters 4-6 do not suggest that the nationality of MEPs should play a
significant role in their representational performance. Instead, the thesis has shown
that there are considerable institutional and party-political incentives for MEPs to
participate and specialise in different policy areas and at different stages of the
legislative process. If anything, we should expect differences in representational
performance across individual MEPs, national parties and party groups.
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Table 7.2 lists the ten MEPs who performed best in terms of representation at
each stage of the legislative process. Though it does of course not constitute a
rigorous test of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, the ranking is nevertheless in
tune with the results of the empirical chapters. First, in policy formulation and
decision-making, the vast majority of the top performers come from the two largest
party groups (EPP and PES). Fully half of the MEPs with the best representational
scores in policy formulation are conservative MEPs from the European People's
Party. As discussed in Chapter 5, open rule in committee and plenary allows members
of the EPP to win the most desirable reports. While proportionality rules guarantee
similar levels of participation across party groups, members of the minority party
groups must content themselves with formulating policy in less salient areas.
Second, representation at the decision-making stage is also dominated by
majority legislators with 6 listings for EPP and ELDR in Table 7.2. Indeed, as pointed
out in Chapter 5, open rule gives a strong incentive to these MEPs to attend their
committee meetings across all policy areas on a regular basis. Three entries in the
Table go to the largest minority group PES, whose legislators have a strong incentive
to focus on the policy areas that are most salient at this stage ofthe legislative process.
The table illustrates the importance of both participation and specialisation for
political representation as it has been defined in this thesis.
Finally, the third column looks very different from the previous two. With
only a combined 4 entries for EPP and PES, parliamentary oversight is dominated by
MEPs from the smaller groups on the left (EUL) and right (UEN) of the political
spectrum. As expected, these MEPs are not represented in the European Commission
and have a strong incentive to participate in parliamentary questioning. Indeed, only
two MEPs in Table 7.2 (Rubig and Izquierdo) are affiliated with national parties that
2SS
are members of the Commission. All other legislators come from 'opposition parties
without direct Commission representation. The ranking suggests that it is the level of
participation at Question Time rather than responsive specialisation which drives
overall representational performance at this stage of the policy process.
TABLE 7.2. Top 10 MEPs WITH BEST REPRESENTATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN
POLICY FORMULATION, DECISION-MAKING AND PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
POLICY COMMITTEE PARLIAMENTARY
FORMULATION DECISION-MAKING OVERSIGHT
1 POSSELT Bernd KARAS Othmar ROBIG Paul
(EPP -Germany) (EPP-Austria) (EPP - Germany)
2 IZQUIERDO ROJO Maria KAUPPI Piia-Noora SJOSTEDT Jonas
(PES - Spain) (EPP - Finland) (EUL - Sweden)
3 KRATSA- KONRAD Christoph TRAKATELLIS Antonios
TSAGAROPOULOU Rodi (EPP-Germany) (EPP - Greece)
(EPP-Greece)
4 DOYLE Avril VAN LANCKER Anne KORAKAS Efstratios
(EPP - Ireland) (PES - Belgium) (EUL - Greece)
5 DE ROSSA Proinsias KORAKAS Efstratios CROWLEyr Brian
(PES - Ireland) (EUL - Greece) ([lEN - Ireland)
6 HYLAND Liam MARQUES Sergio IZQUIERDO ROJO Maria
(UEN - Ireland) (EPP - Spain) (PES - Spain)
7 ORTUONDO LARREA KATIFORIS Giorgos FITZSIMONS James
Josu (PES - Greece) (UEN - Ireland)
(GREEN-Spain)
8 FITZSIMONS James EVANS Jonathan NEWTON DUNN Bill
(UEN - Ireland) (EPP - United Kingdom) (ELDR - United Kingdom)
9 HATZIDAKIS PEsALA Mikko HATZIDAKIS Konstantinos
Konstantinos (ELDR - Finland) (EPP - Greece)
(EPP - Greece)
ANDREWS Niall10 TRAKATELLIS Antonios TORRES MARQUES
(EPP - Greece) Helena (UEN - Ireland)
(PES - Spain)
In addition to providing a tool for comparison of representational performance
across MEPs, countries and party groups at each stage of the policy process. the thesis
also indicates the likely impact of various institutional reform proposals for
parliamentary democracy in the European Union. The remainder of this section
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discusses several what-if scenarios to assess the impact of institutional reform on
political representation in the European Parliament.
Implications for Institutional Reform in the European Parliament
Amongst the most critical observers of democracy in Europe are the proponents of
a European-level parliamentary democracy, who tend to compare the workings of
democracy and political representation in the European Parliament to the national
context. In relation to democratic criteria developed nationally, the European
Parliament invariably performs less than satisfactorily. As a result, some of the most
federalist (and pro-European) scholars have come to the conclusion that European
democracy still has a long way to go. Often, they see the only solution in a greater
federalisation of the Union, lower member state influence in the organisation of the
European Parliament, the nomination of the European Commission and the legislative
process. In other words, according to European federalists, only a profound
institutional reform combined with large-scale change in public and elite attitudes
towards the European Union can save European parliamentary democracy from its
presentpredicament. On the other hand, scholars with a more sceptical view towards a
federal Europe see less urgency in such wide reaching reforms. Instead, they question
the feasibility of federalising Europe, doubt the importance attributed to political
representation at the European level and argue in favour of the status quo or even
scaling back the growing influence of the European Parliament in the legislative
process in the EU.
This thesis breaks with the impasse that normative differences between federalists
and their opponents have created. Instead, the thesis re-defines political representation
as a multi-dimensional concept that is not tied to a particular normative vision of how
European democracy should work. The thesis has drawn an empirical picture of the
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current state of affairs in terms of political representation in the EP and identified the
conditions under which representation occurs. This approach allows us to assess the
workings of the existing institutional set-up, predict the impact of different reform
proposals and improve the nature of political representation in the European Union
without requiring a massive attitude change on the part of the European public or the
creation of an ideal-type parliamentary democracy at the European level against the
will of most European citizens.
So what is the impact of institutional reform on representation? By analysing
variation in representational performance under a number of different what-if
scenarios, the model in this thesis can predict whose values and interests will be
represented best under several alternative reform proposals. For instance, one reform
could propose to eliminate open rule in committee and plenary. As we have seen,
open rule allows majority MEPs to amend or reject bills in committee and plenary
until they conform to the preferences of the majority on the plenary floor. Open rule
stacks the cards significantly in favour of the majority party groups, which have a
policy incentive to participate in committee decision-making and in policy-
formulation in the most desirable areas. Minority MEPs on the other hand sign up for
less salient reports but they focus their contribution in committee decision-making on
the most salient areas. In sum, open rule has opposite effects on representation at the
formulation and decision-making stages ofthe legislative process.
What would be the effect of a reform from open to closed rule in committee and
plenary~ First and most obviously, such a proposal would considerably increase the
policy incentive for MEPs to sign up for rapporteurships, especially in the most
salient areas. Without open rule, the rapporteurs alone would decide the content of
S Under closed rule, the rapporteur canpresent a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to co~ittee and plen~
without possibility of amendment, which would lend individual rapporteurs substantial agenda-setUnl
power.
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their reports, which would make participation in policy fonnulation one of the most
influential tasks in the EP.
Secondly, increasing the role of the rapporteur would reduce the power of the
committee floor and eliminate the incentive to participate in committee decision-
making, except on the closest votes, where a take-it-or-Ieave it proposal from the
rapporteur could run the risk of being rejected. In other words, closed rule would
transfer a large amount of influence from the decision-making to the policy
formulation stage in committee.
Third, such a shift in the relative importance of the two stages of the legislative
process would further increase the gate-keeping powers of party groups. As reports
become more desirable, MEPs will try to please the party leadership, which has the
power to allocate reports among its members. A change from open to closed rule
would make party groups even more cohesive than they are at present.
Finally, eliminating the committee majority's power to amend reports would
reduce differences in incentives for majority and minority groups at the policy
formulation stage. Under open rule, minority groups write less desirable reports
because they have no policy incentive to bid against the majority groups for the most
salient reports. A switch to closed rule would give all groups equal incentives to bid
on the most desirable reports. To the extent that there is significant overlap in
constituency preferences across party groups, this would increase the likelihood of
'bidding wars' among the group co-ordinators in committee. As a result, the average
price of a report would increase and many of the smaller groups (including the ELDR
which assumes a pivotal role in the present arrangements) would be 'priced out' of
policy formulation in the most salient areas.
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A second potential reform proposal would be to replace the proportional element
at the policy formulation stage with a more majoritarian report allocation procedure.
In terms of Ankersmit's (2002) distinction between the Anglo-Saxon and the
continental European conceptions of political representation (see Chapter 1), this
would constitute a significant move away from the consensual quest for a juste milieu
towards a more adversarial political style.
As Chapter 5 has shown, the proportional allocation procedure at present
guarantees a significant level of involvement in policy formulation to all party groups.
Replacing proportionality with majoritarian allocation would further stack the cards in
favour of the majority coalition in committee and plenary (see also Hix, 2005; 2006).
Coupled with open rule, such an arrangement would grant a disciplined parliamentary
majority a monopoly over policy formulation and decision-making and tum the
European Parliament into a much more politicised body, very similar to some national
assemblies (e.g. the House of Commons). Figure 7.2 illustrates the predicted impact
of such a reform on the representational performance of the three largest party groups
in the fifth European Parliament.
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First of all, such a reform would significantly weaken the link between
executive and national party delegations in the European Parliament in favour of the
trans-national party groups, which are already the primary players in policy
fonnulation and decision-making. Increased investiture powers for the EP would
eliminate one of the most striking 'abnormalities' in the European Parliament: the
difference between legislative-executive relations and party group coalitionformation.
Onthe positive side, this would lend additional coherence to European policy and the
legislative behaviour of MEPs. On the downside, however, it would also remove one
of the main sources of representational 'mobility' across the different stages of the
legislative process. As the findings have shown, there is considerable inequality in the
representational performance of MEPs, national parties, party groups and countries.
This inequality is mitigated by the fact that different legislators have different
representational performance records at different stages of the legislative process.
Unifying legislative-executive relations and coalition formation in the EP would
eliminate one of the sources of this mobility.
Second, the proposal would have a profound impact on political representation
at Question-Time. Politicising the Commission increases incentives for minority
MEPs to monitor the executive and to raise public questions about its actions,
encourages the use of planted questions among majority MEPs and raises the
occurrence of exchanges of a purely party-political nature. This would liven up
Question-Time considerably and bring it a step closer to the British Prime Minister's
Questions (PMQ) after which it was originally modelled. At the same time, a
politically charged Question-Time presents few incentives for minority MEPs to raise
issues of concern to their constituents. In Figure 7.3. the main minority group (PES)
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suffers from a reform that increases the role of party groups in Commission
investiture whereas the majority groups EPP and ELDR benefit. Last but not least, the
reform proposal would constitute a large step towards the creation of a Europe with a
much more federal institutional set-up, for which there is little support at the present
time.
This section has discussed a number of reform proposals in the EP and their likely
effect on the political representation of European citizens. The theory in Chapter 2 can
help inform political decision-makers about the impact of different reform proposals
on legislative incentives at all three stages of the policy process, the
representativeness of legislative business in the EP and the responsiveness of MEPs.
The next (and final) section goes beyond the European Parliament to identify a
number of avenues for future research and possible extensions of the theory
developed here.
III. Beyond the European Parliament: Avenues for Future
Research
The theory developed in this thesis has generated a number of predictions
about the link. between political representation and legislative behaviour in the
European Parliament. As such, it helps us understand the way political representation
in the European Parliament works and how it can be improved by altering the
institutional and party-political incentives in which legislative behaviour takes place
througbout the policy process. This section discusses opportunities for further
research to go beyond the model described here.
First, extensions of the thesis could provide a better und~ding of the linkages
between different stages of the policy process and across time. There are indications
that legislative behaviour may have changed significantly over time as a result of
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gradual accretion of powers in the EP. As Kreppel (2002) notes in her study of the
evolution of institutional reform in the EP, for example:
"when the EP was without direct legislative power and unable to
effectively influence policy outcomes, the party groups had little need
or desire to exert strict control over their membership" (quoted in
Scully, 2005).
As the chapter on policy formulation has shown, party group gate-keeping is a
significant explanatory factor in the legislative participation and specialisation
decisions of MEPs. Growing cohesion should have decreased the incentive for
minority groups to use their bidding points in committee on the most salient reports.
Other things constant, lower competition for salient reports should have decreased the
number of "biddingwars" over time and the average "price" of reports. However, this
evolution might be partially occluded by the simultaneous increase in political
competition along the left-right spectrum at all stages of the legislative process in the
European Parliament. By incorporating a larger time frame, further research could
trace the development of the power of party groups over their members and its effect
onpolitical representation at different stagesofthe legislative process.
Second, future research could compare the definition and operationalisation of
political representation in this thesis with the results of existing studies on the EP.
How does the legislative behaviour of MEPs compare with their understanding of
their own roles within the Parliament? A large numberofstudies have investigated the
attitudes and role perceptions of legislators (e.g. Scully, 2005; Taggart and Bale,
2005). Further research in this direction could establish a link between the, thus far,
separate research programmes on representational role perceptions and legislative
behaviour. Bycombining the results of these studies with the findings presented here,
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we can investigate to what extent the stated opinions of MEPs about different policy
areas reflect their legislative participation and specialisation at different stages of the
policy process. In addition, such comparisons might lead to recommendations for
improving the structure of existing survey instruments such as the EPRG MEP survey.
Finally, the model of political representation developed here can easily be
extended to a large number of different institutional and party-political contexts in
Europe and elsewhere. The availability of party manifesto data across time, electoral
settings and countries facilitates a comparative study ofpolitical representation akin to
the proliferation of roll-call voting studies, which have greatly improved our
knowledge of legislative politics across the world. Such a cross-country or time series
study would help us understand why elected representatives do what they do once
elected, which institutional and party-political incentives inform their behaviour and
howthey interact with their electorate at different stages of the legislative process.
This thesis has demonstrated that political representation is a direct function of
the legislative participation and specialisation decisions of individual representatives.
These decisions, in turn, are determined by the party-political and institutional
incentives at different stages of the policy process. As one of the interviewees in
Scully's study on institutional socialisation in the EP explains, people adapt to what
they see as a rational course ofaction (Scully, 2005).
To some, including some legislators themselves, this conclusion may perhaps
come as a disappointment. To euro-sceptics, the seeming irrationality of MEP
behaviour confirmed the idea that the EUropean Parliament is an ineffective, pro-
European talking shop where vast sums of money are wasted on politicians who, in
some cases, don't even bother showing up for their plenary sessions or committee
meetings. To europhiles, on the other hand, it may come as a surprise that MEPs
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engage and specialise in the EP less out of idealism and enthusiasm for the European
project than for their own political bene~t. Finally, the fmdings also contradict the
conclusions of some academic research that advances different motivations for
legislative behaviour, such as institutional socialisation.
For the vast majority of people, however, the conclusion that political
representation can be modelled as a result of rational legislative behaviour is good
news. Over time, the European Parliament has gradually increased its role as the
European Union's legislative branch. As pointed out in the introduction to this thesis,
this parliamentarization of the EU is in sharp contrast with the relative loss of
influence of national legislatures. In a recent study, Rittberger (2005) goes even
further to see the parliamentarization of the EU as a response to the de-
parliamentarization of that is happening in most industrial societies. In this context, if
parliamentary democracy is to survive, the European Parliament must become an
effective vehicle for democratic representation.
The findings in this thesis confirm that, given the right incentive structure,
democratic representation at the supranational level is perfectly possible. The thesis
demonstrates that the requirements for effective democratic representation are
significantly lower than some may have thought. As Norris (1999, pg. 86) points out,
"the process of recruitment, determining who becomes an MEP, is likely to shape the
decision-making and legitimation functions ofthe European Parliament". The studyof
legislative behaviour in this thesis suggests that there is at least one additional source
of legitimacy in legislative politics: even with a weak electoral connection (as in the
European Parliament), rational legislators remain tied to the institutional and party-
political incentives that govern legislative activities at different stages of the policy
process. Government for and of the people is determined by the incentives that
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structure the participation and specialisation decisions of individual MEPs. The
objective for scientific research must be to identify the conditions for effective
political representation, and help create an institutional and party-political
environment that aligns the incentives of individual legislators and their parties with
theinterests of constituents.
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